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ABSTRACT
THE GRAND DESIGN: AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY, 1960-1968
SEPTEMBER 198 9
THOMAS W. ZEILER, B.A., EMORY UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Stephen E. Pelz
This study analyzed the history of American foreign
trade policy during the administrations of Presidents John
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Four levels-of analysis
(international, governmental, societal, and individual)
provided a framework to explore two historiographical
problems: the decision-making power structure of U.S.
trade policy formulation and the aims, motives, and results
of this policy. The campaign for the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 served as a basis for testing four models of
decision-making: bureaucratic, corporatist, interest
group, and inter-branch. The models were tested in the
specific issue areas of textiles, lumber, oil, and carpets
and glass. These commodities also were used to validate
the interpretations of the "hegemony" or the "comparative-
advantage" schools of thought regarding the aims and
effects of American trade policy. Under the auspices of
the Kennedy Round negotiations of the General Agreement on
vi
Tariffs and Trade, trade relations with the European
Economic Community were the overall focus of the debate
between the two schools, but bilateral trade with Japan,
Asian less-developed countries, Canada, and Venezuela
assumed primary importance depending on the commodity. The
inter-branch model, and to a lesser extent pressure from
interest groups, was found to determine decision-making on
trade matters
.
The assumptions of the comparative-
advantage school generally were most accurate in describing
the motives and results of U.S. trade policy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the pre-dawn hours of 30 June 1967, Special
Representative for Trade Negotations William M. Roth sat in
his Washington office talking on the telephone. On the
other end of the line was his deputy and chief trade
negotiator, W
.
Michael Blumenthal , who stood ready in
Geneva, Switzerland to relay news concerning last-minute
developments at the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. The Round was about to be officially
concluded and signed in just two hours. Both men feared
another crisis that might delay the end of the trade talks,
which had their roots in policy initiated by President John
F. Kennedy five years before and which had suffered
numerous delays, conflicts, and problems. It was still
dark in the United States when the conference came to a
1
close. Roth and Blumenthal could now finally relax.
Over the next several days, the administration of
President Lyndon B. Johnson hailed the Kennedy Round as a
great, successful endeavor. Yet nobody noted one critical
fact. The negotiations signaled the end of America's sole
predominance over the postwar international trade order.
The 1960s were a critical decade in world trade
relations. Closing the period of post-World War II
reconstruction, the era opened a new chapter in the role of
the United States abroad. Transformations within the
global economic system, that is, the waning of U.S.
1
supremacy in the world economy, compelled the country to
reassess its outworn trade policies. Undisputedly
predominant for the past fifteen years, America now
suffered a decline in its capabilities to control the trade
order due primarily to a challenge emanating from Europe.
Established in 1957, the European Economic Community,
also called the EEC, Common Market or the Six, had provoked
two responses from American observers . First, this customs
union scared them because of its competitive commercial
potential in and outside of Europe and its protective,
unitary external tariff which threatened to constrict U.S.
exports. But second, the EEC was attractive; its
tremendous market
,
promise of growth, and future political
unity could profit all traders , stimulate national
economies, and strengthen the Western alliance.
The Common Market prompted such a complete
reappraisal of Washington's postwar approach to Europe that
Kennedy chose a foreign trade bill, the Trade Expansion Act
(TEA) , as the centerpiece of his New Frontier legislative
agenda of 1962. Along with it, he offered the "Grand
Design", a comprehensive diplomatic blueprint for forging
an Atlantic partnernship with Europe. The economic part of
this plan was trade liberalization, an area of inquiry
suffering neglect by historians at the expense of security
matters. Liberal trade depended on passage of the TEA,
which granted Kennedy the necessary authority to lower
2
trade barriers on a reciprocal basis with the Six and other
nations
.
The implication of these trade negotiations to
international relations and America's ebbing power reached
much further than the economic realm, however. At the
heart of U.S. trade policy from 1960 to 1968 were
considerations which influenced the course of Western
diplomacy and the very success or failure of American
foreign policy. Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B.
Johnson, banked on the liberalization of trade to stem the
increased political chafing among the allies that might
scribble the Grand Design before it got off the drawing
board. By the dawn of the 1960s, a "plural squirming
world" had replaced the American-centered trade order of
2the early postwar years. The way the United States
confronted its vitiated global position through its foreign
trade policy is the focus of this study.
This history addresses the central historiographical
debate in American foreign relations concerning the
motives, aims, process, effects, and power structure in
U.S. decision-making. On these issues, an "hegemony" school
of historians confronts a "comparative-advantage" school.
The former emphasizes Washington's self-interested, over-
bearing behavior in the global economic order which
profited corporate America at the expense of other
nations.^ The proclivity toward overproduction and
3
underconsumption in the economy impelled the government to
search for foreign markets as a "safety valve" to
depressions and other problems. This expansion gave the
U.S. direct or informal control of the global marketplace
through international lending agencies, military alliances,
postwar recovery programs, and the development (or
underdevelopment) of less-developed countries (LDCs)
.
America had become the world's top imperialist.
The U.S., though pledging to promote liberal trade, was
deceptively restrictive, claim hegemony scholars
.
Washington permitted the free exchange of goods only when
it possessed a distinct comparative advantage, while it
tried to bar imports which competed successfully with U.S.
products. In effect, the professed ideal of an open,
multilateral trading system, the foundation of the Grand
Design, was a rhetorical disguise to hide America's real
intention of garnering mounting profits and preserving its
dominance over Europe and others
.
The comparative-advantage historians argue, however,
that American magnanimity best epitomized U.S. trade
policy.'^ They offer a multi-causal analysis which agrees
with the hegemony assertion that Washington pursued trade
expansion as a palliative to domestic economic problems.
Yet other factors shaped American decisions, such as
strategic aims, actions by foreign countries, humanitarian
impulses to help less fortunate nations, and pressures from
4
the electorate and Congress. These elements kept the reins
of trade policy in government, not private, hands.
This school praises U.S. trade policy, alleging that
America promoted mutual benefits, on the basis of
comparative advantage, for all traders in the international
order. The Grand Design translated into an Atlantic
system, albeit led from Washington, which accepted the
realities of the rising power status of Europe, and so
equality among all members. Self-interest was naturally
prevalent; America required trade expansion in order to
finance its overseas military and aid commitments. But
Western security and the prosperity or development of all
capitalist nations depended on economic growth through
commerce. Having, in fact, experienced discrimination by
Europe before and just after the war, the U.S. tried to
ensure that trade opportunities remained available in the
international economic system.
In order to address the normative split between the two
schools, this study explores policy at four levels-of-
analysis : international, governmental, political economy,
and individual.^ At the international level, the study of
"regimes" serves as a medium to examine trade relations.
Regime analysis posits that nations are not autonomous
actors in an anarchical world but function in an
interdependent arena of economic transactions,
institutions, and domestic factors. States form regimes
5
when they perceive that gains will most likely accrue
through cooperation rather than unilateralism. One example
is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , the
negotiating forum for postwar trade agreements under U.S.
leadership .
^
GATT provided a set of principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures for cooperation among its
members
.
Though liberal trade was its guiding principle,
GATT permitted protectionist measures to safeguard domestic
economic stability from injury due to trade barrier
reduction which clearly clashed with this aim . For
instance , the regime allowed for regional discrimination by
the EEC and exempted many U.S. farm goods from trade
bargaining . Without such exceptions , few countries would
have joined GATT. In other words, there was no commitment
to free -trade orthodoxy; compromises between liberal trade
and protectionism superceded the ideal of laissez-faire
7 ...
competition. This underlying tension exists m
American trade policy and generates several hypotheses-
questions at the international level concerning America's
maintenance of the GATT regime. Did the U.S. maintain the
openness or closure of the regime? Did GATT remain liberal
or become protectionist and fragmented into hostile blocs?
What international economic or foreign political decisions
affected American leadership over the trade order? Did
America selfishly seek to preserve its dominance through
6
the rhetoric of liberal trade, or did Washington pursue a
more pluralistic Western power alignment through the
promotion of mutual benefits in the trade regime? How did
other traders, particulary the Common Market, react to U.S.
initiatives?
A host of variables at the governmental and societal
levels-of -analysis played, moreover, a large part in
determining U.S. trade policy in the international arena.
Policymakers reached decisions at the intersection of
external and internal pressures. The decentralized and
diffused political system of the American power structure
permitted access to politically open issues like trade
gpolicy from many other sources besides foreign ones
.
At the governmental level , bureaucratic politics , or
bargaining between departmental elites within the Executive
branch, may explain decision-making . Individuals compete
for control over the trade agenda, "pulling and hauling" in
the policy process according to their organizational
affiliation. Bureaucratic politics usually results in a
reconciliation of these differing viewpoints and a mix of
strategies and ideas distinct from the recommendations of
any single participant. Because a wide spectrum of
interests in America take part in trade, however, the model
falls short in explaining interest intermediation, or the
process by which resources within society are
distributed. In other words, a multiplicity of actors,
7
not just governmental participants, take part in the policy
process
.
The domestic political economy level-of
-analysis
describes internal socio-economic factors in trade,
including the import or export orientation of agricultural
and industrial interests and the level of protection given
to importers. Interests divided into two sectors: trade-
biased export-competitors and protection-biased import-
competitors
.
^"^ Capital-intensive firms, surplus commodity
producers, and Big Labor, typified the former group, which
sought lower trade barriers in order to increase access to
foreign markets . Import-competitors were declining,
inefficient producers which suffered competition from low-
wage nations. They urged protectionism, hoping to arrest
their deteriorating position in the domestic marketplace.
Which producers were most vocal, what they stood to gain
or lose in trade, and by what means the two sectors
influenced governmental decisions were of critical import
in interest intermediation. These issues are also central
to the hegemony-comparative-advantage stand-off. The
former claims that the decision-making structure in trade
was elitist in that government and business interests
bypassed the democratic process and decisions were
12
determined by socio-economic standing.
The corporatist model penetrates elitism by exploring
capitalist organization and ideology. Corporatism is the
8
informal or formal cooperation between the goverment and
export -minded groups in society - big industries and firms,
labor, and agriculture. The government sought to minimize
conflict between interest groups by rationalizing the
marketplace and offering them protection from the vagaries
of business cycles. Meanwhile, like the hegemony school
argues, entrenched capital-intensive producers, by assuming
control of the trade policy process
,
preserved their
oligopolistic positions in the U.S. and international
economies. Skewed in its representation of societal
interests , trade channeled benefits into discrete sectors
13
which ensured large profits for corporate America.
In contrast to the corporatist consensus, the pluralist
framework points to an amalgam of rival private and public
actors whose divergence over trade goals exhibited a
. . 14fragmented and competitive decision-making process. In
trade, pluralism naturally focuses on Congress, since
commerce was a "pocketbook" issue on which private groups
spent millions of dollars lobbying in Washington. Because
of its electoral accountability and role in passing or
rejecting trade legislation. Congress provided the lever
for interest groups to pressure the government."'"^
Pluralists propose a model of "regulatory politics", in
which interest groups competed for benefits from trade
policy. The passage of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934,
the basic legislation for all postwar trade bills,
9
transferred authority for negotiating tariff levels from
Congress to the president. This change reduced the
leverage enjoyed by interest groups in setting tariff
rates, the most glaring example of their power being the
disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. From 1934
onward, interests vied with each other and confronted
Congress over the allocation of tariffs in a battle which
yielded winners and losers. The interaction between
interest groups and Congress explained the trade policy
decision-making process .
^
Pluralists offer "interbranch politics" as another
paradigm . Bargaining occurred between the president and
Congress, which took cues from special interests but
prevented log-rolling . Though Congress represented import-
competitors and the president export -competitors and
broader strategic and economic interests , both acted in
unison. In trade, the president looked to Capitol Hill
when formulating trade bills, while Congress looked to the
White House, not private lobbies. Mutual cooperation,
trust, and sensitivity yielded the president more
discretion over trade if he responded adequately to
17
congressional concerns
.
These models of interest intermediation rely also on the
fourth level-of-analysis - the individual decision-makers'
perceptions of his external and internal environments.
This cognitive process level factors together the
10
experiences, values, and influences which indicated why a
leader reacted to the trade environment overseas and the
political economy at home in a certain way, and if his
response was consistent or not with practical political
considerations. That is, the ideological orientations and
assumptions of U.S. leaders in trade affected their
domestic political agenda-setting, their negotiating
stance, and their approach to the decline in American
18power
.
The models and levels offer several testable hypotheses-
19questions m the trade decision-making process.
Bureaucratic politics hypothesizes that infighting,
bargaining, and eventual compromise among Executive branch
elites characterized the decision process . Is an
understanding of Executive branch divisions sufficient for
understanding trade policy? What are the differences in
trade ideology and policy preferences among bureaucratic
rivals? Who won and who lost the debates?
Corporatists claim that collaboration between business
elites, trade sectors, and government officials skewed
policy-making and won benefits for capital-intensive groups
in the economy. What coalitions of sectoral interests
joined their public sector counterparts to influence
decision-making? Was there a consensus among private
interests which, working through government leaders, sought
liberal trade for the benefit of big business? Did this
11
partnership extend to the international community through
class alliances or combinations with similar ideological
and political-economic objectives?
Pluralists assume conflict and competition was prevalent
in American society. The regulatory politics model posits
that interest groups possessed much leverage over Congress
in the trade bargaining process. Does trade policy reflect
those interests which had the greatest access^ economic
resources, organizational skills, or whose survival was at
stake? Is the private sector the critical decisional
arena? What interests pressured the government, and did
they succeed?
Interbranch politics supposes that bargaining between a
relatively autonomous Congress and the president epitomized
decision-making. Did Congress make a difference in debates
within the Executive branch and did the Executive branch
have a similar impact in Congress? What did each branch
seek? Did each accommodate or oppose the objectives of the
other, and what accounted for their actions? How was an
accommodation between the two eventually reached?
Finally, the individual's perceptions of the internal
and external environment and his background helped shape
policy. Who were the key decision-makers? What was their
trade ideology? What shaped their views on trade policy?
Did a conflict exist between their trade ideology and
practical politics?
12
The conceptual framework for testing the models,
exploring the four levels-of
-analysis
, and addressing the
historiographical debate centers on the inherent dualism of
liberalism and protectionism in trade. Especially
applicable to Kennedy and Johnson, this two-dimensional
policy is termed the "fair-trade" doctrine. The doctrine
enabled U.S. policy-makers to reduce trade barriers while
protecting domestic sectors hurt by imports.
The first part of the fair-trade approach concerned
trade liberalization
. Lowering trade barriers boosted
exports
,
thereby spurring national growth, funding overseas
cuommitments which burdened the U.S. balance-of-payments,
and unifying the West into a viable force in the cold war
.
In practice
,
Kennedy and Johnson used the fair-trade
doctrine to seek advantages for all traders , often
sacrificing protection of U.S. producers for the good of
the global capitalist trade order. But through a process
of hard bargaining with America's trade partners at GATT
negotiations, America hoped to produce mutually equitable
amd reciprocal trade agreements
.
Yet liberal trade confronted domestic economic and
political realities. Conditions in Massachusetts and Texas
sparked Kennedy's and Johnson's awareness of the injurious
effects of imports on several industries. Thus, the other
half of the fair-trade doctrine hinged on protection of
import-competitors. Kennedy adopted a novel scheme in his
13
Trade Expansion Act called adjustment assistance which
avoided trade restrictions in favor of unemployment
compensation and job retraining. Since the measure would
not be put in effect until the TEA passed, however, Kennedy
backed selective restrictions of imports and promised
American prudent trade negotiations with strict adherence
to reciprocity to help declining import interests and win
meaningful concessions for exporters
•
Fair-trade thus required juggling local, national, and
foreign imperatives in order to expand commerce without
injury to domestic interests. In sum, the doctrine sought
trade based on comparative advantage while reserving to
each country a degree of autonomy to respond to domestic
pressures. Such an approach was in accord with GATT
principles. Fair-trade was a balancing act between meeting
the challenge of the Common Market by stressing the
maintenance of the GATT liberal trade regime, and
cushioning America from the effects of its declining global
power. Guided by the doctrine, American leaders set out to
address the sweeping changes in the international economic
order
.
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CHAPTER 1
SEEDS OF THE FAIR-TRADE DOCTRINE, 1945-1960
American foreign trade policy in the 1960s was,
naturally, an outgrowth of the initiatives of earlier
presidents. They built the framework and set the ideology
of the postwar trade regime, in which recovery and aid
programs gave way to a policy of expanding and freeing up
trade. But domestic economic and political pressures
constrained liberalization plans. Falling global tariff
barriers and other controls helped increase markets for
U.S. exports, but imports rose even faster. Protectionism
in the country heightened as Western Europe, and later the
united Common Market
,
emerged as America' s chief
competitor, and as the economy showed signs of strain by
the 1950s. Thus, while national leaders pressed for free-
trade, they also tried to address domestic economic
problems caused, in part, by lower trade barriers.
Kennedy articulated these dual concerns with his fair-
trade doctrine. His record in Congress demonstrated a
clearly thought out policy of balancing export and import-
competing aims. The development of the trade regime, U.S.
commercial legislation, the effects of trade on the
American political economy and Kennedy's approach to the
issues before assuming the presidency revealed the
continuities and differences between the future New
Frontier and previous administrations. A survey of the
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four levels-of
-analysis during the period 1945-1960
therefore explains the basis of the American trade agenda
of the 1960s and how the country began to address its
declining power
.
America's slipping status during that decade signified a
change from the immediate post -World War II era. Though it
had expended enormous sums of capital and had suffered over
a million casualties during the war, the U.S. enjoyed more
wealth than ever before once peace arrived. In contrast,
the other pre-war powers lay economically prostrate
. Thus
,
Washington assumed the burden of their economic
reconstruction by attempting to stabilize exchange rates
and re -build trade . Recovery was doubly important as the
cold war began, and steadfast allies were needed to fight
international communism. In sum, the U.S. emerged as the
world's chief banker, supplier of goods, and postwar
economic planner; the predominant power in the global
political economy
.
The trade order consequently reflected American design
of economic liberalism, of which three elements were
prominent. First was the traditional open door policy, or
an emphasis on seeking equal access for all nations in
world markets. Second, to ensure the open door, the U.S.
insisted on multilateral trade agreements based on
unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment; that is,
a pledge of non-discrimination which granted to all the
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benefits of concessions reached by two countries in
bilateral negotiations. Third, liberalism sought trade
based on comparative advantage but permitted exemptions
from free-trade as safeguards for domestic producers and as
a fulfillment of obligations in pre-existing imperial trade
systems
.
Economic and political calculations undergirded these
principles. Though its economy did not depend on foreign
trade -exports averaged only 4.3% of the gross national
product from 1945 to 1970 - America feared a recurrence of
the trade wars which were partly to blame for worsening the
Great Depression and ushering in autarkic conditions that
led to World War II. The cold war had a critical influence
in the push for liberal trade, too. The U.S. advocated
free-trade not only to fuel domestic growth but because
expanded commerce enriched national economies and thus
bolstered Western security. Seeking economic liberalism in
order to alleviate world dollar shortages, America even
permitted discrimination against its own goods through
foreign import and export controls in order to bind the
2
alliance
.
In 1947, America introduced the institutional mechanisms
which formalized its trade ideology and political goals.
Because of protectionist opposition at home and abroad, the
International Trade Organization, the overseer of the new
trade order, never got off the drawing board. Though not
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as comprehensive, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in Geneva, Switzerland became the forum for
trade negotiations, A victory for liberal traders, GATT
comprised twenty nations which agreed to trade on a MFN
basis. Meanwhile, the regime permitted exceptions to the
MFN rule by allowing customs unions, free trade areas, and
loopholes by which countries might "escape" from trade
agreements in order to protect domestic producers,
3Washxngton hoped to limit these exceptions.
The first round of GATT in 1947 initiated sweeping
tariff reductions, due mostly to the American Reciprocal
Trade Act (RTA) of 1945 which cut U.S. tariff rates an
average of 25% (the lowest in a century) and started a boom
in world trade. The next GATT rounds in 194 9 and 1951, and
meetings in 1955, lowered duties but dealt primarily with
the accession of new members. Actually, the era of large
tariff reductions ended in the early 1950s, as more
restrictive RTAs permitted only modest decreases at the
fourth (1956) and fifth (1962) GATT rounds. By the mid-
1950s, the U.S. Congress hoped to freeze tariff levels
until the burgeoning imports from the recovering allies
4
were adequately addressed
.
Even though these allies discriminated against American
goods, stagnating global commerce during the recovery
period prompted Washington to encourage trade
liberalization among the Western European powers. The U.S.
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hoped to free up the region's trade and payments system
through the Marshall Plan, the European Payments Union,
which was a clearing house for financing trade, and the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
Despite the fact that these forums existed at the expense
of U.S. exports, the three provided for the permanent
elimination of European bilateralism, removed import
quotas, and, meeting a top American aim, enhanced regional
integration. The union of Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg (Benelux) in 1948 and the Schuman Plan of 1952
which formed the European Coal and Steel Community,
indicated progress toward the latter goal, and the European
5Economic Community marked its achievement
.
Established by the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, the
Common Market was more than a trade bloc. The EEC sought
an intimate union among diverse European nations
,
drawing
the economies of Benelux, France, Italy, and West Germany
together by removing internal barriers to trade,
investment, and mobility of capital and labor. Europeans
hoped the customs union, which within a decade became the
world's largest trading unit, would "spill-over" into a
supranational federation which would henceforth discourage
a renewal of Franco-German hostilities, build Europe into a
potent adversary of Soviet expansionism, and overcome the
overwhelming dominance of the United States in the region.
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For the sake of strengthening its economic base, the
Common Market tacitly backed trade discrimination against
non-Community members in foreign trade. The EEC installed
a common external tariff and a deadline of 1973 by which
each nation would average in its tariff levels to this
unitary rate. Accordingly, high-tariff France and Italy
and low-tariff Benelux and Germany proceeded to harmonize
their duties, though reduction of quantitative barriers to
imports progressed less rapidly. The Six also expended
much effort in constructing the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)
,
a protectionist levy and quota system. Indeed, by
protecting its markets, the EEC served notice that in the
future, European trading rights would take precedence over
the commercial objectives of all outsiders, including
America
.
Backing up this determined policy was an emerging
powerful economy which gave the EEC the capability of
competing with, or out-competing, the United States and
others in trade. From 1938 to 1964, the aggregate gross
national product (GNP) of Western Europe as a whole
increased by 85% - industrial output alone increased two
and one-half times. By itself, the EEC generated $165
billion in goods and services, or about one-third of U.S.
production. Yet in real purchasing power, the output of
the Six was nearly one-half of America's, and the gap was
closing rapidly. EEC steel production, for instance, rose
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from 36.6 to 62.9 million tons from 1952-1959, while
American output stagnated at 84.8 to 84.5 million tons.
Industrial production in the Common Market in 1960, for the
first time, bested that of the United States. In sum, the
growth rate of all the EEC nations from 1953 to 1960 was
45%; the U.S. lagged at 15%.
The European challenge to America in trade paralleled
the impressive gains in production. The exports of Western
Europe as a whole outpaced the region's production and
world trade during 1938-1964. The U.S. remained the single
largest trader nation, but the combined Six outstripped
America in trade volume by 1960. While the growth of EEC
trade exceeded the rates recorded during the Golden Age of
Europe from 1870 to 1913, moreover, U.S. commerce grew
slower in the 1950s than during the pre-1914 period.
Furthermore, as the American share of manufactured exports
among industrial nations fell from 23.9% in 1953 to 21.3%
in 1959, the Common Market countries' percentage rose to
43% by 1959, almost doubling from 1948.
More telling, the U.S. -EEC economic relationship was in
the midst of a transformation which favored the latter.
Washington's export edge was three times that of Europe to
America in the early postwar years. By 1960, this
advantage was less than double. The American world
merchandise trade surplus soared in the 1950s to $4.9
billion in 1960, but that of the Six rose also. But a U.S.
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balance-of
-payments deficit also emerged by the late 1950s,
resulting in mounting European holdings of American gold,
which, in turn, were a mark of increased EEC leverage in
international affairs. The Common Market also enjoyed a
steadily growing share of exports to America throughout the
1950s, while EEC imports declined from across the
gAtlantic
.
American leaders regarded the EEC with both satisfaction
and apprehension. Clearly, U.S. recovery plans had been
successful, since Europe now stood economically solid on
its own feet
.
The Coimnon Market represented, however, the
construction of a trade rival. However minor exports were
to the functioning of the American economy, the U.S. viewed
this competition seriously, especially since trade was a
means of achieving a top objective of U.S. foreign policy
:
unity within the Western alliance. The cold war prompted
this goal. The Soviet economic challenge, Moscow's
impressive industrial and technological growth, and an
effective propaganda campaign disturbingly foretold of
9
communist inroads in Europe and around the globe.
In the meantime, signs in the Western alliance pointed
to a rocky road ahead in relations among the Atlantic
powers. The return of General Charles de Gaulle to power
in France implied a trend toward European independence.
Paris still simmered, moreover, over what it viewed as ill
treatment by America during the Suez crisis. Chancellor
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Konrad Adenauer of West Germany demanded a greater role in
decisions on nuclear weapons. West Germany amd France
hoped to propel Europe into a more decisive role in global
politics and in wriggling free from Americais hold. The
U.S. seemed like an occasional bully to Britain. Though
London cherished its "special relationship" with the U.S.,
the American slap on the wrist during the Suez crisis had
humiliated Britain. In trade, furthermore, Britain formed
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) a trade bloc in
direct opposition to the Common Market and to U.S.
, . 10designs
.
The development in 195 9 of the seven-nation EFTA
threatened America' s unifying strategy. Washington
vigorously opposed the EFTA because the "Outer Seven"
resisted political integration. The Association also had
no common tariff which linked members on an intimate
economic basis in a similar fashion to the Common Market
countries. London's proposal in 1959 to fuse the EFTA to
the EEC also drew American fire. The U.S. feared that both
might gang up to discriminate against American exports and
neglect the political integration of Europe, thereby
dividing the global trade regime and undermining the
... 11
alliance
.
Thus, America sought the evolution of outward-looking,
"trade-creating" European trade partners instead of
preferential "trade-diverting" blocs. Customs unions built
34
up their tariffs for the mutual protection of each member,
reasoned American leaders. The EEC opposed trade
restrictions, yet there was no substantive assurance in its
treaty that such would be the case. As economist Bela
Belassa told Congress, without multilateral duty cuts on
manufactured goods, the elimination of internal tariffs in
the EEC would lead to discrimination against U.S. exports.
Thus, Washington prodded Europe to tailor its trade
policies to the broad, unifying objectives of the alliance
instead of frustrating American designs through
. ^ . . 12protectionxsm.
European integration was the major, but not the only,
development in the trade regime which undercut American
postwar dominance. The U.S. transformed Japan into a close
ally by reorienting its commerce away from the Pacific
basin, granting its goods liberal treatment , and overcoming
European opposition to Japan's accession to GATT . Japanese
trade boomed because of this benevolent treatment. Most
significant , U.S. -Japan trade began to favor the latter
.
Washington enjoyed a three and one-half time growth in
exports to Japan during the 1950s, but imports from Tokyo
multiplied more than six-fold. Ranked thirteenth among
exporters to the U.S. in 1952, Japan climbed to second by
1960. Complaints from American import-competitors about
the Asian invasion of their markets, continued Japanese
trade discrimination, and, in 1960, Japan's first trade
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surplus with the U.S. since the war, compelled Tokyo to
adopt a comprehensive trade liberalization plan."^^
Trade between Canada and America also revealed fissures
by 1960. Both were each others' top markets, with the U.S.
holding a distinct advantage. The origin of nearly three-
quarters of Ottawa's imports in the 1950s, the U.S.
supplied over half of all major product groups except
textiles and petroleum. A trade deficit with America
notwithstanding, Canada occupied roughly over half of the
U.S. market. Washington envisioned a free-trade zone in
which commerce and investment promoted North American
interdependence, a policy not accepted until 1988 by both
countries, and denounced by many Canadians as U.S.
imperialism. Ottawa also protested injurious U.S. farm
surplus disposal programs and oil import quotas. Prime
Minister John Diefenbaker strained neighborly relations by
the late 1950s in seeking closer Commonwealth ties with
14Britain at the expense of U.S. trade.
The less-developed countries also started to rebel
against the postwar trade regime set up by America.
Arguing that the trade interests of rich and poor nations
were identical, the North basically ignored the special
problems of the less-developed South. The LDCs sought
exemptions from liberal trade to protect their infant
industries and development. But GATT excluded such
loopholes, and its insistence on MFN treatment was
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meaningless for the South, which had few concessions to
give in negotiations. Refusing to join GATT, many LDCs
tried to reform the system and later resorted to import
substitution, an inward-looking concentration on developing
domestic markets by industrialization and cutting off
foreign-made goods
.
By the late 1950s, it was apparent that this strategy of
international isolation had failed. Few LDCs manufactured
goods, and because many relied on only one commodity
(usually agricultural) for export, they were vulnerable to
falling world demand and prices. Also, import substitution
did not reduce imports. LDCs traded their crops for
expensive processed or semi -processed items of the North,
and these "terms of trade" failed to earn them enough hard
currency to import capital goods and construct an
industrial base . Industrialization stalled, trade
restrictions in the North increasingly plagued the LDCs,
and the Soviets stepped in with a plan to underwrite a
trade forum outside of GATT for the benefit of the Third
World. In response, a panel of GATT experts issued the
Haberler report in 1958, which recommended that the North
not insist on reciprocity in negotiations with the LDCs and
pledge to expand Third World exports. Poor nations
remained skeptical of the possibility of penetrating
15
Northern markets and competing in world trade.
37
Trade expansion in the LDCs had occurred since the war,
but was skewed. Manufactured exports were limited to
advanced LDCs, nearly two-thirds of these were Asian
(mostly from Hong Kong and India)
, and in only a few
specialized products like textiles, accounted for merely
15% of the Third World export total. Sales abroad did
climb from 1945 to 1960; Latin American exports rose by
22%, African by 42%, and Asian by a paltry 10%. Total
Southern exports registered a 29% increase. But global
trade patterns favored the North, which doubled LDC
exports. Only sales from the Middle East, where oil
spurred exports by 72%, increased more than the industrial
nations
.
Between 1950-1960, the LDC share of world exports
declined from 31 . 6% to 21 . 4% while the Northern share
climbed from 60.4% to 66.8%."^^
The policies of the Eisenhower administration did not
help matters. The President initiated aid programs such as
P.L. 480 or Food for Peace. Yet, these measures, along
with protective quotas on lead and zinc , oil , and textiles
,
retarded agricultural LDC development and exports and
helped U.S. exporters. For instance, only African exports
made gains in the American market while U.S. sales to the
LDCs rose. In 1960, Kennedy indicted Eisenhower for
failing to better Soviet investments in the LDCs and for
not helping these nations diversify their crops, form
common markets, and stabilize economically. In many
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respects, the LDCs were worse off after Ike's eight years
17in office
.
The most ominous legacy of Eisenhower's tenure, and one
that signalled a global power shift away from America, was
the U.S. balance-of
-payments deficit. The payments
statement records the total value of a country's
international economic transactions in current and capital
accounts. The former contains merchandise exports and
imports; expenditures and receipts for services such as
transportation and tourism; income from investment, and
government grants, military spending, and other
remittances. The capital account shows outflows and
inflows of financial assets
.
A payments deficit emerges
when the outflows from both accounts result in an excess of
debits over credits. A settlement must be made to balance
out the accounts, and often takes the form of gold flows.
Specifically, gold is drained in the case of a deficit. It
was the concern over gold outflows, caused by the payments
problem, that worried Eisenhower, A deficit undercut
America's ability to fund its overseas commitments.
Indeed, the U.S. ran a payments deficit almost every
year since 1950. But until a jump to $3.5 billion in 1958,
the deficit had been no more than $2.1 billion from 1950-
1957. Gold reserves dropped $2.3 billion in 1958, in
contrast to the annual outflow of $200 million since 1950.
Furthermore, only in 1957, an exceptional year for U.S.
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exports due to shortages in Europe induced by the Suez
Crisis, did the merchandise trade surplus of the mid- to
late 1950s climb above the marks set a decade before. In
addition, a quick domestic recovery from recession in 1958
prompted a high demand for imports in America. Thus, the
excess of exports over imports dropped to $3,4 billion in
1958 and hit bottom at $1.1 billion in 1959, though rising
in 1960 to $4.9 billion. Nevertheless, the overall
payments deficit in 1959 amounted to $4.2 billion and only
slightly improved in 1960 to $3.9 billion. The deficit
1
8
demanded action.
Taking the payments balance out of the red was
Eisenhower' s primary aim in foreign economic policy by the
late 1950s, but his remedies foundered. He tied foreign
loans to purchases in America, promoted aid and military
burden-sharing among the allies, and encouraged surplus
farm disposal. In trade, he urged export expansion and
helped form the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to facilitate Western cooperation on
economic problems. Washington also initiated the Dillon
Round of GATT in 1960 which brought unimpressive results
two years later. These efforts to reverse the payments
deficit generally fell short and required the country to
rethink, with an eye possibly toward curtailing, its
foreign policy goals.
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America's difficulties in financing objectives abroad,
increased friction with friendly nations, and changing
trade patterns which warranted an overhaul of the regime
were major themes in international trade. In effect, the
causes of the erosion of U.S. power were predictable. The
continuation of immediate postwar supremacy was a virtual
impossibility, especially once the reconstruction of the
industrial countries had been completed. But by the late
1950s, an erratic domestic economy exposed further evidence
of waning predominance.
In fact, sluggishness epitomized the U.S. economy as the
1950s closed. Growth slowed, outbursts of inflation
occurred periodically, and joblessness worsened relative to
the full employment levels in other nations
. Such
conditions had serious implications. Feeble productivity
at home undercut production of goods necessary for export
and also for domestic consumption. Indeed, if this trend
were reversed, the U.S could build a larger trade surplus
and hence reverse the payments deficit. Kennedy, in order
to highlight Republican failings, pointed out and perhaps
exaggerated these problems. But Eisenhower also wished to
boost growth and employment, while he lamented the halting
20
recovery of the economy in 1959 from recession
.
A factor hindering growth was trade competition, which
whittled away U.S. dominance in overseas markets. As the
merchandise trade surplus shrunk, so did exports of
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machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, textiles,
and steel. The U.S., for instance, became a net steel
importer by the late 1950s and European restrictions boded
ill for future trends. Farmers also sought more exports.
Under development in the EEC was, however, a restrictive
agricultural system which threatened to curb the sizable
bulk of American farm sales. For example, the Common
Market aimed to replace U.S. wheat in Germany and Benelux
with Italian and French grain, American rural protests
over these restrictions were somewhat disingenuous since
exporters enjoyed a system of government protection from
low world commodity prices. Along with other export-
competitors
,
though, farmers pushed for more access abroad
21
as the decade ended
.
Imports received much of the blame, though, for economic
problems. Farmers demanded curbs on foreign goods despite
the fact that imports declined throughout the 1950s. Many
manufacturers felt the impact of European and Japanese
recovery and pressure from the LDCs in the form of low-
priced imports . Cotton textile imports, for instance, more
than tripled from 1950 to 1960. Import-competitors claimed
such trends caused drops in production and worker lay-offs,
and that this stagnation further burdened the struggling
economy. Most critical to the future trade policy of the
1960s was, however, that their grievances, some calculated,
others more legitimate, received much play on Capitol Hill.
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Congress, in essence, qualified the commitment to
liberal trade. In general, legislators had learned from
the onerous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 that free-trade was
essential to peace and prosperity. Unlike Britain's
unilateral trade liberalization in the 1860s, however.
Congress made sure that the U.S. lowered tariffs solely on
a reciprocal basis under the Reciprocal Trade Acts starting
in 1934. Furthermore, Congress took as its base-point for
duty reduction the high Smoot-Hawley level, and not a more
reasonable reference, and also circumscribed the trade
liberalism of postwar presidents by attaching protective
23
clauses onto RTA bills.
These clauses were wide-spread . In 1947 , the "escape
clause" became a formal mechanism in trade negotiations and
along with the "peril point" provision, it emerged as a
permanent part of the trade program by 1951. The escape
clause, pursuant to investigations by the U.S. Tariff
Commission, permitted withdrawal of concessions from a
trade agreement which might injure an industry. The peril
point set a point at which such a concession, in the form
of a tariff cut, threatened injury. The extension of
Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1948, in
addition, imposed limits on commodity imports regardless of
prior agreements through a waiver from GATT, which
contradicted GATT principles. Congress weakened but
retained in 1954 the Buy American Act of 1933, which gave a
preference to American bidders for government orders. The
national security clause of 1955 permitted escape from a
trade agreement if an import reached such quantities that
it impaired the country's defense effort.^"^
The RTAs of the 1950s were so loaded down with these
devices that protectionists gained leverage in trade
policy. Eisenhower hailed his 1955 bill as a "tremendous
victory" for free-trade, but it called for tariff cuts of
only 15% when earlier RTAs provided for larger reductions.
The RTA of 1958 was even more of a retreat from liberal
trade. The bill enabled any domestic industry, regardless
of whether it was crucial to U.S. defense, to seek
protection under the national security provision, and
empowered Congress to override a presidential refusal to
invoke the escape clause. This RTA granted authority to
reduce tariffs by a meager 20%. Liberal traders blasted
the 1958 legislation, aimed at negotiating with the new EEC
over the next four years, as "the most protectionist
measure ever passed by Congress in all the Reciprocal Trade
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renewals since 1934 .
"
Eisenhower's difficulty in winning enough authority to
make tariff negotiations with Europe and other GATT members
worthwhile was a critical development. By the late 1950s,
the trade regime responded less than before to U.S.
prodding. Congress made liberalization efforts, which were
necessary to unite the West, aid LDCs, and inject the
American economy with a dose of export growth, more
problematical. Protectionists clashed with those who
accepted more imports as a requisite for boosting exports.
Recognizing the tricky balance between protectionism and
tariff reduction were many congressmen who criticized
Eisenhower's outworn, ineffective, and to some,
disappointing, approach to liberal trade policy. Among
them was Senator John F. Kennedy.
Kennedy was the consummate fair-trader. He formulated
his presidential trade policy while in Congress by
reconciling the economic, and political, realities in
import-competing Massachusetts with the national program of
liberal trade. Foreign commerce, wrote future economic
advisor Paul Samuelson, was an issue on which Kennedy had
focused attention because of New England' s problems with
imports and consequent pressure from his constituents. Yet
the senator understood the importance of free-trade, noted
economist and frequent Kennedy correspondent Seymour E.
Harris, and was convinced it was essential. Indeed,
Kennedy explained that deciding where to stand on trade
2 6
matters in Massachusetts required a "split personality".
He also found trade policy a sensitive subject in a
state where some segments of the economy favored low duties
in order to buy raw materials more cheaply, like oil, while
other groups sought protection for traditional,
increasingly inefficient industries like textiles. Kennedy
voted in favor of the RTAs throughout his congressional
career, but such support was qualified and he urged
protection for regional industries through a special
delegation of New England senators.
On the protectionist side of fair-trade, Kennedy blamed
imports for deterioration in key sectors of New England's
economy. In soft goods, for instance, he not only
criticized government policies which ignored the movement
of factories to the low-wage South but also the rising
inflow of low-wage imports which had diminished textile
production. New England lost 150,000 jobs between 1929 and
1950 as hundreds of mills closed. As a response, Kennedy
denounced Eisenhower's inaction in limiting textile imports
from Asia as a "lack of comprehension or mis judgment " or
"indifference". He demanded quotas and backed the "Geneva
Reservation"
,
which permitted a raise in textile duties
2 8
when GATT provided insufficient protection
.
In the fishing sector, imports were again among the
reasons Kennedy cited for industry troubles . He noted that
lags in research and development and scarcity of some
species caused stagnation . Yet after constituents informed
him of the sizeable yearly increases of fillet imports, he
blamed rising imports from northern Europe for the drop in
sales by American fishermen of groundfish and ocean perch
in 1952. Without protection, he concluded, the old fishing
industry of Massachusetts would soon be extinct. Kennedy
did not seek higher tariffs in instances such as these
merely for the sake of "unjustifiable protection from
foreign competition". Instead, he argued "that there are
certain industries which by their nature are unable to
compete with imports on a fair basis. In those situations,
I feel that a tariff to equalize competition is
29
necessary .
"
The depressed state of certain interests taught Kennedy
early in his career that protection was a practical
necessity from an economic and political standpoint, and
thus he frequently fought for import relief. He lodged a
complaint with Eisenhower, for example, after the President
refused to uphold a Tariff Commission report which
recommended import restrictions on fish. The RTA was "not
designed to crucify the ancient New England fishing
industry", Kennedy proclaimed, but it had permitted so much
"cutthroat competition" from northern Europe that major
30ports were fast becoming "dead" cities. The remedy was
simple, he told a Massachusetts labor organization. "We
know that our fisheries, our jewelry, and certain other
industries need protection if they are not to be offered as
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a sacrifice to the theoretical principle of free trade".
This pragmatic view of trade, the basis of the fair-
trade doctrine, portrayed Kennedy as a protectionist early
in his political career. "Everyone recognizes the
desirability of free trade between nations ... as an
ideal", he asserted in 1952. The complete removal of trade
barriers was possible only when the prevention of injury to
U.S. producers was certain. Tariff reduction could not be
a "one-way street" with America bearing the burden.
Without import relief, America would merely "be putting the
cart of the ideal before the horse of our own bread and
butter . "^^
In effect, Kennedy argued that theory did not mesh with
the hard facts of depression in New England or in global
trends in foreign trade. Contrary to popular belief, the
U.S. possessed low tariffs comparable to the Benelux and
Scandinavian nations
. Consequently, American imports had
more than quintupled over the past twenty -five years while
European protectionism had outlasted its necessity
.
Kennedy complained that "a cardinal principle" of
international trade had been violated; America was "being
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subjected to unfair and unequal discrimination" abroad
.
When economist Charles P. Kindleberger called Kennedy a
protectionist, the senator tempered his tone but replied
that his trade views were more complicated than the label
implied. He opposed unfair discriminatory trade practices
against American goods, that is, an import policy which
34jeopardized the welfare of New England.
Though he appeared as a protectionist, Kennedy at bottom
was not one. His position on foreign trade policy was
grounded in a New Deal faith that government should cure
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economic distress. Seeking a consistent balance between
national and local interests, the senator believed the
federal government had an obligation to modify U.S. trade
policy when imports threatened entire industries. He
sympathized with Eisenhower's dilemma of reconciling "the
conflicting national interest" of freer trade with the
"legitimate needs" of a few domestic interests. Just as
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had overseen the transition
to a war economy, however, so Eisenhower must give
assistance to those hurt by the nation's trade policy.
He found a means for national aid in a government
-
financed program of "adjustment assistance" which became
one leg of his fair-trade doctrine. He borrowed the remedy
from David McDonald, head of the United Steel Workers.
Adjustment assistance provided for compensation or
retraining for workers, loans for businesses, and
development aid to areas adversely affected by imports.
The Eisenhower administration rejected the plan, as did
other anti-big government conservatives. Kennedy fared no
better when he introduced adjustment assistance as a bill
alongside successive RTAs and the Area Redevelopment Act in
the 1950s.
Despite such opposition, Kennedy supported adjustment
assistance throughout his political career. He argued that
the provision was not a subsidy, but merely consolidated
existing federal aid programs into one act. Recognizing
that liberal trade was embedded in U.S. foreign policy, his
program was a third alternative to tariff hikes or cuts
which would not result in the "mutilation" of the RTA. The
escape clause had failed to protect producers, he claimed,
since only three of forty-three applications for relief had
won protection. Instead relegating industries to "suffer
in silence" because of the national interest in lowering
tariffs, the President had a viable option. Adjustment
assistance was a compromise, permitting "the constantly
increasing international trade so essential to the economic
health of the United States without jeopardizing the
3 7welfare of affected industries and their employees".
Most important, adjustment assistance allowed Kennedy to
be consistent in trade policy
. He could advocate
protection for injured interests but remain in the
mainstream of New Deal ideology as an adherent to liberal
trade. By no means a doctrinaire free-trader, he told his
constituents nonetheless to be realistic, for regardless of
local attitudes, the postwar trend in foreign trade was
toward less restrictions . Even in the case of the fishing
industry he opposed excluding imports, arguing instead for
a "fair and equitable" quota with which to prop up
fishermen. "In all frankness", he wrote a voter, he
38
approved of liberal trade.
High tariffs, he emphasized in revealing the free-trade
leg of his fair-trade ideology, provided only a temporary
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solution to production for American industry. Indeed,
while "indiscriminate competition" from other nations
should be avoided, America must encourage trade
liberalization and enhance economic cooperation in the
world. In sum, Kennedy supported the RTA because he was "a
firm believer in subsequent international agreements by
which other nations have been enabled to sell their
products in the United States, as we sell our products
abroad. World trade can never be a one-way street".
His father's profitable liquor importing business
demonstrated the financial benefits of lower tariffs to
Kennedy. As ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy had
helped negotiate the Anglo-American trade agreement of 1938
which reduced restrictions on a reciprocal basis between
Washington and London. He spouted free-trade dogma in
claiming that liberalization would end economic conflict,
increase the standard of living, and unify the democracies.
There was, meanwhile, no doubt that lower tariffs would
enhance the sales of imported liquor, of which the
^ ^ . . 40ambassador was a major concessionaire.
Such personal gains aside, his son understood that the
harmful effects of trade restrictions damaged the American
economy as a whole. Thus, though cognizant of import
injury. Senator Kennedy usually rejected the notion that
low tariffs were the culprit. He argued instead that
competition from the South and factors of inefficient
production, such as outmoded plant facilities, expensive
transportation and power, lack of diversification, and
scarce capital investment, were the key causes of economic
difficulties. On those occasions when he backed a tariff
hike, he preferred it be of temporary nature and adjusted
downward once its need had been fulfilled. "^"^
Though sensitive to the potential political backlash
from this liberal trade bent, he had no qualms in telling
producers that they exaggerated the impact of trade
competition. Kennedy disputed protectionist contentions
that imports worsened domestic employment, especially since
nearly a third of New England's jobs relied on low-priced
raw material imports such as oil. Even in the region, he
perceptively claimed, the profits from exports of most
firms overcame losses incurred from imports . "If we
depress imports", he said, "then there will also be
reductions in exports. Foreign countries cannot buy our
42goods unless they have entry for theirs " . Such was the
rationale behind the fair-trade doctrine.
At the heart of this belief in the advantages of
reciprocal trade was his interest in foreign affairs . The
harmful effects of restrictions on American foreign policy
and international relations far outweighed the benefits of
protectionism. His father's service in England during the
high-tariff era of the 1930s had demonstrated to Kennedy
the dangers of economic nationalism which had caused a
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schism between America and Europe. Joining other postwar
leaders, he advocated liberal trade to reduce the chances
of future political conflict,
In the 1950s, the danger was international communism,
and here Kennedy viewed free-trade as a means to combat
Soviet economic competition. Protectionism would undermine
America's ability to meet Russian advances with attractive
trade opportunities for members of the Western alliance.
"It is a fact", he wrote a constituent as the Common Market
emerged in 1958, "that American rigidity would probably
force European nations to seek trade outlets in Communist
bloc countries with resulting adverse political
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consequences ,
"
The creation of the EEC and EFTA and relations within
the Atlantic community were of paramount importance to the
liberal trade part of Kennedy' s commercial ideology . In
1954, for instance , he opposed a rigid adherence to the Buy
American Act; U.S. employment had to be weighed against the
economic needs of America' s allies . When the European
trade blocs planned to raise trade barriers to outsiders,
Kennedy urged them instead to "create an environment" in
which other nations would willingly reduce restrictions in
tandem with Europe. Giving this logic an institutional
base, the senator backed American membership in the
Organization for Trade Cooperation, a forum which would
give the U.S. a "decisive voice" in promoting a liberal
trade order and perhaps slow the decay of U.S. global
45power
.
In the LDCS as well, commerce became one of Kennedy's
chief concerns and provided further evidence of his
adherence to liberal, fair trade. After visiting the
Middle East and Asia in 1951, where he saw firsthand the
vulnerability of the South to Soviet influence, he
suggested that the U.S. should concentrate aid also on the
LDCs and not just on Europe. Kennedy sought to close the
"economic gap" between the South and North also through aid
and commerce because, as he noted, the Third World had not
really shared in the tremendous growth in world trade
during the 1950s. While he cited U.S. recessions for
lowering the prices of LDC commodities and thus worsening
their terms of trade with the North, he generally indicted
Eisenhower for a lack of imagination in foreign economic
46programs
.
As possible solutions, Kennedy recommended reducing U.S.
tariffs and quotas, easing Export-Import Bank restrictions,
and negotiating international commodity agreements to boost
prices of Third World goods and raise revenue for
development. He also backed the formation of regional
economic blocs along the integrationist lines of the EEC in
order to enhance stability and self-sufficiency in the
South. He also proposed an end to unilateral exporting
schemes in wheat. By not cooperating with other Northern
agricultural producer nations in exporting farm surpluses,
America increasingly alienated its friends, disrupted
global commodity trade, and in the end, opened the way to
Soviet dumping of these goods as political pressure on the
47LDCs .
Undergirding these modifications of trade and aid
programs were the unifying economic and political purposes
of the fair-trade doctrine. In the long-run, a lack of
growth in the LDCs due to decreased exports would
deleteriously affect the economies of the industrialized
nations by slowing down their expansion, too. Very likely,
stagnation would set off mutually self-defeating trade wars
in the North, similar to those of the 1930s. Thus, Kennedy
urged an increase for the real income of the Southern
nations by ensuring that international trade channels were
held open. By accelerating growth in underdeveloped areas
through aid, assuring market access, and lessening import
restrictions, the North could show the LDCs "that the
democratic process is a persuasive method of creation, not
frustration"
.
By the late 1950s, Kennedy had developed his trade
perspective into a coherent fair-trade doctrine. Lowering
trade barriers took precedent over protectionism, yet he
sought to prevent injury to certain domestic industries.
While he knew expansion of world commerce was important, he
refused to give unqualified support to a free-trade policy
55
which jeopardized public welfare. His answer was a "double
attack" of adjustment assistance undergirded by the Area
Redevelopment bill, which would address inherent economic
problems not caused by imports. In 1959, he co-sponsored
labor legislation which offered protection, but not tariff
relief, from low-wage imports
.
i
When the last RTA of his senate career exited the Senate
Finance Committee in 1958 in diluted form, however, Kennedy
expressed his disappointment as a firm advocate of free-
trade. He eventually voted for the bill, but had earlier
made known his complaint that the RTA was too rigidly
protectionist in its grant of bargaining authority for
negotiations. The Common Market now a key concern in
trade, Kennedy rejected the "sledge-hammer approach" of
protectionists in attaching "dubious" restrictions on
50presidential authority to lower tariffs.
Decisively in the camp of liberal traders, Kennedy saw
trade as a crucial element in U.S. foreign policy of the
1960s, especially in maintaining America's position in the
international economy . " I have long made my position
clear", he told a voter. "We must have a reciprocal trade
policy if we are to preserve our relationship to foreign
governments and if we are to encourage our domestic
51industry to produce for foreign markets". The "somewhat
jaded battles" between protectionists and liberal traders
were irrelevant since every nation possessed high and low
If
If
duties. Protectionism, in sum, was no longer viable in an
increasingly interdependent world, he warned, for such a
policy would create a vacuum for Soviet economic and hence
political penetration into the Third World and also weaken
the economic base of the Western alliance. He remained
convinced that liberal trade helped "cement together the
nations of the free world".
A pragmatic, calaculated, but also fair trade strategy
should guide U.S. policy. In GATT negotiations, Kennedy
candidly declared that Washington should not be
philanthropic". Instead, he expected Americans to be
hard bargainers" and demand equal concessions from other
nations. But toughness must be mixed with the recognition
that the basis for a permanently healthy domestic economy
rested on the U.S. also giving up concessions . Lowering
duties helped America since other nations earn dollars with
which to purchase a more U.S. goods. Increased trade thus
led to a rising standard of living for all. In effect, the
"great merit of the trade agreements system is that it
53permits all parties to the agreements to benefit".
On the presidential campaign trail in 1960, Democratic
Party candidate Kennedy also shunned protectionism. He
planned to "get the country moving again" by boosting
output among producers at an annual rate of 5%, because
growth was the "best protection" against displacement from
imports. Noting America's lagging growth among
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industrialized nations since 1953, he warned against
"economic slackness" because competition would be "keener"
during the decade ahead. Witnesses at a hearing on the
U.S. -Common Market relationship echoed this exhortation.
Congressman Mike Monroney (D-OK) said, for instance, that
the country had become "overly fat and a little self-
satisfied" in the 1950s, unconcerned about foreign
competition. A failure to modernize, provide good service,
or gear products to European demand had lost America its
preeminence in the typewriter and small automobile markets
to a more "lean, thin, and hungry" EEC.
Yet debate during the campaign on trade necessarily had
more domestic overtones since Kennedy and Republican
candidate Richard M. Nixon knew that free-trade had no
voter appeal in import -competing areas . Kennedy spoke with
caution, particularly in the South, not only because
textile firms there had suffered during the past decade,
but because he expected electoral difficulties in the
region over the Catholic and race issues. Textilemen
groaned that both candidates were "free traders", but
singled out Kennedy for criticism. While he had indeed
denounced Eisenhower for increasing imports, they
commented, the candidate's record showed that he would
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"broadly boost, not restrict, imports."
The Democratic platform offered, however, more
protection than it was credited for, although less than the
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Republican plank. The Democrats resoundingly endorsed the
RTA as the means to meet the challenge of EEC, help the
Third World, correct the payments deficit, and unite the
West against communism. They adopted adjustment assistance
to protect domestic industries. The Republicans, though
pressing for liberal trade, supported more protectionist
devices, including increased use of the escape clause,
national security provision, and voluntary import quotas.
This platform perhaps made Kennedy appear less willing to
act for import-competitors, though aides also worried that
his isolated protectionist remarks, such as requests for
voluntary textile quotas, might be construed as
inconsistent with the liberal trade. Yet Kennedy knew that
his seemingly contradictory stance was an inherent part of
the tricky balancing act of satisfying foreign, national,
and local needs through fair-trade
.
The campaign was the culmination of a congressional
career which juggled liberal trade with a sensitivity to
declining but vocal domestic interests. In effect, most
national leaders had done the same, for the postwar trade
regime under GATT permitted protectionism at the same time
negotiations to lower commercial barriers were underay.
Coming from a state that epitomized the troubles with
rising imports, Kennedy accepted trade restrictions as a
political fact of life. He clashed with the Eisenhower
administration on this score, since the President naturally
fostered national over regional solutions to the import
problem. But Kennedy and Eisenhower agreed on the merits
of free-trade for economic and international reasons.
Differences between Kennedy and the administration
existed, however. As a New Deal adherent, the senator
accepted the notion of Big Government. Thus, while the
conservative Eisenhower relied on traditional, yet
ineffective devices such as the escape clause and peril
point as a means to protect import-competitors, Kennedy
proposed the social security safety net of adjustment
assistance as a remedy. During the 1960s, this measure
changed the concept of import injury by the extent to which
domestic interests could be subjected to liberal trade.
Nonetheless, it actually provided more protection than the
escape clause , which under Eisenhower had been invoked only
rarely
.
In essence, Eisenhower remained entrenched in
increasingly obsolete, and at times insensitive, methods of
dealing with imports. By the end of his tenure,
ironically, he had provoked a wave of protectionism that
undercut his authority to lower tariffs in the RTA.
Kennedy and the vanguard of the Democratic Party initiated,
on the other hand, an imaginative program which addressed
contemporary conditions in the domestic economy and
international trade regime. Their willingness to apply
even doses of government aid and laissez-faire trade
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competition exemplified a workable American policy for the
future
•
Such trade management underscored Kennedy's forward-
looking vision in foreign affairs which confronted
America's declining predominance across the globe. While
Eisenhower fostered free-trade with Europe, an intimate
Atlantic community, and Third World development, his
actions seemed tired and oftentimes fell flat. Kennedy,
while seeking the same goals, hoped to adopt more forceful,
dramatic ways of meeting the challenges to U.S. power with
overhauled aid, trade, and general foreign policies. In
trade, he planned to attack competition from the EEC and
inherent flaws in the LDC system, hoping to adapt America
to its vitiated world economic status through energetic
measures , not modifications of outworn ones
.
Kennedy took to the presidency an expertise in foreign
trade which he had acquired first-hand . The purpose of his
new administration, he announced, would be "to make
effective the concept of responsible trade among free
nations by means which will promote the economic prosperity
of all peoples while ensuring equitable conditions of
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competition for our own industries". The victory secured
in November, 1960, the President-elect set out to achieve
this fair-trade objective
.
61
Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The
Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order
.
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969),
chapters 1 and 2/ Pollard and Wells, Jr., "1945-1960: The
Era of American Hegemony", 333-339/ Robert Dallek, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 283.
2Foreign Trade Related to Various Measures of
Production: 1869-1970, U.S., Department of Commerce,
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), pt. II, 887; Pollard and Wells, Jr., "1945-1960: The
Era of American Hegemony", 333-339/ Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope
,
vol. 2 (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), 111/ Dean Acheson,
"The Interest of the American Businessman in International
Trade", Vital Speeches
, no. 11, 15 February 1945, 264/
Burton I . Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower^ s Foreign
Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press 1982), 16.
3 Spero, The Politics of International Economic
Relations, 94-96/ Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy
,
chps
.
3, 8, 17 and pp. 348-361/ 95-96/ F.V. Meyer, International
Trade Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 136-137/ Lipson,
"The Transformation of Trade", 240-243.
62
4Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreicrn
Economic Policy, 78, 98-99; Robert B. Reich, "Beyond Free
Trade", Foreign Affairs 61 (Spring 1983): 778; Meyer,
International Trade Policy. 72-73, 136-141; Kenneth W. Dam,
The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 56. Italy
acceded to GATT in 1949, West Germany in 1951, and Japan in
1955 .
5Pollard and Wells, "1945-1960", 346; Spero, The
Politics of International Economic Relations
, 97, 126;
Hogan, The Marshall Plan ; M.M. Postan, An Economic History
of Western Europe, 1945-1964 (London: Methuen and Co.,
Ltd., 1967), 98-99.
6William Diebold, Jr., "The Process of European
Integration" in The Common Market: Progress and
Controversy
, Lawrence B. Krause, ed, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 34; Emile Benoit, Europe at
Sixes and Sevens: The Common Market, the Free Trade
Association, and the United States (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961), 5, 29-30. The treaty created the
European Atomic Energy Committee (Euratom) , a Council of
Ministers
,
comprising government representatives of each
nation, and a supranational executive, the Commission . The
EEC covered 5.9 million square miles, comprising 168
million people in Europe, 10 million in Algeria, and 53
million in associated and dependent areas.
63
Harry G. Johnson, "Mercantilism: Past, Present, and
Future", Journal of World Trade Law 8 (January-February
1974)
: 12-13; Benoit, Europe at Sixes and Sevens
,
24;
Arnold Wolfers, "Integration in the West: The Conflict of
Perspectives" in The Atlantic Community: Progress and
Prospect
,
eds. Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), 245; Meyer,
International Trade Policy
,
160-161.
g Statistics are drawn from Max J. Wasserman, Charles
W. Hultman, and Russell F. Moore, The Coimnon Market and
American Business (New York: Simmons -Boardman Publishing
Corporation, 1964), 59, 69; B.R. Mitchell, European
Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1978), 182, 308-309; Postan, An Economic
History of Western Europe
, 11, 90-91; Alfred Grosser, The
Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945
(New York: Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1980), 177-
178; Statistical Briefing: U.S. Trade and the Common
Market, undated [1961]; Memorandum on Performance of US
Exports During the Past Decade, 15 December 1961,
President's Special Message on Trade-Correspondence
Concerning the Speech, box 2, White House Staff Files-
Howard C. Petersen, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts (hereafter cited as Petersen files)
;
Historical Statistics of the United States, pt . II, 903, 905.
64
A.W. Deporte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The
Enduring Balance (New Haven, CT : Yale University Press,
1979), 175; Pollard and Wells, "1945-1960", 378, LaFeber,
America, Russia, and the Cold War
, 205; Thomas A. Bailey, A
Diplomatic History of the American People
, 8th ed. (New
York: Meredith Corporation, 1969), 847, see also chp
. 54.
""^Deporte, Europe Between the Superpowers
, 182, 189-
190, 223; Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War
,
208-
209; Grosser, The Western Alliance
, 148, 168, 177;
Shonfield, "International Economic Relations of the Western
World", 3; Kaufman, Trade and Aid
, 188.
11Benoit, Europe at Sixes and Sevens
,
68-71, 82-83,
92-93; Kaufman, Trade and Aid
,
182; Pollard and Wells,
"1945-1960", 367, 387; Shonfield, "International Economic
Relations of the Western World", 3-18; James R.
Schlesinger, The Political Economy of National Security: A
Study of the Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power
Struggle (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers,
1960) . Though smaller in population, exporting volume, and
GNP than the EEC, the EFTA imported approximately as much
and comprised a wealthier, but slower growing, economy.
Roderick N. Grant, "The European Common Market and
U.S. Trade" in Public Policy: International Economic
Problems , vol. 11, eds . Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E.
Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Graduate School
of Public Administration, 1961), 234; Randall Hinshaw, The
65
European Economic Community and American Trade: A Study in
Atlantic Economics and Policy (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publisher, 1964), 142-143; Edwin M. Martin, "New
Trends in United States Economic Foreign Policy" in
Whither American Foreign Policy in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science
, ed. James
C. Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1960), 29; Ernst H. Van Der
Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European
Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy
(Amsterdam, Holland: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1966)
,
ch. 5; Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of
Europe (Washington, D.C., 1963), chps . 6, 8, 9; Bela
Belassa, "Competitiveness of American Manufacturing in
World Markets" in Problems of the Modern World Economy:
Changing Patterns in Foreign Trade and Payments (New York:
W.W, Norton and Company, Inc., 1964), to Joint Economic
Committee, September 1962, 31.
^•^Pollard and Wells, "1945-1960", 348-349; Kal J.
Holsti, "Politics in Command: Foreign Trade as National
Security Policy", International Organization 40 (Summer
1986) : 648-652; Alfred K. Ho, Japan's Trade Liberalization
in the 1960s (White Plains, NY: International Arts and
Sciences Press, Inc., 1973), 5-6; Hugh Corbet, ed.. Trade
Strategy and the Asian-Pacific Region (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1970), 51-59; Warren S. Hunsberger,
66
"Japan-United States Trade - Patterns, Relationships,
Problems" in Pacific Partnership: United States-Japan
Trade: Prospects and Recommendations for the Seventies
, ed.
Jerome B. Cohen (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972),
121-122; Historical Statistics of the United States
, pt
.
II, 903, 905; Warren S. Hunsberger, Japan and the United
States in World Trade (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1964), 33-45, 51-55, 131-140, 257-275; Meyer,
International Trade
,
142-143; Kaufman, Trade and Aid , 39-
41; David B. Yoffie, Power and Protectionism: Strategies of
the Newly Industrializing Countries (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), 44-64.
14Gordon T. Stewart, "'A Special Contiguous Country
Regime : An Overview of America's Canadian Policy",
Diplomatic History 6 (Fall 1982) : 348-351, 356; Harry G.
Johnson, Canada in a Changing World Economy (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1962), 5-6, 32, 50; Simon S.
Reisman, "The Issue of Free Trade" in U.S. -Canadian
Economic Relations: Next Step? , eds . Edward R. Fried and
Philip H. Trezise (Washington, D.C: The Brookings
Institution, 1984), 43; Mitchell Sharp, "Canada's
Independence and U.S. Domination" in U.S. -Canadian Economic
Relations: Next Step? , eds. Fried and Trezise , 13, 16-17;
Paul Wonnacott, The United States and Canada: The Quest for
Free Trade, An Examination of Selected Issues (Washington,
D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1987), 16;
67
B.W. Wilkinson, Canada^ s International Trade: An Analysis
of Recent Trends and Patterns (Quebec: Private Planning
Association of Canada, February 1968), 29; Historical
Statistics of the United States
, pt . II, 903, 905; J.L.
Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove: Canada and the
United States" in Kennedy^ s Quest for Victory: American
Foreign Policy, 1961-1963
, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
15 Spero, The Politics of International Economic
Relations
,
221-229; John Pincus, Trade, Aid and
Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1967)
,
177-185; Finlayson and Zacher,
"The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers, 293-295;
Dam, The GATT
,
225-231; Johnson, Economic Policies Toward
Less Developed Countries (Washigton, D.C.: the Brookings
Institution, 1967), 18.
1
6
Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development 233-235; Walter
LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in
Central America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983),
90-91; Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism
,
155-157; Gunnar
Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of
Nations , vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 595-603;
J.A.C. Brown, "A Brief Survey of Prospects for African
Exports of Agricultural Products" in African Primary
Products and International Trade (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1965), 1-6; Spero, The Politics , 227.
68
17Kaufman, Trade and Aid
, 10, see also 1, chp . 2, 88-
91, 97-100, 124-131, 147-151, 163; W.W. Rostow, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press, 1985), 10, 44-49, for the report; Pollard and Wells,
"1945-1960", 362; Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism
, 56-72;
Yoffie, Power and Protectionism
, 64-77; Position Papers for
Senator Kennedy Prepared by Professor Fred Burke [Africa]
,
undated (1960) ; Position Papers on Cuba and Latin America,
1960, Briefing Papers-Water Supply Program-Foreign Policy:
Cuba and Latin America; Foreign Policy Memorandum, Subject:
Latin America, 30 August 1960, Briefing Papers-Foreign
Policy: Foreign Service-Latin America, box 993, Pre-
Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts (hereafter cited as PPP) ; Historical
Statistics of the United States
,
pt . II, 903, 905.
1
8
Kaufman, Trade and Aid
,
176-180; Peter B. Kenen,
Giant Among Nations : Problems in United States Foreign
Economic Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963),
20-27; Howard S. Piquet, The U.S. Balance of Payments and
International Monetary Reserves (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1966), 1.
^^Kaufman, Trade and Aid
,
177, 180-189, 192; Seymour
E. Harris, "Some Material Ideas on the Dollar Problem and
the Competitive Position of the United States" in Public
Policy: International Economic Problems, vol. 11, eds . Carl
69
J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Graduate School of Public Administration, 1961),
136.
Gary M. Walton and Ross M. Robertson, History of the
American Economy
, 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1983), 633, on recessions in the 1950s.
Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making of
Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New
York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1985), 86-88; Seymour E.
Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years and a Look Ahead
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), 26/ E. Ray
Canterbury, Economics on a New Frontier (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), 30, 96.
21 .Historical Statistics of the U.S.
,
pt . II, 889,
898-900/ Frank W. Tuttle and Joseph M. Perry, An Economic
History of the United States (Cincinnati: Southwestern
Publishing Company, 1970), 786/ U.S., Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Foreign Commerce Study:
U.S. Trade and the Common Market , 8 6th Cong., 2nd sess.,
1960, 217-218/ Trudy H. Peterson, Agricultural Exports,
Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 27-28, 114-118/ John
M. Leddy, "United States Commercial Policy and the Domestic
Farm Program" in Studies in United States Commercial
Policy , ed. William B. Kelly, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1963), 174.
Vernon L. Sorenson, "Contradictions in U.S. Trade
Policy" in U.S. Trade Policy and Agricultural Exports , ed.
Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development, 185-189; Historical Statistics of the United
States, pt. I, 482/ 900.
23Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt
, 84, 92; Arthur A.
Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United
States, and the International Order", International
Organization 38 (Spring 1984): 380.
24Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy
, 94, 99-100; John M. Leddy and Janet L.
Norwood, "The Escape Clause and Peril Points Under the
Trade Agreements Program" in Studies in United States
Commercial Policy
, ed. Kelly, Jr., 124-146; Sorensen,
"Contradictions in U.S. Trade Policy", 186; Dam, The GATT
,
260-261; Sidney Ratner, The Tariff in American History (New
York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1972), 64-65; Kaufman,
Trade and Aid
,
45
.
25Kaufman, Trade and Aid
, 29, see also chps . 7, 43-44,
74-76. See also Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S.
Foreign Economic Policy
,
101-104; Harry C. Hawkins and
Janet L. Norwood, "The Legislative Basis of United States
Commercial Policy" in Studies in United States Commercial
Policy , ed. Kelly, Jr., 110-114; Leddy and Norwood, "The
Escape Clause", 138-143; Bauer, de Sola Pool, and Dexter,
American Business and Public Policy, 73
.
71
Kennedy to Linda Chapman, 20 November 1959, Trade-
8/1/59-11/20/59, box 727, PPP; See also Paul Samuelson Oral
History, 63, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts; Seymour E. Harris Oral History, 2-3, John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts; Myer Rashish Oral
History, 2, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
(oral histories hereafter cited by last name) ; Interview,
George W. Ball, 21 March 1986, Princeton, New Jersey.
27Kennedy to Frederick Putnam, 11 February 1954,
Trade-Reciprocal Trade and Tariff-5/1/54-7/9/54, box 654,
PPP; James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy: A Political
Profile (New York: Harcourt and Brace and Company, 1960)
,
181; Congressional Quarterly-Almanac
, roll calls, 5 (1949) :
50; 7 (1951) : 260; 9 (1953) : 210; 10 (1954) : 296; and 14
(1958) : 448, Kennedy supported the RTA in 1949, 1954, and
1958 (this year in absentia) . There is no record of his
vote in 1951 and 1953.
2 8Memorandum 1, box 993, undated; Memorandum II,
Tariff and Trade Policy, box 993, undated; Memorandum, New
England Delegation to Sinclair Weeks, 3 February 1958,
Trade-General-2/3/58-3/3/58, box 707, PPP.
2 9Kennedy to Frederick Putnam, 11 February 1954,
Trade-Reciprocal Trade and Tariff-5/1/54-7/ 9/54 , box 656,
PPP. See also John F. Kennedy, "New England: Promise and
Problem", 22 July 1953, Articles-New York Times Magazine -
11/8/53, box 5, Testimony of Senator John F. Kennedy Before
72
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Upon S. 3229, the Federal Fisheries Assistance Act, 17 July
1958, New England Interests-Folder 2, box 19, Papers of
Theodore C. Sorensen, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts (hereafter cited as Sorensen papers); L.J.
Hart to Kennedy, 2 June 1952, Massachusetts Fishing Speech
Materials, box 93; JFK for U.S. Senator, Congressional
Record Report on Kennedy, xiv, 1952, box 101, Congressional
Record Report on Kennedy-Section II, PPP
.
30 John F. Kennedy, "Let's Fight for New England", 8
August 1952, box 93, Massachusetts Commerce Speech
Materials, PPP. See also Kennedy to President Eisenhower,
19 December 1956, Tariffs (Veveteen) , box 681, PPP.
31Kennedy, "The Future of Massachusetts",
Massachusetts State CIO Convention, 5 October 1952, same
folder title, box 93, PPP.
32
"Reciprocal Trade Agreements", [1952], Campaign
Speeches and Material, box 102, PPP.
^•^Kennedy to Edgar Brossard, 15 April 1953, Tariff
Commission, box 413, PPP.
^"^Kennedy to Charles Kindleberger , 2 April 1958,
Trade-General-4/1/58-4/30/58; Congressional Record , vol.
99, pt. 4, 7 May 1953, A2445; Kennedy to H.D. Baker, Jr.,
undated, Trade-General-11/4/57-11/28/57 , box 707, PPP.
73
Adjustments to the National Trade Policy, 22 June
1954, John F. Kennedy: A Compilation of Statements and
Speeches Made During His Service in the United States
Senate and House of Representatives
, 88th Cong., 2nd sess
.
,
Senate Doc. No. 79 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1964), 325, 327, 329 (hereafter cited as House and
Senate Statements )
.
See also Should an Old Massachusetts
Industry Be Penalized?, House and Senate Statements
, 25
June 1952, 118; Congressional Record
, vol. 99, pt . 4, 25
May 1953, 5461.
3 6Kaufman, Trade and Aid
,
20-22; Congressional Record
,
vol. 99, pt. 5, 22 June 1954, 8628-8629.
37Press release, 26 February 1959, 8 6th-lst-Trade
Adjustments S. 722-5/lu/55-2/26/59, box 635, PPP . See also
Kennedy to Charles Lewin, 17 March 1955, Trade Agreements
(Adjustments) Act, box 656; Remarks of Senator John F.
Kennedy in Introduction of a Bill on Adjustments to the
National Trade Policy, 21 June 1954, 86th-lst Trade
Adjustments S. 722-10/20/53-3/21/55, box 635; Kennedy to
Charles Hamilton, 9 June 1958, Trade-General-6/4/58-
6/11/58, box 707; Kennedy to Eisenhower, draft, undated
(1959), 86th-lst-Trade Adjustments S. 722 -5/19/59-2/26/59;
Press release. Office of Senator John F. Kennedy, 21 June
1954, 86th-lst-Trade Adjustments S. 722-10/20/53-3/21/55,
box 635; Kennedy to Walter Reuther, 19 July 1954, Trade:
Reciprocal Trade and Tariff-7/14/54-7/30/54 , box 656;
74
Kennedy to Gertrude Beard, 16 August 1954, box 657, PPP;
Leddy and Norwood, "The Escape Clause and Peril Points",
124-146, from 1947 to 1962, the Tariff Commission
instituted 134 escape clause investigations. It completed
112, in which no injury was found in 71. Of the 22 not
completed, 9 were terminated, 9 withdrawn by the applicant,
and 4 were pending.
3 8Press release, undated. Press Releases, box 98, PPP;
Adjustments to the National Trade Policy, 22 June 1954,
House and Senate Statements
, 329; Kennedy to Mrs. Edward
Peck, Jr., 20 January 1958, Trade: Woolen Textile Industry-
1/13/58-1/29/58, box 708, PPP.
39Should An Old Massachusetts Industry Be Penalized?,
25 June 1952, House and Senate Statements
, 118. See also
Kennedy to Linda Chapman, 20 November 1959, Trade-8/1/59-
11/20/59, box 727, PPP.
40David E. Koskoff, Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and
Times (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974),
52-53, 172-175, the halved U.S. tariff dropped the price of
liquor, thus increasing sales for British distillers and
U.S. importers like Kennedy.
'^''Trade Adjustment Act of 1957, House and Senate
Statements , 5 67; Statement of Senator John F. Kennedy of
Massachusetts Submitted to the U.S. Tariff Commission, 31
August 1953, Tariff Commission, box 413; Kennedy to Linda
Chapman, 20 November 1959, Trade-8/1/59-11/20/59, box 727;
Kennedy to Arthur J. Bastarache, 15 September 1958, Trade-
General-9/2/58-11/6/58, box 707, PPP
.
42Kennedy to Harry Kimball, 4 August 1958, Trade-
General-8/1/58-8/14/58, box 707, PPP. See also Kennedy to
Robert Reece, 13 August 1954, Trade-Reciprocal Trade and
Tariff-8/6/54-10/8/54, box 657, PPP.
43Kennedy to Senator Harry F. Byrd, 21 March 1955,
Trade: Tariffs-3/11/55-3/31/55, box 657, PPP; Robert E.
Baldwin, "Protectionist Pressures in the United States" in
Challenges to a Liberal Economic Order
, eds . Ryan C.
Amacher, Gottfried Haberler, and Thomas D. Willett
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1979), 233.
44Kennedy to Arthur Mann, 2 6 March 1958, Trade-
General-3/10/58-3/31/58, box 707, PPP.
45Kennedy to Charles Hamilton, 9 June 1958, Trade-
General- 6/ 4/58 -6/1 1/58/ Kennedy to Arthur Mann, 2 6 March
1958, Trade-General-3/10/58-3/31/58, box 707, PPP. See also
Kennedy to W.S. Ginn, 2 9 June 1954, attached to Ginn to
Kennedy, 22 June 1954, "Buy American" Act, box 641; Kennedy
to George Bell, 9 July 1957, Organization for Trade
Cooperation, box 676, PPP.
4 6
Revision and Renewal of International Wheat
Agreement, 5 March 1959, House and Senate Statements , 800.
Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid , 57, 61, 64.
Kennedy' s concern for the LDCs was such that he devoted
eight of ten sections of his primer for the presidential
campaign to the Third World, see The Strategy of Peace , ed.
Allan Nevins (New York: Popular Library, 1961), 73-82, and
"Areas of Trial" section. See also The Economic Gap, 19
February 1959, House and Senate Statements
, 788-792/ At a
Democratic Dinner, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 15 December 1958,
Strategy of Peace
, 170.
47 The Economic Gap, 19 February 1959, House and Senate
Statements
,
788-792; At a Democratic Dinner, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, 15 December, 1958, Strategy of Peace
, 170;
Second Annual Conference of the American Society of African
Culture, New York City, 28 June 1959, Strategy of Peace
,
163-164; Press release, Kennedy Calls for Renewal of
International Wheat Agreement, 5 March 1959, 8 6th- 1st -Wheat
Agreement S. Res. 90, box 635, PPP
.
48
In the Senate, 25 March 1958, Strategy of Peace
,
195; Kennedy, "The Destiny of Europe", Draft article,
September 1956, Europe, box 561, PPP.
4 9Kennedy to Claus Cosman, 21 August 1958, Trade-
General-9/2/59-11/6/58; Kennedy to H.D. Baker, Jr., 7
January 1958, Trade-General-11/4/57-1/28/58 ; Kennedy to
D.W. Ellis, 9 June 1958, Trade-General-6/4/58-6/11/58 , box
707; Kennedy to G.H. McCutcheon, 6 October 1959, Trade-
8/1/59-11/20/59, box 727, PPP; U.S. -Common Market Hearings ,
214, protectionists claimed that high U.S. wage rates
placed domestic producers at a trade disadvantage. Kennedy
proposed a bill to combat these unfairly low foreign wages.
But, he shied from protectionism, asserting that high
productivity and cheap raw materials at home and high
transportation costs abroad offset the wage differential.
He opposed versions of the bill which called for raised tariffs
50Kennedy to Paul Douglas, 4 February 1958, Trade-
General-2/3/58-3/3/58; Kennedy to George Clark, 24 June
1958, Trade-General-6/12/58-7/10/58; Kennedy to Ernest
Henderson, 14 July 1958, Trade-General-7/14/58-7/31/58/
Kennedy to Mrs. David Owen, 29 June 1958, Trade-General-
7/14/58-7/31/58; Kennedy to Theodore Johnson, 30 June 1958,
Trade-General-6/12/58-7/10/58, box 707, PPP
.
51Kennedy to Nicholas Nyary, 21 July 1958, Trade-
General-7/14/58-7/31/58, box 707, PPP.
52Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy before the Joint
Convention of the Tobacco Association of the United States
and the Leaf Tobacco Export Association upon Reciprocal
Trade, 24 June 1958, same folder title, box 901, PPP.
53Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy before the Joint
Convention of the Tobacco Association of the United States
and the Leaf Tobacco Export Association upon Reciprocal
Trade, 24 June 1958, same folder title, box 901, PPP.
^"^
U . S . -Common Market Hearings , Monroney, 14-14, 87-88,
and also David J. Steinberg, Corporation for Economic and
Industrial Research, 88; Lloyd Neidlinger, U.S. Council of
International Chamber of Commerce, 5; Emile Benoit,
78
Professor of International Business, 51. See also Joint
Appearances of Kennedy and Nixon, 436/ Jim F. Heath, John
F. Kennedy and the Business Community (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1969), 2; Economic Growth -
Administration Miscalculations, 2 September 1960, Economic
Policy: Domestic, box 992; Kennedy to Gertrude Weiss, 3 May
1960, Trade-5/60, box 748; Economic Speech, 5 October 1960,
Economic Policy: Domestic, box 992; Kennedy to Gavitt, 28
March 1960, box 773, PPP
.
55
"News and Comment", Textile World 110 (August 1960)
:
18-20. See also Foreign Trade Policy - Briefing Papers,
undated (1960)
,
Briefing Papers-Foreign Policy: Foreign
Service-Latin America, box 993, PPP; Ithiel de Sola Pool,
Robert P. Abelson, Samuel L. Popkin, Candidates, Issues,
Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 Presidential
Election (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964)
,
107;
"Washington Outlook", Textile World 110 (October 1960) : 22;
"Washington Outlook", Textile World 110 (July 1960): 24.
^^The Democratic Platform, pp. 9-10, 14-15, 12 July
1960, President's Office Files-Democratic Platform 1956-
1960, box 539, PPP; Foreign Trade Policy; Peter Kenen,
Memorandum on United States Foreign Trade Policy, 19
September 1960, Foreign Trade Policy-9/19/60, box 196,
Records of the Democratic National Committee, John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter cited as
DNC) ; Foreign Trade Policy - Briefing Paper, undated
(I960), box 993, PPP; What Nixon Said, Subject: Trade -
Tariffs, same folder, box 256, 432-433, DNC; U.S.,
Congress, Senate Freedom of Communications Subcommittee of
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Part III: The
Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice-
President Richard M. Nixon and Other Campaign
Presentations
, 87th Cong., 1st sess. 1961, 435; U.S.,
Congress, Senate Freedom of Communications Subcommittee of
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Part II: The
Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of
Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, August 1 through November
7_j__1960, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 404; Constant
Southworth to Archibald Cox, 30 August 1960; Statement on
Foreign Trade Policy, 19 September 1960; Craig Mathews to
Myer Feldman, 19 September 1960, Tariff and Trade Policy,
box 993, PPP; Kennedy to Senator Ernest Rollings, U.S.,
Congress, Senate Freedom of Communications Subcommittee of
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Part I : The
Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of
Senator John F. Kennedy, August 1 through November 7, 1960 ,
87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 66-67 (hereafter cited as Part
I -Kennedy Statements, 1960 )
.
57 Statement on Foreign Trade Policy, 19 September
1960, Tariff and Trade Policy, box 993, PPP.
80
CHAPTER 2
A NEW FRONTIER IN TRADE, 1960-1962
President Kennedy set out immediately to give substance
to his fair-trade doctrine. With an eye on sending a trade
bill to Congress in 1962 once the Reciprocal Trade Act
(RTA) of 1958 expired, the administration addressed
America's trade program. Though committed to a liberal
trade regime, the President approached commerce and other
matters affecting the domestic economy with extra caution.
After all, his slim victory at the polls denied him a
legislative mandate that would have allowed an immediate
overhaul of the RTA. He therefore recognized that to
attract Congress to his objectives in trade, he must press
for liberalization but protect import-competitors,
The new leaders in Washington accepted that the rise of
Europe and other trade partners, and the consequent decline
in American foreign economic power, necessitated a broadly
revised trade policy. Indications of the change in
relative power were abundant in 1961. The Kennedy team
hoped to recapture the initiative in trade liberalization
that Europe, and even the LDCs, had seized from Eisenhower
and strengthen American leadership among the allies.
Developments in 19 61 presented the administration with an
opportunity to address the challenges of the trade regime,
especially those from the Common Market.
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Thus, decision-making in trade policy reflected both
legs of the fair-trade doctrine. Kennedy^ s adherence to
the doctrine and his method of reserving the ultimate
decisions for himself essentially predetermined trade
policy during his presidency. Eliminating much of the
previous administration's ponderous foreign economic policy
bureaucracy, he informally tapped certain bureaucrats and
aides for policy options."^ Yet, their opinions served as
mere reminders of the foreign and domestic complexities of
trade policy, not as attempts to control decisions along
the lines of the bureaucratic politics model. The actual
decision-making stemmed from Kennedy's own calculations
concerning the pervasiveness of congressional protectionism
and his desire to encourage international cooperation in
free-trade
.
The bureaucracy exemplified these two inherently
divergent policies. The views of Undersecretary of State
for Economic Affairs George W. Ball, a friend of EEC
founder Jean Monnet, represented the liberal traders.
Nicknamed "Mr. Europe", Ball linked free-trade to amicable
international relations . Though in agreement, Kennedy
feared a backlash from Ball's dogmatic avowal of trade
liberalism. Some congressmen criticized the State
Department for granting too many concessions to other
nations at negotiations. Needing someone to mollify Ball's
provocative stance, Kennedy found Secretary of Commerce
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Luther H. Hodges. The President's first appointee, this
former governor and textile industry spokesman astutely
gauged of protectionist sentiment and enjoyed considerable
popularity with import-competitors.^
With Hodges as a shield against protectionists, Kennedy
and Ball sought trade liberalization in order to reverse
one of the President's biggest obsessions: the payments
deficit. Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, a Wall
Street investor and former State Department official,
concurred that the deficit and subsequent gold drain were
pressing matters, and Kennedy asserted that the deficit was
"not a joke", especially for a world leader. The problem
threatened domestic programs, might reduce overseas
commitments, and gave gold-hording nations like France the
leverage against U.S. designs. A trade surplus was
insufficient to balance the debit in the capital account,
causing an average deficit of nearly $3.5 billion between
1960-1963. Pervading economic discussions at the White
House, the deficit reportedly scared Kennedy as much as
nuclear war because it hurt not only U.S. prestige but
3
capabilities at home and abroad.
The deficit also posed a domestic dilemma for the New
Frontier. Recovery from recent recesssion would increase
imports and worsen the deficit, but correcting the deficit
required a cut in imports. Kennedy admitted that he could
reverse the deficit by raising tariffs, and later confessed
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that his liberal trade bill would not, by itself, solve the
problem. But this remedy was protectionist, and was
unfeasible because of its bad effects on trade and general
foreign relations. Instead, he set wage and price
guideposts to prevent inflation and keep U.S. export costs
competitive. But the deficit demonstrated that America was
no longer the predominant global economic power, and could
not shape its domestic stabilization policies without
considering the international repercussions.'^
While protectionists claimed that trade restrictions
would alleviate the payments crisis, the administration
disagreed. In a report commissioned by Kennedy during the
transition from the Eisenhower presidency, Ball argued that
protectionism created only "ephemeral" gains by preventing
long-term adjustments to global trade patterns and
instigated nations to close markets and raise tariffs. In
that event, Americans would opt to invest abroad than pay
these higher duties through exports . The resulting
scenario of capital and job flight, Kennedy frequently
warned, was a worsened deficit. His fears were warranted.
Attractive market opportunities and the threat of high
tariffs in Europe had doubled U.S. investments in the EEC
between 1959 and 1960 to nearly $1 billion, with increases
ranging from 100% in Belgium and Luxembourg to 165% in West
5Germany
.
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The solution to the deficit problem included a free-
trade program written by Ball which became the foundation
of the administration's trade bill. The proposal advocated
a reduction in barriers, increased access to European
markets, and promoted multilateral institutions to boost
trade, A form of competitive cooperation with Europe was
the key to Ball's plan, America, as only the "strongest of
the strong", could not expect "an unquestioning response to
our demands for a common policy" from the EEC. Thus,
Kennedy must initiate an overhaul of the obsolete RTA to
help the U.S. compete with the Six. In doing so, he could
prevent the Atlantic community from dissolving into two
separate trade or political systems, and might even lure
Britain and the rest of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) nations into the Common Market. Then, a unified
alliance economy would possess the resources to enable
Europe to share the financial burden of defense and LDC
assistance programs that Washington had borne for so long
and which had adversely effected the deficit. This plan
was the economic leg of Kennedy's "Grand Design".
Kennedy tacitly endorsed the Ball recommendations out of
the recognition that American power would slip still
further if exports and other measures did not right the
payments balance. He agreed that protectionism provoked
retaliation from abroad, could turn the trade surplus into
a deficit, and thus add to the dollar woes. The payments
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deficit would be more burdensome in the decades ahead, he
predicted. "If we're not able to export substantially more
than we import", he warned three weeks after the
inauguration, "we're going to either cut all assistance to
countries abroad or begin to draw our troops home".'^
The stubborn deficit showed that America' undisputed
reign over the world economic order had ended. The Common
Market now compelled adjustments in America's trade and
financial dealings overseas, in a sense reversing the adage
that when the U.S. sneezed, Europe caught a cold. While
America suffered recessions, a growth rate that was one-
third of the EECs, and 7% unemployment, Europe, and even
stagnating Great Britain, performed better. West Germany
claimed that there were five job openings for every one
person unemployed and boasted a 1% jobless rate. Italian
and French chemical, steel, and appliance manufacturers
reported such booming sales that they had to turn away
g
orders. That the U.S. must accept a more pluralist
international order and ensure that it remain open through
liberal trade was a foregone conclusion for Kennedy
.
Debate over U.S. ratification of the Convention of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in early 1961 demonstrated Kennedy's acceptance of a
mutually beneficial trade regime. This body of eighteen
nations, soon to include Japan, provided an institutional
foundation for an Atlantic partnership in trade.
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Protectionists in Congress, however, opposed the potential
meddling in U.S. policy which might result from the OECD
.
They revealed the political pitfalls involved in pressing
for liberal trade and kept Kennedy conscious of the role
import-competitors played in his fair-trade doctrine.
Trade was the major point of contention in the
ratification process. Smaller nations, seeking to increase
their access to markets in larger countries, noted
unhappily that the U.S. and others had relegated the OECD
to a mere consultative role in trade. Congress insisted on
this vitiated function by refusing beforehand to let the
OECD substitute for GATT, which it had never formally
approved. Protectionists zeroed in on the Code of
Liberalization of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, the precursor to the OECD, which entailed a
promise among Europeans not to discriminate against each
other. If carried over into the OECD, the Code would bind
Americans to trade agreements without approval from
Congress, and thus undermine the RTA' s authority. As a
result of pressure against such "constitutional
encroachment", Eisenhower refused to attach the Code to the
9
completed OECD Convention in December I960.
Kennedy carefully circumvented the trade issue in his
public pronouncements on the OECD. He showed a special
interest in the forum, though reportedly believed that it
was too weak to be of significant use. But he recognized
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that Eisenhower had left him with a sure winner in
international affairs since every ally had endorsed the
OECD, and that its ratification was a certainty in
Congress. Noting the sentiment that the Code had stirred
up in Congress, however, he promoted the OECD as a
facilitator of cooperation on foreign aid burden-sharing to
help the deficit and as an organization which would
encourage Western unity. "'"'^
Administration forces rallied behind this rationale, but
protectionists remained skeptical. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, Ball, and Dillon pledged repeatedly that decisions in
trade would be outside the domain of the OECD. The reason
for ratification, said Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.)
during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, was to
win the cold war through economic cooperation. But letters
to Fulbright against U.S. membership numbered ten times
more than those in favor and showed how deeply rooted was
protectionist sentiment regarding the OECD. The State
Department, asserted Congressman W. J. Bryan Dorn (D-SC)
,
had already been "outfoxed and outtraded" in previous
negotiations . Now, decisions which would effect American
imports and exports would be reached at OECD headquarters
in Paris, "completely out of the range of eyesight or
11influence" of Congress, added James C. Davis (D-GA)
.
Opposition to lower trade barriers was at the bottom of
these comments. Indeed, many interests backed the OECD,
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including the National Association of Manufacturers. But
import-competitors, ranging from piano manufacturers to
milk associations feared that the forum would precipitate
large-scale tariff reductions. Ardent protectionists
declared that efforts to end restrictions should be
corralled in Congress. Other producers accepted the
inevitability of freer trade yet sought a moderate
liberalization policy. An electronics industry executive,
for instance, appealed to Kennedy not "to rush pell-mell
down the road to free trade" without some form of "shock
12absorbers" for industry
.
Antagonism toward the Common Market also surfaced.
Fulbright informed southerners that their farm exports to
the EEC could be expanded through discussion in the OECD.
Yet many producers feared that the Six, by unfairly
refusing products from low-wage nations, would force the
United States to shoulder the burden and increase its
intake of these highly competitive goods. The U.S. was
also naive in hoping the Common Market would consider
American interests when fashioning its import policy, added
liberal traders Seymour Harris and John K. Galbraith. They
thought Kennedy was too anxious to accommodate the EEC by
13
not criticizing its selfish trade policies.
Yet Kennedy had already recognized that though Europe
might be overly-restrictive, reducing tariffs was the only
realistic way to open the EEC to outsiders. This view was
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at the heart of his plans for Japan and the LDCs in the
OECD. To be sure, Americans hoped to restrict Japanese
exports and complained that Tokyo's low wages unfairly
lowered the price of its exports and had caused its exports
to the U.S. to double from 1956 to 1961. But producers
ignored the fact that the U.S. maintained a surplus with
the Japanese of almost $800 million. Admittedly in need of
liberalizing its import policy, Japan still worried about
"signs of regression" in U.S. trade policy. Visiting to
Washington in June, 1961, Premier Hayato Ikeda declared
that his businessmen were losing enthusiasm for the
American market. Other officials asked how the U.S. could
square restrictions toward Japan with the demand that
14Europe lower its trade barriers?
The answer was that to a large extent, Kennedy had to
respond to Congress, which was very sensitive to import
injury, while pressing for free-trade. Thus, he promised
Ikeda an "orderly expansion of trade", stressing at the
same time that the U.S. could not expect to just sell
overseas and never buy goods from abroad. He could turn
the table on Ikeda' s frustration with American policy by
attacking Japan's foreign exchange controls which penalized
U.S. exports. Yet Tokyo remained the best customer of
American farm exports, an important consideration now that
the EEC's restrictive agricultural policy was nearly in
place. Meanwhile, Japan needed markets to sustain its
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growth rate and, most important, curb a desire for trade
outlets outside the Western alliance, particularly in
Communist China. "^^
Walt Rostow of the State Department suggested that the
U.S. champion Japan's membership in the OECD as it had
backed Tokyo's entry into GATT
. Presently defining its
role in international politics, Japan might be angered by
its exclusion from this club of industrial nations. Its
exports also curbed, Japan could turn to China, a Kennedy
nemesis, or form a peaceful, inward-looking version of the
former Co-Prosperity Sphere. The EEC felt Tokyo was "not
ready" for full membership status, however, and delayed
Japan's entry until 1964. Prohibitively restrictive of
Asian imports, the Six feared a Japanese presence in the
OECD would begin a flood of low-cost goods into Europe.
This position clashed against U.S. plans to divert such
products from America, which imported twice as many goods
1
6
from Japan than Europe, to the thriving Common Market.
The OECD could advance this aim.
Trade diversion applied to LDC exports as well. The
colonial independence movement of the past few years had
provided the initial impetus for the globally-oriented
OECD. The U.S. hoped that Europe would assume a greater
share of funding assistance programs and buy more Southern
products. Ball promised Congress that the OECD would
expose those rich nations which refused to meet their
responsibilities in LDC trade and aid.^^'^ Fair-trade meant
that low-cost Third World exports, because they oftentimes
easily outsold goods made in the North, would be spread
equitably among the industrial countries.
This forceful approach to Europe and sensitivity to
concerns at home earned congressional approval of the OECD
on 16 March 1961. A special "interpretation" by Congress
discarded the Code of Liberalization and relieved America
from any obligations made in trade agreements. Careful not
to provoke anxious congressmen, Kennedy concentrated his
remarks on the themes of Western economic cooperation and
unity on which free-traders and protectionists alike
agreed. To be sure, the administration believed that
America must take an active part in OECD operations and
supported the target growth rate of 50% in the members'
1
8
collective GNP over the next decade. Overall, the OECD
became a symbol of multilateral cooperation among nations
who enjoyed equal standing with America for the first time
since the war.
The OECD episode was a test run for Kennedy's trade
plans . Import -competitors battled for the first time
against supporters of the New Frontier' s liberal trade
policies, even though the former group expected to lose
this round . Regardless, protectionists indicated that new
trade legislation would encounter a much bigger fight, a
prospect Kennedy feared because he hoped to face the Common
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Market with substantial negotiating authority. The EEC had
accelerated its timetable for putting in place its common
external tariff by 1 January 1962, and offered an initial
cut of 20% if America responded with reciprocal reductions
at the GATT talks which were already underway.
Revitalizing the RTA program demanded action, wrote
Professor Jacob Viner in an assessment of the
administration's first one hundred days of foreign economic
policy. Regardless of its recent tariff cut proposal, the
EEC was still a preferential trading bloc with the
potential for building a restrictive tariff wall. Worse,
Kennedy had not yet indicated the concessions on imports
the U.S. might offer to meet the European demands at the
trade negotiations, protectionism was on the rise in
Congress, and the RTA was soon due to expire. The
1
9
international trade regime had reached a crossroads.
The President answered the call by setting up the
administrative machinery to write a new trade bill. He
concurred with aide Richard Neustadt^s plan to direct the
bill from the White House under a task force. A search
began for candidates to head the group who were well-versed
in the technical as well as political aspects of trade,
respected by Congress, and preferably Republican to assure
a non-partisan approach. The administration settled on
Howard C. Petersen, a former undersecretary of war, a close
friend of Ball's, and now a Republican banker interested in
foreign trade. Like Kennedy, Petersen held a hard-nosed
view of trade. He faulted America as much as Europe for
agricultural barriers, high tariffs, and restrictions
against LDC goods, but criticized the EEC common tariff
because it diverted many products to the U.S. market.
Urging acceptance of the principles of just compensation,
comparative advantage, and realistic access to markets,
Petersen declared that "most of all, we shall have to
create the fact and appearance of fairness" in trade.
Petersen debated Ball over the bill. Both agreed on
authority to halve tariffs over five years, but differed on
the extent of safeguards from imports. Petersen revised
the peril point, or the import level which permitted escape
from a tariff agreement, because its elimination would
invite the wrath of protectionists. Ball removed the peril
points as part of his plan to junk entirely the RTA. Their
major point of contention was when to present the bill to
Congress. Ball said Petersen's suggestion of 1962 was too
early to offer a radical departure in trade policy. He
feared that provoking protectionists might hurt Democratic
Party prospects in an election year. Kennedy also needed
more time to educate the public on the link between freer
trade and American economic health. Above all. Ball
delayed so as not to upset Britain's chances of entering
21the EEC.
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Its trade on the Continent threatened, its leadership
role in European politics undercut, and its economy mired
in a state of stagnation, Britain had announced this course
in August, 1961. Many British citizens opposed accession
because of the potential loss of sovereignty, farm
subsidies which kept prices high for farmers but acceptably
I
low for consumers, and the preferential trade system of
which the Commonwealth nations depended for duty-free
access into British markets. Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan pledged to protect these interests, but knew that
the future of Europe lay not with the British-led EFTA, but
with the blossoming EEC which had already drained U.S.
investment capital out of England. He also believed his
country could step in as a leader in the event that Charles
de Gaulle did not survive the Algerian crisis or German
22Chancellor Konrad Adenauer retired.
While the Six in general encouraged Britain, de Gaulle
doubted British sincerity in upholding Common Market goals,
especially economic and political integration. History
made the application suspect. England had not only stayed
aloof when the EEC was formed, but had been decidely
hostile to the Six. London's deep commercial and political
ties to the Commonwealth and the United States bothered de
Gaulle, who wondered about Britain's committment to a
wholly European bloc. Once a member, de Gaulle feared,
Macmillan might lean more toward Atlanticism and boost U.S.
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preeminence in Europe, destroy the purpose of the EEC, and
subvert French leadership on the continent.
The Kennedy administration recognized Gaullist
suspicions as a legitimate concern. London stressed a
"special relationship" between the U.S. and Britain,
founded on their affinity in military, political, and
economic affairs. Though soured over the Suez incident and
recent U.S. opposition to the EFTA, Britain hoped that
relations would blossom under the anglophile Kennedy. This
wish was mere illusion. Kennedy and Macmillan were on
friendly terms, but the appointment of "Europe-first"
proponent Ball implied a loosening of the Anglo-American
binds in trade. Kennedy reportedly pleaded ignorant when
the Prime Minister referred to the special relationship.
In effect, the U.S. sought a special relationship not with
the UK, but with all of Europe in a united Atlantic
24
community
.
Thus, when the British sounded out Ball in late March,
1961, concerning the accession, he told them that America
would applaud the move on the condition that London accept
the political integration of the EEC as a step toward
Western unity. Contrary to the claims of de Gaulle,
British anti-Common Marketeers, and hegemony scholars,
Washington desired but had not forced the entry on London.
Some Americans, such as Galbraith, even opposed accession
because Britain might worsen the U.S. payments balance by
adding to an even stronger high-tariff bloc in Europe.
Ball and Kennedy thought the opposite; membership would
keep the EEC open. Nevertheless, before Macmillan visited
Washington in early April, Ball cautioned Kennedy that the
Prime Minister might seek the "best of both worlds" - trade
advantages through a loose association without a full
commitment to European integration,^^
The President was aware of this possibility, but was
also enthusiastic about the application. He accepted the
judgment that a more competitive Europe might hurt U.S.
trade interests, yet was confident that if the EEC expanded
trade with other nations, the benefits of membership would
outweigh the potential economic problems. Accession would
prevent the Six from turning inward and restricting access
to outsiders, as Britain would act as America's
"lieutenant" in Europe to counter Gaullist nationalism.
But without a doubt, entry would also serve British and
European aims. Although "in every case" it might not be in
American economic interests to back Britain, Kennedy added,
"we believe [the UK] builds a stronger Europe"
.
These hopes dampened when Britain qualified its
application. Just after his visit with Kennedy, in which
he had expressed his willingness to plunge Britain into
Europe, MacMillan retreated to the "old grooves" of British
policy. Due to intense pressure at home, he suggested that
the President press for transitional arrangements for UK
agriculture, the Commonwealth, and the EFTA during
Kennedy's meeting with de Gaulle in June, 1961. De Gaulle
rebuffed Kennedy's representations, claiming that he had
known all along that Britan would attach strings to its
2 7application. At best, the meeting aggravated de Gaulle's
suspicion that Britain would be Kennedy's "Trojan horse" in
Europe
.
Though sympathetic to the political constraints on
MacMillan, the administration was irked by his
qualifications. The U.S. could not permit the Commonwealth
to have the same preferential access in the EEC as French
overseas territories, while other LDCs suffered
discrimination. MacMillan hoped to "slide sideways into
the Common Market", argued Ball, by emphasizing economic
and not political imperatives. But in doing so, Britain
provoked nationalist sentiment in the EEC, thereby
undermining cohesion within the alliance and jeopardizing
2 8Kennedy' s primary consideration of political unity
.
In sum, Britain countered American plans for building a
North Atlantic concert. For broad political reasons, the
U.S. accepted that the EEC with Britain would be an even
more effective competitor. This view showed that America
did not seek a partnership solely on its own terms, as
2 9
some scholars have claimed. While MacMillan seemed
reluctant to sacrifice for the Western alliance, Kennedy
sought terms acceptable to the entire Atlantic community.
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In any event, Ball anticipated problems at the EEC-UK
talks, begun in October, 1961, and thus urged a delay in
the trade bill until 1963. He reasoned that new U.S. trade
legislation, by opening the way for reciprocal reductions
in EEC barriers, might give British opponents of accession
grounds to declare that membership was unnecessary once
greater access to the Continent became a reality. Also,
the Six might feel pressured by a new RTA, based in part on
the hopes of an enlarged Common Market, and cancel the
negotiations. Petersen and the President disagreed. Ball
was being an alarmist about the fragility of the UK-EEC
talks which might be might be pushed along if America had
new trade negotiating authority, believed Petersen,
Kennedy needed this power immediately, he continued, as
events in the Dillon Round of the GATT soon revealed.
The Dillon Round was the first test of whether America
and the EEC could agree on refashioning the trade regime of
the 1960s. Americans took to the negotiations in September
1960 the authority to reduce U.S. tariffs by 20% under the
RTA of 1958. Because of peril point restrictions, however,
most observers predicted America would not reach even this
meager percentage cut. Since Europe would not trim its
tariffs without reciprocal advantages in U.S. markets, GATT
Secretary-General Sir Eric Wyndham White pronounced that
the Round would at best serve as a launching point for more
31
major progress in trade liberalization in the future.
Like the other 22 participants, America expected
problems because GATT had never before dealt with a customs
union of such magnitude as the Common Market. The focus of
the talks was the EEC common external tariff, which the Six
offered to cut by 20%. Ball saw this offer as indicating
the EEC's determination to pursue a liberal course, but
Eisenhower and then Kennedy believed this reduction might
not be equitable in all cases since cuts might expose
sensitive industries or not lower EEC tariffs sufficiently.
Moreover, before multilateral reductions could begin, GATT
rules obliged the Common Market to grant compensation to
outside suppliers of products which might be burdened by
higher duties after the Six had adjusted their individual
rates to the EEC common external tariff on 1 January
321962.
The breaking of such "bindings" on these prior tariff
commitments, of which the U.S. claimed amounted to 1100
rates valued at $2 billion, obligated the Six to cut duties
on other products. But they resisted. In setting their
external tariff, they averaged the high French and Italian
rates with the lower German and Benelux duties which, they
declared, essentially lowered the overall aggregate tariff
level of the EEC as a whole and thus compensated outside
exporters to Europe. The U.S. disagreed. After haggling,
America pried concessions on bound duties in the EEC
totaling almost $1.6 billion on 991 rates. The Six said
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that this phase of the talks, extended four months past the
initial deadline, was now over. Dissatisfied with EEC
offers on agriculture, which were deferred to the next
phase of the Round, Washington grudgingly acquiesced to
33this position.
The complex field of agriculture, in fact, would plague
U,S ,"001011101:1 Market trade relations throughout the 1960s.
The EEC's common agricultural policy, a particularly rigid
protectionist system that penalized efficient exporters
such as the United States, was a major culprit. The CAP
promoted internal free-trade in farm goods, but subsidized
exports and subjected produce from outside Europe to a
minimum import price through a "variable levy"
(supplemented in some cases by tariffs) , which boosted the
price of these goods above the cost of EEC-produced
commodities. The levy promoted inefficiency; the Six,
expecially France which possessed almost half of the EEC's
arable land, needed more time to modernize farming
techniques and overcome U.S. and Commonwealth comparative
advantages in trade. The CAP, which relegated imports to a
marginal role of filling the decreasing gap between EEC
production and consumption, was anathema to suppliers
reliant on European markets. GATT head Wyndham White
blamed the "inward-looking" CAP for the "bleak" outlook of
34the Dillon negotiations
.
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The CAP was not the sole culprit in stemming
agricultural trade, however. European farmers hoped to
transform outsiders into minor suppliers in the region.
The EFTA excluded farm and fish products from tariff-
reduction schemes and, contrary to GATT rules, bargained
only on a bilateral basis. The United States, suffering
from a chronic production-consumption imbalance, had
constructed the biggest government subsidy in the world fo
farm goods. By the 1960s, however. Congress grew more
reluctant to allocate funds, and an American comparative
advantage in commodity trade gave export expansion through
free market mechanisms a greater importance
•
Because of the balance-of
-payments crisis, agricultural
trade was critical to the New Frontier. Kennedy took much
interest in farm exports as a partial solution for the
deficit and set out early in his administration to attack
protectionism overseas. He instructed Secretary of
Agriculture Orville Freeman to initiate an export drive as
one weapon to reverse the "marked lag" in trade barrier
reduction abroad. The President urged an end to these
restrictions "to keep the door of the Common Market open t
3 6American agriculture, and open it wider still" • True to
his fair-trade doctrine, he sought increased farm exports
because America held a comparative advantage over other
nations
.
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Kennedy knew that the CAP was a prerequisite for
European integration, but hoped to guarantee access for
U.S. agriculture during the compensatory phase of the
Dillon talks. Since the EEC bought nearly one-third of
these exports, of which the variable levy penalized 40%, he
pressed EEC Cominission President Walter Hallstein to
consider outsiders' interests before the CAP was in place
in early 1962. But Kennedy also knew that America would be
lucky to hang on to its existing markets, much less
increase access, especially since European farmers demanded
a greater share of regional trade. The Six, on the
understandable grounds that the unfinished CAP excused them
from setting tariffs for major commodities, would probably
promise only to maintain access for selected U.S.
^ 37exports
.
Kennedy hoped this pledge would satisfy American
farmers. Freeman warned him about the difficulty of
selling the tough controls envisioned for domestic farm
program if it appeared that the U.S. had traded
agricultural for industrial concessions at the Round.
Southern peanut, rice, tobacco, poultry, soybean oil, and
cotton producers were upset by the CAP ; so were Midwestern
feed grains, wheat, and dairy exporters. This bad feeling
could spill onto Capitol Hill, where powerful House and
Senate members would champion not only the cause of their
constituents but expect the administration to fight EEC
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farm protectionism on the LDCs
. "The politics that flows
from the potential loss of significant agricultural
markets, especially in the light of the need to sell the
Congress a Trade Expansion Act and a long-term supply
management farm program", noted Freeman, "is obvious".
His hands tied by Common Market policy, Kennedy agreed
to the EEC offer to maintain America's historical level of
access. He sent Charles Murphy of the USDA and Petersen to
make "a strong representation" on this score to the EEC.
They received assurances of access from the Six under
"standstill" agreements, but the Europeans refused to
compensate the U.S. for bindings broken on one-third of its
farm exports. The USDA suggested suspending the Round as a
signal of American displeasure, but Kennedy abandoned the
issue for the time being. He viewed the EEC's offer as a
concession which met an important U.S. demand. In any
event, he expected to fight the CAP another day once his
3 9new trade bill gave him more bargaining authority.
Besides, if he had pressed the EEC, he risked a collapse
of the negotiations in the more promising industrial
sector. On manufactures, remarked a trade official, "we're
. . 40getting a damn sight more than we're giving away." The
EEC still offered to cut its external tariff on a
reciprocal basis by 20% in broad, "linear" sectors.
Washington welcomed the linear approach, used by the EEC in
internal duty reductions, as a replacement for the
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cumbersome method of negotiating tariff cuts on each item
within a sector. Ball declared however, that the U.S. had
no authority under the RTA of 1958 to proceed with such
across-the-board cuts. In the end, though the Six attached
numerous exceptions to the linear provision, America could
offer concessions on only one-fifth of the EEC's requests
41on manufactured goods.
Since the Six recognized the limited authority of the
RTA, yet exected some showing of reciprocity, Kennedy
proposed more concessions to forestall a collapse of the
Round. A comparison of tariff rates on seven types of non-
agricultural products showed most EEC duties ranged between
25-40%, while many American rates were much lower but also
much higher. U.S. tariffs above 30% applied to 7% of the
value of these goods, for example, while only 1% of
Europe's duties were in this category. Stymied by peril
points, which effectively emasculated his authority to
reduce tariffs by 20%, Kennedy permitted negotiators to
ignore the limits and grant concessions on $76 million
worth of non-sensitive imports. Since the U.S. still gave
substantially less than the EEC, the Six withdrew over 100
items from the bargaining table. The Dillon Round ended on
7 March, 1962 with duty cuts of 10% instead of the
42
unambitious initial 20% goal.
The results, though disappointing, were not fruitless.
The difficult talks on agriculture had won an EEC promise
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to maintain the status quo on farm imports and stimulated
efforts to produce an agreement at the next GATT round.
Both sides made significant concessions on manufactures;
Europe on transportation equipment, electrical and
industrial machinery, and chemicals and the U.S. on
machinery, electrical apparatus, steel, and most important,
European automobile imports which had jumped in the past
couple of years. The Six offered once again to reduce
their common tariff by 20% when America possessed new
4 3
negotiating authority.
Most important, the talks publicized the need for
revised trade legislation. The Round revealed the
anachronistic nature of the item-by-item approach to tariff
negotiations and thus helped to persuade Congress to accept
the linear method in Kennedy^ s trade bill. The President
exaggerated the gains won by American negotiators in order
to maintain domestic support for trade negotatiations with
the Common Market. Yet he concentrated on the "hampering
features" of the RTA which undermined the U.S. position at
the Round. "Our negotiators were grievously short of
bargaining power", he said, and though the EEC had
understood this fact, "we cannot be expected to bargain
effectively in the future under the limitation of the
44present law"
.
His position showed a fair-trade bent. By dropping
below the peril points, with substantial political risk, he
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tried to forge an acceptable trade agreement with the
Common Market. He had abandoned hope of prying open the
EEC's agricultural market any further because Europe was
not yet ready to give more, and took what he could in the
industrial sector. Overall, the President implicitly
recognized that problems with the EEC in farm exports, and
America's inability to respond adequately with cuts in
industrial tariffs, meant that Europe had managed to
bargain with the U.S. for the first time on an equitable
basis. In order to meet this new European bargaining
power, he set out to replace the inadequate RTA with his
own trade bill.
Some public feelers helped Kennedy begin this process.
Returning from Europe, Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA)
asserted that an extension of the RTA would be "grossly
ineffective" in future negotiations with the EEC. He held
hearings in December to propagandize for new trade
legislation
.
Former State Department officials Christian
A. Herter and William L. Clayton had appealed to Boggs
along the same lines on 1 November. While Europe moved
forward, America "drifted backwards" under the RTA into
protectionism, potentially causing allied friction,
disarray in the Third World, and ultimately, the West to
fail against "relentless, irreconcilable, [and] merciless"
communist expansion, they wrote. A U.S. -EEC "partnership",
45
forged by U.S. trade policy, could avert this occurrence.
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At this time, the administration disavowed the
partnership idea and the closed regional system it implied
in order to stress trade based on the most-favored-nation
principle. But in its descriptive qualities, the Boggs-
Herter pamphlet mimicked the administration's stance. No
longer could American economic health determine foreign
trade policy, explained Ball to the National Foreign Trade
Council. Khrushchev boasted that communism would win the
cold war through growth and economic competition, and
rising Soviet-EEC trade was just one indication of his
47
mission. Businessmen m the EEC and EFTA, moreover, had
abandoned their old trade and investment patterns. They
recognized the Common Market as an "inescapable fact", he
added, which placed America on "the threshold of a new
trading world" in which there was no place for economic
nationalism
.
Thus
,
Congress must give the President the
tools to bargain with the Six and maintain the U.S.
......
• • ^ ^ • n 48initiative m international commerce
.
The momentum generated by the Boggs , Herter /Clayton, and
Ball sorties wiped out any doubts about a "bold" trade bill
for 1962. Kennedy hinted in early November 1961 that
Congress could expect a bill which provided for large
reductions in U.S. trade barriers to meet the challenge of
the EEC. Some domestic interests might be hurt, he
admitted, but the country must trade fairly by buying as
well as selling. Kennedy already sided with Ball on the
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outline of the bill and agreed with Petersen on 1962 as the
time to proceed. Characteristically, he had reached these
decisions before he met with Ball, Petersen, Hodges, White
House aide Theodore Sorensen, and trade task force member
Peter Jones at Hyannisport on 24 November to discuss the
bill. ^9
Naturally^ their central concern was Congress. Petersen
admitted that since 1962 was an election year, legislators
might be ultra-sensitive to import-competing constituents
and choose to oppose a liberal trade bill. Seymour Harris
urged Kennedy to beware of the doctrinaire free-traders,
because if the President shrugged off protectionists by
overstating the case for liberal trade, he would be "taking
a large political gamble and probably a losing one" with
his bill.^°
Regarding the politics of trade, Kennedy needed no
prompting. He appointed the respected Hodges to shepherd
the bill in Congress and refused to erase the peril point
because of its importance for protectionists. But,
cognizant of congressional behavior, Kennedy opposed
postponing or weakening his bill . Lawrence 0' Brien, his
liaison with Congress, promoted a departure from the RTA
after encouraging talks with House Ways and Means Chairman
Wilbur Mills, whose committee would hear the bill*
Believing that much of the New Frontier's stalled
legislation in 1961 was the result of delaying tactics by
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the President, O'Brien pressed Kennedy to make the trade
bill his top priority in Congress. The President agreed,
believing the feeble RTA of 1958 had been the result of
Eisenhower^ s unwillingness to attack protectionists.
Kennedy, whom advisors agreed understood Congress as well
as anyone, decided to take the offensive for "a big one".^^
The President announced in early December his intention
of sending a trade bill to Congress. Speaking before the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) , he noted the reasons for his
legislation. The deficit, the EEC, aid to poor nations,
and the cold war provided the impetus for a refashioned
trade policy. In essence, America had no other choice but
freer trade, for protectionism would chase capital and jobs
from the country. Above all, restricting trade would
further "diminish our stature in the Free World".
Americans must accept that U.S. economic supremacy was a
thing of the past, he said, and no "part of the world
market is any longer ours by default" because "the
competition grows keener"
.
To slow the loss of U.S. dominance and its leadership
around the globe, there was one answer: free-trade. He
did not seek to abandon the traditional safeguards for weak
industries or lower American trade barriers unilaterally,
but relied on adjustment assistance as a remedy for import
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injury. Drawing the battlelines for protectionists,
however, Kennedy boldly promised that imports would rise,
though not as much as exports, he hoped. The nation could
not tolerate inefficient industries; they were "standing in
the way" of progress in American domestic and international
plans. Trade based on comparative advantage must become
accepted practice in American policy.
America must therefore approach negotiations with common
sense. Surely no country would lower its trade barriers
unless the U.S. offered concessions which were in their
economic interest to accept. In order to induce every
member of the Atlantic community to share military,
economic, and political burdens, American domestic
interests must accept that the purpose of tariffs was to
"cushion adjustments", not to "shut off competition". The
AFL-CIO and NAM might grumble, and some advisors wince at
this straight forward declaration for liberal trade, but
they should have also recognized it as the foundation of
52Kennedy' s fair-trade doctrine
.
On 25 January 1962, the President sent his trade bill to
Congress. It was novel, even in name. In order to detach
the legislation from the outworn Eisenhower RTAs, and to
promote growth as an overriding factor in foreign trade,
the administration christened the bill the Trade Expansion
Act (TEA) . It aim to afford "mutual benefits" to all of
America's trade partners, especially the EEC, boost LDC
exports, and assist, but not protect, import
-competing
industries. A "wholly new approach", the TEA "could well
affect the unity of the West, the course of the Cold War,
and the economic growth of our nation for a generation to
come", Kennedy proclaimed,
For international trade negotiations, the TEA provided
the President with four kinds of authority to be used over
a five-year period ending 30 June 1967. In all four, the
linear, or sectoral tariff-cutting procedure replaced the
onerous item-by-item method. First, there was a basic
authority which enabled the President to reduce tariffs by
50% of the rates existing on 1 July 1962 on a most-favored-
nation, or non-discriminatory, reciprocal basis. Such a
drastic cut gave U.S. negotiators bargaining power to
induce the EEC to grant wider access and fair treatment to
outsiders' goods and crops. Second, the TEA provided for
the elimination of tariffs of 5% or less.
The third authority was the "dominant supplier"
provision, directed specifically at the Common Market. On
products in which the EEC and the U.S. combined for 8 0% or
more of world exports, the President could exceed the 50%
basic authority and eliminate all tariffs. This zero duty
clause addressed the "commonality" and unique "trade
partnership" between the Six and America in that
collectively, they held an overwhelming competitive
position on certain goods. These products were ones in
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which both sides sought more access and accounted for $2
billion in U.S. exports. The dominant supplier applied to
other nations under the MFN rule, but the provision
signified Kennedy's over-arching concern with the Common
Market as he shifted trade policy from a multilateral to a
regional focus as part of his Grand Design.
The dominant supplier turned out to be a mis judgment.
Ball and Kennedy could not hide their intention of making
British membership in the Conmion Market more attractive to
the EEC through the zero duty clause. Without the UK
figured in, very few products (aircraft and margarine and
shortenings) existed in which America and the EEC combined
for 80% of global sales. Thus, the Six could abort the
clause if they refused Britain entry. The duty free
measure might irk de Gaulle and several congressmen who
perceived the authority as a veiled attempt to buy off the
EEC. The policy appeared as if America indeed sought to
push Britain into the EEC as its "trojan horse".
The fourth authority promoted Third World exports. The
TEA decreased the trade disparity between rich and poor
nations by applying MFN treatment to all countries, not
just the North. The bill also included reductions of
restrictions on tropical agricultural and forest
commodities supplied by the LCDs and not produced in
significant quantities in America. The latter proviso
alleviated the fears of U.S. import -competing sugar,
cotton, and other commodity producers. Kennedy cloaked the
LDC authority behind the humanitarian aim of raising Third
World exports to a level which would provide a self-
sufficient income
.
The provision would also help Latin American exports
climb over CAP barriers and gain greater access into the
EEC. Kennedy sought curbs on the preferential tariff
treatment accorded the African territories of EEC nations
and the Commonwealth once Britain joined the Six. Most
Latin American products entered duty-free into the U.S. but
suffered discrimination in Europe. Opening up the EEC for
Latin America was in America's interests, too, because
greater opportunity in Europe might reduce the U.S. intake
of LDC crops
.
Nonetheless, Kennedy' s representation for
54Latin exporters was also generous and far-sighted
.
In order to meet the barrier reduction goals of the four
authorities, and promote trade based on comparative
advantage, the TEA restricted the use of domestic
safeguard, or protection provisions . The bill introduced
new criteria which changed the "no-injury" philosophy of
the RTA. The previous definition permitted the escape
clause even if imports were only partly responsible for
injury of any segment of an industry . The TEA required
proof that imports directly caused and were the main factor
in persistent idling of a firm, or the inability to turn a
profit, or unemployment in an entire industry. In effect,
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the TEA made resort to the escape clause more difficult
than under any previous RTA. Furthermore, the Tariff
Commission would still hold peril point hearings, but would
only recommend, and no longer make, peril point
determinations to the President.
By no means did the TEA abandon safeguards. The
national security clause, which permitted a defense-related
industry to withdraw from a trade agreement deemed harmful
to the country's security, remained intact. The TEA also
allowed escape when "indirect" competitive products, or
import substitutes, displaced domestic production. For
instance, imports of glace cherries were competitive with
U.S. raw cherries and therefore could be restricted. Non-
tariff barriers, including inducing other nations to
establish voluntary export restraints, could be used if the
President found serious injury from imports . As a
temporary resort, he could also raise tariffs up to 50% of
the rate existing on 1 July 1934 on dutiable or duty-free
, 56goods
.
Adjustment assistance, however, would provide an
alternative to trade barriers as the solution to import
relief. This plan, developed by Kennedy in the 1950s, gave
the President flexibility to cut tariffs by relying on
safety nets. The President, advised by the Tariff
Commission, determined eligibility for adjustment
assistance . Unemployment compensation, re -training, early
retirement benefits, and relocation aid was available to
workers. Farmers, manufacturers, and firms received
technical advice on planning and implementing adjustments
to imports, tax benefits and loans with liberal
depreciation and amortization allowances, and aid to
modernize and diversify plant facilities. Industries could
even resort to temporary tariff hikes. Aid flowed also
through other legislation, such as the Area Redevelopment
program, and cease when the injured party had recovered. ^'^
The program was a realistic fair-trade compromise
between protectionism and free-trade. Adjustment
assistance substituted for high tariffs, explained Kennedy,
yet eased the burden of duty reductions on producers and
provided an option to the seldom-invoked escape clause. It
also embedded the principle of comparative advantage into
U.S. trade policy. The trend toward freer global trade
offered more opportunities in the long-run for exporters,
and would make import-competitors more competitive instead
of postponing hard choices through protectionism. The
"accent" of the TEA was on "adjustment" more than
"assistance", he noted, in order to "strengthen the
efficiency of our economy, not to protect its
inefficiencies"
.
The Trade Expansion Act was the culmination of Kennedy's
experience over the past fifteen years and the most
revolutionary reciprocal trade legislation since 1934. The
116
bill signified a major departure in tactics in postwar U.S.
trade liberalism. Though it cushioned the impact of freer
trade at home like the old RTA, the TEA offered direct
government aid as a substitution for protectionism.
Kennedy appraised the global transformations affecting
American commerce and the political limits of pressing the
principle of comparative advantage on Congress. The TEA
thus reflected a fair-trade balance of aid and free-trade.
By doing so, the bill furnished opportunities unparallelled
in U.S. trade history for adjusting America to a trade
regime in which it was no longer the sole leader.
Kennedy recognized the changes wrought by the Common
Market, the payments deficit, and Soviet rivalry, and asked
for the tools to meet these challenges. America faced a
choice between a stronger domestic and global economy or
endless recessions, deteriorating growth, and a fractured
alliance of Western nations. Columnist Joseph Kraft wrote
that economic dilemmas at home, rising LDC demands for aid,
and European drift toward an independent course in economic
and nuclear policy awaited the U.S. if Congress rejected
the TEA. America would simply "default on power;", he
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warned, and "resign from history".
Surely, Kraft noted that the administration had not made
great strides in injecting U.S. power sucessfully
throughout the globe during its first year. Kennedy
suffered setbacks in his European policy, the most
noticeable being the Berlin wall in August and a troubled
relationship with de Gaulle and Adenauer made apparent in
June. The meager results of the Dillon Round, caused by
the conflict over agriculture and U.S. peril points,
revealed a possible split over trade matters between the
allies. Furthermore, the Third World and Japan pressed
increasingly for access into Atlantic markets and attacked
U.S. protectionism.
Kennedy recognized the significance of the Common Market
and its potentially harmful impact on U.S. trade. The
payments deficit, the creation of the OECD, and the results
of the Dillon Round were manifestations of European
equality in commercial power relative to the United States.
Kennedy feared that West Germany and France, the
predominant powers in the EEC, might use the Six against
American political designs for an open and united Atlantic
community, especially by rejecting UK membership. Yet he
also winced at Britain's pursuit of attaching conditions to
its entry and further upsetting his European policy.
The TEA addressed these problems. To Kennedy, the bill
was the logical outgrowth of postwar U.S. foreign policy,
aimed at building a concert of Western nations through
free-trade. He now meant to use the prospect of
liberalized access to the American market to help the whole
system. In effect, a trade coalition of rich and poor
nations represented a segment of the international arena
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where the West might make great strides in defeating
communism, poverty, and the potential for war. In defense
policy, Kennedy used U.S. military aid and other carrots to
foster closer relations between the U.S. and its allies.
In foreign economic policy he employed the Trade Expansion
Act
.
The primacy of the TEA propelled it to the top of the
administration's legislative agenda of 1962, Some
advisors, such as Arthur Schlesinger, believed that other
programs deserved more attention. Critical of the mystique
surrounding the TEA, he missed the intention of the
legislation. The bill was the hallmark of the New
Frontier's foreign economic policy, a panacea for present
problems and future circumstances. It thus warranted the
almost evangelical promotion by Kennedy. Thus, considering
its sweeping provisions, there was truth in the President's
statement that as "NATO was unprecedented in military
history, this measure is unprecedented in economic
history .
"
Without a doubt, moreover, the need for a legislative
victory explained the TEA'S top billing in 1962. The first
year of the New Frontier had yielded Kennedy few
significant gains despite his desire to change things. His
narrow electoral win in 1960 was not a mandate from the
people which might ease his legislation through Congress,
as Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan later
enjoyed. Kennedy believed that the issue of trade, if
advertised effectively as a crucial part of American
economic health and international unity, might present him
with a much-needed major victory on Capitol Hill.
The TEA was a calculated risk, however. Most of
Congress might accept liberal trade, but protectionists
were an obstacle, as the OECD debate had shown. The
gutting of traditional safeguards under the TEA aggravated
them, and even those private interests amenable to freer
trade opposed opening U.S. markets "willy-nilly" to
imports. Democratic and Republican legislators alike now
considered the ill effects of trade on producers and
workers at home rather than voting a party line on trade
bills, as had been more the case in the 1950s. The Wall
Street Journal in November 1961 reported that protectionist
sentiment in Congress had never been higher. Other
business experts predicted that protectionism "on Capitol
Hill will clash head-on with the Administration", making
the TEA campaign the "biggest" and "bitterest" battle over
6
1
trade since the Hawley-Smoot high tariff debacle of 1930.
A victory for Kennedy was not a sure thing. He therefore
set out beforehand to remove the most vocal and influential
import-competing protectionists from the path of his trade
bill.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: TEXTILES AND LUMBER
The passage of the Trade Expansion Act depended on how
effectively the President mustered votes from Congress.
Kennedy counted on support from Midwestern farm states,
which sought an increase in agricultural exports, and
industrial states in the East, Midwest, and Far West which
traditionally backed liberal trade. But in 1958,
Eisenhower had relied on these states, too. Though he won
his trade bill. Congress limited his ability to lower trade
barriers by attaching a plethora of safeguards and
weakening his authority over tariffs. Kennedy demanded
much more authority, and from a similarly protectionist
Congress
.
Kennedy aggressively approached Congress. Realizing
that his bill undermined the traditional protection of
previous U.S. trade policy, the strong, organized
protectionists had already served notice of their intent to
mount a vigorous campaign to defeat the TEA. Many of them
--were not strident protectionists who opposed free-trade out
of principle, but merely sought aid for industries which
had suffered under rising imports in recent years. Textile
and lumber interests, both with powerful support on Capitol
Hill, were two examples. Kennedy hoped, like Eisenhower,
that free-traders would overwhelm the protectionists. Yet
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he tried to satisfy the latter' s demands before the TEA
came to a vote and neutralize large blocs of
protectionists
.
This tactic of wooing legislators provides a test case
for models of interest intermediation. Corporatists point
to a consensus of government and private sector decision-
)
makers in forging textile and lumber trade policy.
Bureaucratic politics points to competition between
departments and officials in molding policy choices and
influencing presidential decisions. The interest group and
regulatory politics models offer Congress as the arena
where trade policy is determined.
Centered on Capitol Hill, with the administration on one
side and interest groups on the other, the decisions on
textile and lumber indicated an accommodation between the
President and Congress consistent with the regulatory
politics model. Pushed by their constituents, the textile
and lumber blocs confronted Kennedy and demanded relief
from imports. He satisfied enough of these legislators
with special assistance programs, but not to the extent
wished by import-competitors. The President based aid on
one leg of the fair-trade doctrine, yet such help signified
a tactical compromise. His attention cleared the way for
congressional acceptance of the TEA and made possible the
international leg of the doctrine. That is, Kennedy
protected some industries in order to achieve his overall
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goal of lowering trade barriers under the principle of
comparative advantage.
The administration confidently predicted victory for the
TEA but off the record worried about its prospects. One
senator estimated only 4 0 votes for the TEA in the Senate,
while support in the House was lacking. The President's
congressional liaison office reported that supporters of
the 1958 trade act had turned lukewarm in recent years.
Polling Congress, Theodore Sorensen told Kennedy that the
TEA needed bi-partisan support to win. But Congress had
stalled the New Frontier in 1961, prompting Congressional
Quarterly to predict an "uphill struggle" for Kennedy
legislation in 1962,
The 87th Congress was the most conservative since 1954
because of a coalition of Republicans and Southern
Democrats. Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark.), chairman of the House
Ways and Means committee which would hold hearings on the
bill, supported Kennedy but was tough on imports. Senator
Harry F. Byrd (D-W,VA) , whose Finance Committee would also
hear the bill, was a protectionist and disliked the new
President. Kennedy missed the leadership of free-traders
Sam Rayburn, the House Speaker who died in 1961, and Lyndon
Johnson in the Senate, got on badly with the new House
Speaker John W. McCormack (D-MA) , and was weakened by
Senate floor leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who lacked
Johnson's power. Partisan politics, moreover, inspired
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Republicans to veto legislation on which the President had
risked much of his prestige. By rallying against the TEA,
they hoped to seize control of Congress and hamper the New
Frontier as a way of derailing Kennedy's re-election bid in
1964.^
To win the TEA, Kennedy also had to overcome
protectionism as an effective force in Congress.
Congressman John H. Dent (D-PA)
, who claimed that Kennedy's
view of trade was a one-way street of exports where imports
were ignored, led these forces in the House. His Senate
counterpart, Prescott S. Bush (R-CT)
, railed that the TEA
permitted a "reckless destruction of jobs" with little
insurance except for the "untested" and "dubious"
adjustment assistance measure. Since 1962 was an election
year, Kennedy feared that even members of Congress with
import-competing constituents, who sided with free-trade,
might join the protectionists in order not to upset voters
at home
.
Imports encumbered the President's task of removing the
cotton textile industry, the largest protectionist
interest, from the opposition's camp and enhancing the
prospects of the TEA. From 1958 to 1960, imports of cotton
goods increased by nearly two and one-half times; in dollar
value, a jump of over 76%, or $119 million. Meanwhile,
since exports rose only slightly, the cotton textile trade
surplus, which had been $125 million in 1958 shrank to $19
million two years later. These high imports and sluggish
exports curbed production and depressed the industry. For
instance, 128 mills closed across the nation and employment
reached an alltime low.*^
His senate experience and the campaign of 1960 compelled
Kennedy to address these problems. As a senator, he had
described Eisenhower's textile import policy as "shabby"
but the presidential politics of trade required some
balance. During the campaign, Kennedy relied on a regional
strategy of winning the South, New England, and big
Northern industrial states. A protectionist policy on
textile imports would appeal to the former two, where the
industry was strongest. Fair-trade might win votes from
the latter, where states such as New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Ohio ranked high as exporters but had
industries which had suffered import injury. During the
campaign, he pledged to South Carolina Governor Ernest
Rollings, who made good on a pledge to deliver his
consitutuents to the Kennedy cause, that a solution to the
cotton textile problem would be a "top priority objective"
. . . 5
of hxs administration.
His commitment was sincere but based on a keen
appreciation of the industry' s political strength. One of
the nation's largest manufacturing employers, the cotton
textile industry amassed approximately 94% of its workers
in 16 states. Over half of these employees hailed from
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four deep-South states
-Alabama, Georgia, and North and
South Carolina
- and another 7% came from Virginia and
Tennessee. Due to 140 mill closings since 1951, these six
states had suffered an average drop in textile jobs of
nearly 17%, and the South as a whole a loss of 14%.^
Kennedy's textile program centered on cotton
manufactures in order to win TEA votes from southern
congressmen, most of whose districts were filled with
cotton textile mills. Howard Petersen and House Majority
Whip Carl Albert calculated that the President needed
support from Southern Democrats since he could not depend
on Republican votes. Though Kennedy did well in the South
in 1960, he surmised that a trade policy which hurt the
region, especially an industry with "political muscle"
like textiles interests, would bode ill not only for his
TEA, but for agricultural, civil rights, and social
spending bills which would face congressional committees
led and dominated by southerners. Opposition from mill
owners to free-trade had a great effect on Southern
congressmen, noted a Georgian businessman, and even many
legislators from non-textile districts were philosophically
protectionist and thus sympathetic to restraints on
7imports.
The South was not Kennedy's only worry, however. Every
New England and Mid-Atlantic state except Vermont,
Maryland, and Delaware, in addition to Ohio and Illinois,
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were among the top 16 states with textile employment.
They, too, demanded special consideration regarding import
limitations on cotton, wool, and synthetic textiles. with
employment down 61% since 1951 and 12% from 1958, or 15,000
jobs. New England had experienced 278 mill liquidations in
all textile categories. In the Mid-Atlantic states, 47% of
the workers had lost their jobs since 1951 and in Illinois
alone, 27%. Kennedy expected some opposition among
congressmen from these states to a liberal trade program.^
Six votes on trade between 1948 and 1961 showed the
depth of protectionism in the textile bloc. In the 16 top
employment states were the 132 congressmen and 32 senators
who would vote on the TEA. In the House, 61%, or 81 of the
members in these states voted against the RTA at least
twice and 38%, or 50 voted protectionist in 1958. In
addition, many of the 128 members of a new, 35-state bi-
partisan textile group did not come from the major textile
states, including all but one of the 22 congressmen from
Florida, Mississippi, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
House members who had conditioned their support for the
last RTA on assurances that textile imports would not
injure the industry were now upset that the opposite had
9
occurred.
In the Senate, only seven out the 32 members of the 16
textile states voted for a restrictionist amendment to the
1958 RTA and only nine sided with a similar amendment to
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the minimum wage bill in 1961. Yet, 34 senators, including
at least one member from all but one of the top 16 textile
states, one each from Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Oregon, South Dakota, and both from Texas and Wyoming,
signed two letters to the President expressing their
concern over textile imports. Senator Edmund Muskie (R-ME)
warned that without a "realistic solution to the problem of
textile imports", Kennedy faced "real difficulty" on the
Trade Expansion Act."'-'^
Behind Congress was a powerful and vocal lobby of
textile interests. Since 1958, when major hearings on
textile imports began. Congress heard repeated grievances
from "Big Textiles", such as Burlington Industries, J.P
Stevens, and Cannon Mills, against imports. They were
members of the peak political cotton textile organization,
the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute (ACMI)
, which
represented 80% of the industry. The ACMI compelled the
National Cotton Council, an association of growers who sold
cotton to mills, to support protectionism. Joining them
was the Textile Workers Union of America. These groups
enjoyed leverage in Congress
.
Textile protectionism varied in degree, but the majority
within the bloc sought import restrictions. Congressman
Dent held hearings throughout 19 61 on a variety of import-
competing products, including textiles. He explained that
protectionism for the industry was not new, quoting Senator
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Kennedy's remarks about cutting imports when certain
industries faced extinction. Textilemen supported freer
trade, but not when competition was "unfair" due to low-
cost and low-wage production abroad. Indeed, administration
members remarked that Americans most feared imports of
labor-intensive manufactures from the Third World.
Interest group pressure prompted a subcommittee headed
by Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) to recommend import
quotas, modernization efforts, and federal assistance to
help the industry. Pastore admitted that the industry's
health was cyclical and pledged support for the TEA, yet
implied to the ACMI that inaction on textile imports might
lose his vote. He urged a reappraisal of the import
situation by the cabinet-level Inter-agency Textile
Committee (ITC)
,
which under Eisenhower had rejected all
the subcommittee's suggestions. Textilemen remembered that
Kennedy had pledged a "comprehensive industry-wide remedy"
and had backed Pastore' s recommendations. Now they urged
him to make good on his campaign promises
.
Kennedy tried to head off such pressure, but events
overtook him. Just weeks after Rollings, the textile bloc,
and the industry recommended a textile import quota bill In
February, 19 61, he appointed Commerce Secretary Hodges, a
veteran of service to the textile industry who, as Governor
of North Carolina, had called for quotas on textile
imports, to lead the ITC and find a solution to the import
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problem. Before Hodges could act, the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America announced a boycott in February 1961 on
cut cloth from Japan unless the U.S. established quotas.
The President warned that such action only invited
retaliation from other nations and worsened the payments
deficit. The union stopped the boycott, but labor groups
remained uneasy about the inflow of imports . •'"'^
Meanwhile, the textile bloc and the ITC suggested import
restrictions. Representatives Carl Vinson (D-GA) , a key
source of Southern support for the New Frontier, W.J. Bryan
Dorn (D-NC)
,
an enemy of the administration, and a nucleus
of protectionists formed the 128-member Textile Conference
Group. After talking with Kennedy on 2 7 March 1961 about
imports, the Group wrote him a letter which predicted
congressional rejection of a new trade bill unless there
were safeguards for textiles. In April, the ITC reinforced
this and the Pastore subcommittee position. Bureaucratic
politics mattered little; the protests of free-trader
George Ball, a member of the ITC, were swept aside. Hodges
recommended a system of controls modeled after the 1957
voluntary export restraint on Japanese cotton textiles
which slashed Tokyo's sales to America by a quarter after
1956.-^^
On 2 May 1961, Kennedy bowed to congressional and
industry pressure and proposed a seven-point agenda of
assistance for the cotton textile industry. He called for
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government aid to help the industry modernize and become
more competitive, including revised depreciation
allowances, loans, and research and development programs.
He asked for a study of the two-price global cotton price
system and the possible imposition of an eight and one-half
cents "equalization fee" on cotton textile imports. A
barrier against raw cotton imports made textile
manufacturers captives of higher domestic cotton prices,
while foreign manufacturers bought cotton at the lower
world market cost. The fee would balance out the
differential.
The seven-point plan also opened up the possibility of
easier resort for cotton textile manufacturers to the
escape and national security clauses of the RTA as well as
permitting industry's to seek federal aid. Most important,
Kennedy directed Ball to arrange a meeting under GATT to
negotiate a protective trade agreement. The program,
Kennedy hoped, would build a fair-trade regime in cotton
textiles by protecting domestic producers and slowly
expanding LDC exports.
Ball began organizing a GATT trade regime for cotton
textiles. Believing that LDC development depended on
export expansion of their lucrative but scant industrial
exports, Ball urged the North to ease restrictions on light
manufactures such as textiles. Behind the plan was
America's objective of decreasing U.S. imports from poor
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nations while increasing Third World access into the EEC.
Ball sought a fair-trade arrangement by protecting Northern
textile industries without cutting off textile exporters -
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, and the United
Arab Republic - from Atlantic markets. "^"^
Ball advocated two aims as he shuttled between the LDCs,
Europe, and North America to round up participants for the
GATT meeting. First, he sought to ease severe restrictions
in importing nations by a more equitable distribution of
LDC cotton textile exports. Ball focused on compelling the
EEC to take its fair share. Second, and somewhat
disingenuously he believed, the U.S. sought voluntary
export restraints so that the North could "stabilize" LDC
exports in an expanding but "orderly" fashion. He opposed
unilateral quotas, planned to discuss only cotton goods,
and set import levels higher than expected by the U.S.
textile industry. When prodded for a more restrictive
policy by the U.S. textilemen. Ball grew hostile toward
them.
Ball's response obviously did not appease textile
interests, who reacted angrily to the details of the plan,
and disturbed the politically sensitive Myer Feldman, the
President's aide on trade matters. Wool, synthetic, and
apparel manufacturers and unions and the ACMI expressed
dissatisfaction that the GATT talks would be limited to
cotton textiles and would base future textile imports on
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the high 1960 level. a letter signed by the House and
Senate textile blocs denounced the Kennedy solution as a
"piecemeal and totally inadequate program" that could only
embarrass the President's long-term trade proposals.
Senator Pastore added that the alternative to satisfactory
quotas was certain defeat of the projected trade bill by
the concerted efforts of the textile bloc.^^
A generally uncooperative international community also
threatened to upset the plan. Only Canada and West
Germany, both with textile problems similar to those of
America, endorsed the GATT conference without
qualifications. Japan and the LDCs, with comparative
advantages in cotton textiles, feared that the U.S. and the
EEC would turn any agreement into a global quota system and
therefore severely restrict their exports. Japan, Hong
Kong, and India to a lesser extent backed a multilateral
quantitative scheme, though a voluntary export agreement
between the former and the U.S. and British bilateral
limits with the latter two already existed. But they only
supported a regime that would assure more liberal trade and
2 0curb export restraints.
Skepticism was the feeling in Europe. Britain chafed at
letting in more textiles from Asia. Under accords with
Hong Kong and India, London had accepted more cotton goods
and, to the detriment of its Lancashire mills, became a net
importer by 1958. The British posited that cautious.
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bilateral negotiations, not a global multilateral regime,
would better serve the interests of all nations. To
appease Kennedy, however, Britain supported "orderly-
import growth but only when other nations accepted
comparable shares of textiles from Japan and the LDCs.^l
Britain and the U.S. accused the Common Market of
muffling discussions on liberalizing textile imports. Four
members of the EEC still withheld Most-Favored-Nation
treatment from Japan, thus discriminating against its
goods. While imports from Japan and the LDCs totaled 34%
and 26% respectively of American textile imports in 1960,
the Six took in a paltry 9% from these nations, well below
even the EFTA' s intake. The Common Market "agreed on the
principle" to ease quotas, but domestic pressures prompted
France, Belgium, and Italy to request a weak textile regime
which would preserve their ability to invoke future
restrictions. Prior to the textile negotiations in Geneva,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce Hickman Price, Jr. noted
the foot-dragging by all the Six but West Germany. The
Economist warned that "the prospect of a liberal outcome at
Geneva does not look good".
Nevertheless, the GATT parties reached a settlement
under a Short-Term Arrangement on cotton textiles in July
1961 which satisfied the Kennedy administration. The 17
nations agreed that, starting 1 October 1961, any textile
importer suffering import -related "market disruption" could
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ask an exporter to cut back textile shipments to the levels
of the previous year ending 30 June 1961. If the exporter
refused, the importer could apply for a waiver from GATT to
restrict imports. This new safeguard was a novel concept
in discrimination against the LDCs
. The U.S. also attached
a clause which, pending the establishment of a Long-Term
Arrangement, would assure that the EEC "share fairly" in
the growth of cotton textile imports. The new regime
stretched the fair-trade doctrine but provided for the
continued, albeit slower, growth of Third World exports.
Still, all sides attacked the cotton textile accord. It
indeed impressed American textilemen and Congressmen Vinson
and Dorn by its recognition that import restrictions were
in order. But they considered it as merely a "first step",
and wanted Kennedy to end the two-price cotton system,
reduce and police the quotas, and limit other fibers. The
EEC was lukewarm but grudgingly increased import quotas by
60%. Hong Kong expressed uncertainty about which
categories of textiles would be affected while Japan
predicted that restrictions on its exports would allow Hong
Kong to fill the gap at Tokyo's expense. Japan called the
Short-Term Arrangement a "backward step in world trade"
which ignored its voluntary export restraint with the
United States, and warned of retaliation, especially
24against America.
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U.S. trade policy lay at the root of Japan's unhappiness
with the GATT agreement. Tokyo complained that Americans
used Japan as a scapegoat for their more complex problems
Of inefficiency and for the harm done by other nations to
U.S. textile interests. Japan was America's major source
of cotton textile imports, occupying approximately one-
quarter of the U.S. market. Yet these imports comprised
less than 1% of U.S. production in 1960 and actually shrunk
by 5 million square yards from 1958 to 1960, while the
sales of Spain, Portugal, Egypt, and France as a group rose
3.3 billion, Formosa, Korea, Pakistan, and India 1.2
billion, and Hong Kong 321 million square yards. On the
well-worn issue of unfair labor practices, moreover,
Japan's wage rate in the textile industry was as high or
higher than all of the aforementioned countries except
France
.
The U.S.
-Japan trade relationship also favored America.
The United States suffered a deficit in cotton textile
trade due to Japan's comparative advantage, and economic
and military aid to Japan cut into America's favorable
overall commercial balance and worsened the payments
deficit. But except for a slight deficit in 1960,
Washington enjoyed an export surplus with Japan, its second
biggest customer next to Canada, every year since the war
until 1965. Meanwhile, the booming Japanese economy
created a large demand for imports and worsened Tokyo's
159
payments deficit. A major customer of American cotton,
moreover, Japan's purchases were three times larger than
its sales of textiles to the U.S.^^
Kennedy and Ball warned of the dire implications of
clamping down on Japanese imports. America could not cut
off textile imports and expect "anything but ruin for our
cotton exporters", said the President. Thus trade with
Japan must be a matter of "balance", especially since that
nation took in more U.S. cotton than America's total
textile imports from the entire world. International
politics also were critical. Premier Ikeda had hinged his
leadership on economic growth and close ties to America.
Restrictions would undermine these goals and might force
Japan to turn to China as a source of raw cotton. Kennedy
abhorred communist China and hoped to avoid this outcome. ^"^
None of the arguments swayed U.S. textilemen, who
complained about Japanese textile dumping. The
administration both resisted and acquiesced to this
pressure, renewing the 1957 bilateral cotton agreement
under which the U.S. raised its import quota ceiling 6%
instead of the 30% demanded by Tokyo. The textile industry
grumbled even over this hike, to take effect in January
1962, but that was all they could expect. The deal was
more than generous and, most important, a blow to
Kennedy's reputation as a liberal trader.
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in November 1961, contrary to Japanese interests,
Kennedy also ordered the Tariff Commission to study the
equalization fee, which would raise the price of cotton
textile imports by eight and one-half cents in order to
balance out the higher prices textilemen paid for U.S.
cotton. The industry deemed the fee crucial to textile
votes for the TEA. The Commission rejected the measure in
September 1962, after the TEA vote, but Kennedy immediately
ordered the Department of Agriculture to find a solution to
the iniquitous "two-price" system. This request boosted
the administration's claim that it was doing everything
possible to assist the industry.
The TEA, in fact, was the overriding influence on the
textile program. Kennedy preferred protection rather than
risk a "boomerang action" from textilemen and their
congressional allies against the TEA. Ball warned other
industries not to interpret the restrictive Short-Term
accord as a general rule in U.S. trade policy and Petersen
lamented the lack of international and national priorities
among the White House staff on trade. But Kennedy himself
was accustomed to ward politics. "The mentality was
Boston", said Petersen. "You want the votes, you give the
guy the post office". "^"^
Relentless pressure from Congress forced Kennedy to
deal. Textileman Robert Stevens wrote Senator Pastore
blasting the TEA because Kennedy seemed willing to "sell
down the river" whole segments of U.S. industry. The
watchdog House Textile Conference Group and a letter on 23
January 1962 from over one-third of the Senate criticized
the projected provisions of a Long-Term Cotton Textile
Agreement, to replace the Short-Term accord. The textile
bloc wanted ceilings on imports with no increases unless
U.S. consumption of textiles rose and the inclusion of all
fibers. Congressmen, consistent with regulatory politics,
had made their offerings. Now they expected cooperation
from the President. Votes on the TEA were at stake.
Kennedy did not completely meet these stringent aims,
but produced a five-year Long-Term Arrangement (LTA) that
came close. The U.S. proposed to abolish cotton textile
quotas after five years, but on this point liberalism
ceased. The LTA would freeze imports in 1963 and 1964
followed by a controlled rise in quota levels based on the
concept of market disruption over the next three years.
Citing the inordinate growth of textile imports as the
reason for these limits, the administration admitted that
the plan might be interpreted as sheer camouflaged
protectionism. Yet the LTA sought to pry open European
markets and spread the burden of imports among all Northern
32
nations
.
The international community reacted coolly to the
Arrangement. The Asian nations were gratified for the
increased access into the EEC but still feared the
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potential for greater restrictions. Since a rise in
imports would affect the Common Market more than any of the
other 19 participants signees, the Six began to hedge on
liberalizing their textile trade policy. Fearing a
doubling of imports over the next five years, the EEC
recommended a more liberal use of the escape clause to
invoke the market disruption clause than desired by
Washington. Kennedy resisted any change in the LTA.^^
Fair-trade required that the Common Market significantly
increase its share of cotton textile imports in the new
regime
.
As approved on 9 February 1962, the LTA favored the
United States. By diverting foreign textiles bound for
America to Europe, the accord allowed a possible
"standstill" of cotton textile imports, announced the
administration. Dissatisfied with the LTA, however, every
nation except the U.S. and Britain delayed signing the
accord for nearly seven months, or just before it took
effect on 30 September 1962."^'^
American treatment of Hong Kong boded ill of textile
policy in the future, believed these nations. Refusing
restrain its textile exports to America, Hong Kong paid a
price. When Kennedy prohibited importation of eight
categories of cotton textiles in April 1962, a third of
Hong Kong's textile workers reportedly lost their jobs.
Though the U.S. did not adequately demonstrate market
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disruption under the terms of the GATT textile agreements
or intend such a serious blow, Washington claimed that Hong
Kong would make up for its loss by its competitive
superiority.
At home, the LTA cleared the way for the trade bill. m
March, 1962, the administration claimed that it had
realized, or would soon fulfill, all seven points of the
textile program, sought a decision on the industry's
request for relief under the national security clause, and
pledged to apply the textile plan to other fibers. Such
aid earned an acknowledgement from the journal Textile
World that the President had "gone to bat for the
industry". The National Cotton Council announced its
support for the trade bill because of the "exceptional
treatment" given by Kennedy. Victory was definitely his,
however, when the ACMI thanked Kennedy on 31 March 1962 for
his "unprecedented degree of thoughtful consideration and
constructive action for textiles". The ACMI then endorsed
the Trade Expansion Act."^^
Congress revealed the political effectiveness of the
seven-point program. Business Week wrote of Kennedy's
neutralization of the congressional textile bloc. Senator
Pastore appreciated the cooperative efforts of government
leaders in reaching the LTA and the resulting standstill on
imports. Congressman Vinson told textilemen to back the
TEA. When some industry leaders persisted about government
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neglect of imports, Vinson slapped them for their
ingratitude. He asserted that the President had placed the
industry "in a unique, preferential, and beneficial
position
- a position not enjoyed by any other segment of
American industry" and acquiesced to Commerce Secretary
Hodges'
s request to keep the textile bloc "in line" for the
upcoming vote on the TEA.^"^
The criticism by free-traders of the LTA also told much
about Kennedy's adept political maneuvering. Importer
William Bernhard cynically applauded textilemen for their
political "efficiency" but warned Kennedy that further
concessions to protectionist industries might turn the TEA
campaign into a disastrous "economic Bay of Pigs".
Importer Jerome Pitofsky had expressed his shock when the
ACMI endorsed the TEA, the first time to his knowledge that
the headlines of the textile industry's newspapers
proclaimed support for a liberal trade bill. Pitofsky
asked what "backroom political deal" by Kennedy had been
necessary to accomplish "the miracle" of textile industry
support for the TEA?-^^ Kennedy's textile program, an
accommodation based on inter-branch politics, was the
answer
,
Unease from TEA proponents also surfaced in Congress.
In June 1962, Kennedy signed a bill which allowed the
President to limit cotton textile imports from non-signees
of the LTA. The bill aimed to slow down U.S. textile
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imports in 1962, which exceeded 1961 levels, by applying
the Arrangement to all textile exporters. The legislation
wooed textilemen but stung liberal traders. Congressman
Thomas B. Curtis (R-MO)
, disgusted by the "raw political
deal" which epitomized Kennedy's textile program, denounced
the "gross inconsistency" of the bill to free-trade.
Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) asserted that the textile
bloc "in a very genteel fashion has held a pistol to the
head of the President", extorting concessions for its vote
on the TEA."^^
Though morally right, the charge (which the
administration denied) that Kennedy bought off the textile
bloc to pass the TEA, was naive. Vinson had warned of
growing unrest in the textile bloc over the TEA and urged
the President to carry out the terms of the LTA without
modification or dilution. But Kennedy had told Senator
Pastore that though freer trade was in America's interests,
he would stand by the protectionist aspects of the seven-
point program. Thus, meeting with 11 senators led by
Pastore, and supported by Finance Committee chairman Byrd,
just four days before the senate vote on the TEA, he
reaffirmed his intention of freezing textile imports more
effectively
.
The President reaped the rewards of his textile policy.
On 11 October 1962, the TEA passed by large margins and
garnered substantial textile bloc support in both houses of
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congress. The 16 top textile employment states yielded 158
of a possible 213 votes in the House, or almost three-
quarters, and 28 out of 32 votes in the Senate in favor of
the bill. Many bloc members were confirmed liberal traders
or voting the Democratic Party line, so they would have
backed the TEA regardless of the textile program.
Yet the tally also reveals extensive Republican
opposition. The party had resisted the New Frontier in
1962. In Eisenhower's first RTA in 1953, moreover, 95% of
the Democrats backed him. By contrast, three-quarters of
the Republicans supported Kennedy's first trade bill.
Thus, the 4 "nays" in the Senate and 4 0 of the 55 in the
House came from Republican stalwarts. They either retained
vestiges of traditional GOP protectionism or hoped to
embarrass Kennedy by rejecting the centerpiece of his
legislative agenda. The textile strategy did not matter in
their case.
Most significant, 87 out of the congressmen who had
joined Vinson's 128-member Textile Conference Group and 28
of the 34 senators who had signed the textile letter to the
President voted for the TEA. Thirty-eight congressmen
voted against it, but well over half of them were
Republicans, as were five of the six opponents in the
Senate. The other nay vote came from Strom Thurmond (D-SC)
who soon switched parties. In addition, 77 members of the
House bloc and a majority of the Senate bloc opposed
protectionist amendments or motions to recommit the old
RTA. Also, 14 senators opposed an attempt by Senator Bush
to restore the broad powers of the peril point, which was
defeated by only a handful of votes.
The vote also showed regional trends of support.
Kennedy won over Southerners. For instance. White House
staffers expressed amazement that Congressman Dorn of North
Carolina, who had voted for only 4 of 43 administration
bills during 1961, acted "totally out of character for him"
and "not only voted for us, but worked with a large number
of members" to gain their support. Eighty-two of 105
House Southern Democrats followed Congressman Vinson and
supported the bill, including all of those from Georgia,
Tennessee, and Virginia and a predominant majority from
Alabama and North Carolina. In the Senate, 19 out of 20
voted for the TEA. New England backers tripled the number
of those opposed, including Senator Pastore, whose
subcommittee had led the fight for protectionism on
textiles. The concessions on textiles were not the sole
reason for the favorable outcome, but as many observers
claimed, they were a major factor. '^^
Thus, the seven-point program attained its objective.
The LTA indeed violated GATT principles by restricting
trade. Liberal traders recognized the hypocrisy in the
administrations' s professed aims for freer trade when
measured against the international agreements on textiles.
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Perhaps Kennedy had over-stretched his fair-trade doctrine,
but he had good reasons. Among these were his sympathy
with the textile industry and, most prominent, the battle
he faced in Congress over the TEA.
The only other explicitly formulated concession offered
by Kennedy to an import-competitor was an assistance
program for the softwood lumber industry. The Pacific
Northwest (Washington, Oregon, and northern California) and
the "Inland Empire" (Montana and Idaho) lumber interests
appealed for restrictions of lumber imports from British
Columbia, Canada. These were states which Kennedy had lost
in the presidential election and needed in order to offset
Republican foes or possible Southern flight from the New
Frontier. Some pine and hardwood regions mobilized behind
them. Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) , for instance, said that
imports had placed the industry "in a serious fix" for
"precisely the same reason that the textile mills" were in
trouble.
Like textilemen, lumber interests tested Kennedy's
political skills in preserving free-trade under the TEA.
Recognizing that the problems stemmed as much from U.S.
laws and government policies which curtailed timber cuts,
hindered transportation, and raised prices for lumbermen as
they did from Canadian exports, Kennedy sought to placate
the industry with federal aid and revamping goverment
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procedures. Included was a pledge to seek some sort of
voluntary export restraint from Ottawa, but merely as a sop
to lumber interests. Kennedy by no means intended to
disrupt the profitable U.S. trade with Canada through a
restrictive accord. In its international and domestic
aspects, his lumber import plan was a mark of his fair-
trade doctrine.
An flood of cheap softwood imports from British Columbia
to the prime U.S. East coast market instigated the lumber
problem. Almost four-fifths of U.S. forests were softwood,
of which the West coast supplied 70% of Eastern consumption
in the 1950s. But Canada, the world's leading softwood
exporter, depended on America to buy more than half of its
production. This reliance was critical after 1954, when
competition from the Soviet Union, Finland, and Sweden
began to shut out Commonwealth Canada from its traditional
market in Great Britain and as Canadian consumption leveled
out during the 1950s while production rose. Thus, a burst
of Canada's softwood exports from 1959 to 1963 seized over
57% of the U.S. market. Ten years earlier, British
Columbia occupied 15% of the Atlantic market, while West
coast lumbermen held the rest.'^^ Now, the trend had
reversed.
This situation affected U.S. production. The 1950s had
been a "boom" period in production due to construction
surge, reported the National Lumber Manufacturing
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Associatxon (NLMA)
.
Domestic consumption fluctuated, but
remained even, despite occasional lags in housing starts.
By 1961, however, production fell by 5 million board feet,
or 16%, from the 1959 figure. Only once in the 1960s would
production climb above the 1959 total. Such sluggishness
was especially serious for Oregon and Washington, where the
forest industry accounted for 60% and 40% of the
manufacturing payroll respectively. Employment in the
industry fell 44% between 1947 and 1961, making many
counties in lumber states candidates for the new Area
Redevelopment program.
Lumbermen blamed imports for their problems. Declining
U.S. production and soaring consumption had attracted
Canadian lumber at the expense of American mills. Despite
an upswing in housing in 1962, claimed the new Lumbermen's
Economic Survival Committee, imports had caused prices for
lumber to fall, creating a simply "awful" state of affairs.
The Simpson Timber Company of Seattle, for instance,
estimated a loss to West coast sawmill communities of $10
million a year because of competition from Canada. An Idaho
banker remarked that he had never witnessed a decline in
the industry, similar to that of 1960-1962, since the Great
Depression. The cause clearly was "foreign competition",
wrote Congressman Jack Westland (R-WA) to President
4 6Kennedy
.
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In reality, however, Canadian imports were a symptom,
not one of the many causes, of these lumber problems.
Canada enjoyed several advantages in the lumber trade. in
order to correct its worsening balance-of
-payments deficit
with America, Ottawa devalued its dollar in June 1961,
which made imports more expensive and exports cheaper. The
currency reached a sub-par value of 92.5 cents (U.S.)
before being stabilized by the International Monetary Fund.
The depreciated Canadian dollar had a "devastating" effect
on U.S. lumber interests, admitted the State Department.
Regardless, to aid its payments woes, Canada later adopted
an import surcharge affecting many U.S. products . "^"^
Canada had other advantages. British Columbia
experienced its second most active year in logging history
in 1961, and lumbermen there lobbied for higher export
quotas which at present restricted their sales abroad.
Lower wages and operating costs and a more liberal
allowance of national forest cuts relative to the United
States helped Canadian lumbermen. In 1962, Canada had the
lowest stumpage prices in its postwar history, thus mills
paid less for timber from British Columbian forests than
Americans. Meanwhile, Japanese buyers, willing to pay a
premium for logs, had driven up the cost of timber for U.S.
mills. The nominal U.S. tariff on softwood lumber,
especially relative to Canada's, also added to Canadian
J. - ^ 48competitiveness
.
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Transportation laws also gave British Columbia an edge
over U.S. lumbermen. The method of selling cars of lumber
in transit, the "free-hold" system, allowed for cheaper
Canadian railroad costs. Of more impact was the U.S.
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, or the Jones Act, which
required the goods bound for domestic markets to be shipped
in U.S. vessels. Northwest lumbermen paid the more
expensive American rate of $36 per thousand board feet
while British Columbia sent its lumber to the East coast in
world charter bottoms at $6 to $11 below the U.S. rate. In
addition, the number of ships engaging in intercoastal
trade had declined since the mid-1950s, leaving American
lumbermen without adequate service. For instance, only one
vessel ran every 45 days from Portland, Oregon to Puerto
Rico. Not bound to U.S. ships, Canada doubled its share of
waterborne shipments to the Atlantic Seaboard and Hawaii
and monopolized service to Puerto Rico.'^^
The lumber industry urged the administration to address
some of these problems in early 1962. Over 50 industry
spokesmen, including the NLMA and lobbyists from softwood
areas in the South, Southwest, and Northwest, 7 U.S.
senators, and 14 congressmen visited Secretary of
Agriculture Freeman on 21 February 1962. They requested an
orderly program of timber sales at fair stumpage prices,
more access roads, and more efficient administration in the
National Forests, which were the major sources of timber.
A letter from nine senators to Freeman and congressional
hearings in April prompted an investigation of lumber
conditions by the USDA.^*^
Like textiles a year earlier, the lumber import issue
thus appeared on the national stage of trade problems. A
^""^^ Crow-s Lumber Digest regarding Canadian softwood
exports found unanimity among producers and wholesalers
that palliatives were necessary; the former group placed
more weight on tariffs or quotas as the answer. Both
groups backed a modification of the Jones Act, continued
prohibition of the railroad free-hold, and a requirement
that the Buy American preference be used on homes insured
under the Federal Housing Act (FHA)
. Imports were also the
major topic at the annual meeting of the West Coast
Lumbermens Association (WCLA) in March. ^"^
The WCLA and NLMA concurred on two remedies. First,
Congress should amend Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act to qualify forest products for quantitative
import limits in trade agreements, as enjoyed by other
commodities. Second, they recommended a 10% duty plan
under which tariffs on softwood lumber would be removed
altogether until a time when imports from either Canada or
the U.S. reached 10% of domestic consumption. At this
point, the importer could assess a duty of 10%.
The plan was a thinly veiled protectionist measure. A
removal of lumber tariffs would not harm America, since its
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duty was minimal. More revealing, since Canadian imports
had already reached 17% of U.S. consumption, the 10% duty
would go into effect automatically. Northwestern and
inland Empire interests had drawn the line of protectionism
clearly for the President.
The congressional bloc championed the recommendations.
In the spring and early summer of 1962, Congresswoman Julia
B. Hansen (D-WA) introduced the Section 22 amendment, House
members Walt Horan and Thomas M. Pelly (R-WA) the 10% plan,
and Hansen and Congressman Clem Miller (D-CA) a provision
which would have discriminated against lumber exporters by
requiring a country-of
-origin label on all wood product
imports. Senator Mundt tried to attach a protective timber
import agreement on to the same bill that subjected non-
participants of the GATT textile Arrangements to quotas.
All of these measures met eventual defeat over the next two
years thus, in part, undermining the interest group
53model. But, they alerted Kennedy to disgruntlement on
Capitol Hill which might transfer to the Trade Expansion
Act
.
Kennedy listened most attentively to lumber problems
because the TEA was moving through Congress at the time.
His task, as in the textile case, was to reach a fair-trade
balance of assistance while keeping open the channels of
liberal trade. Lumbermen noted the difficulty of
considering quotas while Congress debated a trade expansion
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program, but they argued that barriers were permissible
under the concept of the TEA. The President, however, did
not want to enmesh himself in another difficult and
restrictive international agreement like the LTA, if
avoidable
.
Sending Secretary of State Rusk to Seattle to
investigate the import problem, Kennedy reminded lumbermen
that trade restrictions on Canada were not in U.S.
interests. Ottawa held an advantage in lumber trade, but
the U.S. enjoyed an overall trade surplus ranging from $58
million to $1.25 billion from 1945 to 1968. This surplus
was halved between 1960-1962, but by 1965 approached the
high 1960 level. In material terms, America supplied
almost 90% of Canada's agricultural implements and over
one-third of its steel and iron. Canada was America's
single most important customer; their trade comprised the
largest volume of merchandise exchanged by any two nations
in the world.
Thus, the administration stressed that federal
assistance, and not trade restrictions, which might cut off
this lucrative trade, was the best way to help lumbermen.
Though sympathetic to West coast problems. Rusk said that a
voluntary export restraint by Canada was the most that
could be realistically expected. Harsher measures might
provoke retaliation and upset bilateral cooperation in
defense and economic matters. Sensitive to U.S. domination
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of their economy, Canadians, under the politically
unpopular Prime Minister John Diefenbacker
, had hinted at
protectionism as a symbol of independence. The import
surcharge and a reportedly restrictive revision of the
Canadian Tariff Law were two outward manifestations of this
sentiment. Ottawa's support of the TEA hinged, moreover,
on America's commitment to free-trade. Limits on lumber
imports might provoke Diefenbacker to oppose U.S. designs
to lower trade barriers under the TEA.'^^
Howard Petersen pressed the free-trade line.
Restrictions, he summarized, should be a "last resort".
Commerce Department figures revealed that softwood imports
from Canada amounted to only 13% of U.S. consumption, which
meant Western lumbermen supplied a healthy 87% to America.
A more "durable solution" than limiting imports, he wrote
Senate lumber bloc leader Wayne Morse (D-OR)
, was domestic
and export measures aimed at increasing total demand at
home and abroad. Under the fair-trade approach, the
administration placed "primary reliance on encouraging
domestic industries to become more competitive by the
adoption, where necessary, of appropriate domestic
measures" and not by the "essentially negative step of
restricting imports".
These explanations fell on deaf ears within the
industry. Not all of the forest products industry opposed
the trade bill; pulp and paper manufacturers, multinational
loggers^ and plywood wholesalers, hoping to boost their
exports, supported Kennedy. But the NLMA disliked the TEA
because it abolished the escape clause, lowered the already
minimal tariff on lumber imports, and offered inadequate
help under the adjustment assistance measure. When the NLMA
advocated the 10% plan, several representatives of the
hardwood and plywood industries in the Mid-West, South, and
New England, which opposed imports from Canada, Japan, the
5 8Philippines , and Finland, supported its position
.
Private sector efforts incited congressional appeals.
Legislators weighed free-trade with rising unemployment
among their constituents which would inevitably occur under
the TEA. They also considered their chances in the
upcoming November elections. Thus, Senator Morse, the
chief critic of lumber imports, cringed at a handbill
presently circulating around mills in his home state of
Oregon. It advertised that foreign workers should apply to
Morse for jobs lost by American employees if the TEA
passed. Though supportive of the TEA and realizing that
imports were not whole cause of lumber problems, he thought
possible some "conscionable compromise" with Kennedy, whom
he perceived was sympathetic to the import problem.
Just weeks before the House vote in late June on the
trade bill, however. Congress still expressed
dissatisfaction with administration offerings.
Protectionists rallied. Fresh from the textile battle,
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Congressman John Dent claimed he would vote for the TEA
only when Kennedy informed him of the fate of the possibly
several thousand unemployed lumber mill workers. Others
recognized that the TEA would help expand lumber imports to
Europe, but until that eventuality, they sought some
emergency restrictions. Trade journals reported that
Kennedy now faced the "greatest barrage of protectionists
against Canadian lumber that has ever been fired" from
Capitol Hill.
Most noteworthy was the bloc of 43 congressmen from
various areas, but concentrated in the West and South, who
wrote Kennedy a "lumber letter" on 12 June 1962. The
letter urged federal aid and quotas and surely concerned
him since the lumber bloc issued it just two weeks before
Congress voted on the TEA. Eighteen of the signees had
voted against the 1958 RTA. Yet the overall House tally on
the TEA revealed that among the bloc, only Washington state
legislators cast a majority against the bill. The lumber
letter adherents also split along party lines, explaining
why 17, or 40% of the 43, rejected the TEA and 19 voted for
the major protectionist amendment. The House vote showed
that interest groups had not prevailed on Congress, but the
import problem worried Kennedy because the Senate was
6
1
really the main seat of lumber bloc discontent.
In the Senate, most of the lumber bloc, including close
friends of the administration such as Democratic whip and
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Inland Empire representative Mike Mansfield, were sensitive
to the NLMA proposals for import limits. Senator Warren
Magnuson (D-WA)
,
a free-trader and chair of the lumber
hearings, complained that quotas were not under
consideration even though softwood interests had suffered
import injury. The most fervent opinion came from Morse,
who pledged to fight the administration on the TEA to
ensure that the lumber industry would not suffer. He was
impatient with the President's delays on lumber especially
since Kennedy had acted so swiftly for textilemen. "I
cannot vote for the President's foreign trade bill," Morse
pronounced, unless "we get comparable justice for lumber as
was given the textile industry" under a "fair" trade
62program.
On 2 6 July 1962, Kennedy hoped to meet this requirement
by proposing a six-point program of assistance for the
lumbermen. He ordered an increase in loans and new
depreciation schedules to upgrade mills and promote
productivity. The plan provided for more access road
construction and efficient transport of logs in the
National Forests, an immediate increase in cuts in Bureau
of Land Management areas, and a study by the USDA on the
feasibility of raising allowable cuts in the national
forests . Kennedy sought to modify the Jones Act to
overcome the high cost or lack of ships available for U.S.
producers and ordered government agencies to buy more
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American lumber. in trade, he promised talks with Canada
and a prompt Tariff Commission investigation on imports
that had been requested earlier by the industry.
Private sector reaction was positive. In fact, the only
real criticism came from the free-trade Committee for a
National Trade Policy which claimed that the prospective
restrictive agreement with Canada, Buy American preference,
and Tariff Commission action were inconsistent with the
principles of the TEA. Most lumber groups expressed their
gratitude to Kennedy and their congressmen, although they
warned about laxity with Canada regarding import barriers.
The NLMA still wished to tack to the trade bill authority
for an emergency quota, but thanked the President anyway at
the TEA hearings for his program which addressed all of its
previous complaints
.
Congress, too, was appreciative, and turned its
attention from Kennedy to Canada as the main target.
Before both houses of Congress, Representative Hansen
analyzed each provision of the six-point program and
described the administration's tireless efforts on behalf
of the industry. She argued especially that Kennedy had
undertaken every action legally open to him under the
present RTA by urging a Tariff Commission investigation and
swiftly naming a negotiating team to Ottawa. Morse
exemplified the shift from pressure on Kennedy to an attack
on Canada the day the President signed the TEA. Commending
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possible to the United States in light of Canada's apparent
increasing failure to correct its payments deficit with its
neighbor and the world as a whole. Demand had mounted in
America for lumber, moreover, and Canada had not exactly
begged East coast builders to buy its lumber. Ottawa
feared the same occurrence Kennedy had dreaded: a return to
the "bad old days" of Smoot-Hawley
. It was ironic, thought
Canada, that America's best customer should find itself the
scapegoat for U.S. domestic economic problems, too.^^
Thus, at the talks, Ottawa manuevered around U.S.
requests for restraints. The Canadian government noted
that it had never adopted a voluntary export restraint, and
only once (for zinc) had it permitted an industry to do so.
In words that could be attributed to the President of the
United States as much as Canadian producers, the latter
hoped that "the U.S. lumber industry will not persuade
liberal-minded Washington to play once more the same kind
of disastrous protection against the country's main
g 9
customer" as it had during the Great Depression.
In the end, nothing came of the succession of
negotiations, or subsequent talks with Prime Minister
Diefenbaker, over the next two years. Canada was stubborn,
but it seems clear the Kennedy administration did not push
too hard for restrictions, either. Both sides merely
pledged to reach an agreement of "mutual interest" without
consenting to quotas. Kennedy therefore received credit
183
with U.S. lumber protectionists for seeking restraints yet
in no way jeopardized profitable t relations with
Canada or his liberal tr i.]*- m".i1s.'^°
At home, the Senate bloc rewarded Kennedy by easily
passing the Trade Expansion Act. The voting record of the
9 senators who visited Freeman in February 1962 gives an
accurate indication of the success of the six-point
program. These legislators, all from the Pacific Northwest
and Inland Empire states, voted unanimously for the TEA.
The 2 senators from Alaska, active on the import issue,
also favored the bill. The bloc voted against the Bush
amendment to restore the peril point by a total of 10 to 1
and unanimously opposed three other protectionist measures.
Again, other reasons are plausible for the bloc's
support, including the fact that all but one of its members
were Democrats supporting party legislation. Yet, both
parties had soundly defeated Mundt's proposal to negotiate
a protective lumber agreement similar to the textile
accords and Wayne Morse, the most outspoken member of the
bloc, voted for the TEA. Less than half of Kennedy's
legislative requests for 1962 passed Congress but thanks to
adept presidential politicking, the TEA did not become one
7
1
of the casualties.
Progress on the six-point program also played a part in
swinging votes. In early September 1962, the Senate
amended the Jones Act to permit mills to ship lumber on
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non-American vessels to Puerto Rico if no U.S. vessels were
available. In January, 1963, Georgia-Pacific became the
first company in 43 years to load lumber on a foreign
vessel bound for a domestic port. In October 1962, the
USDA announced an increase in allowable cuts from the 42
national forests in the five lumber states by 547 million
board feet. The Bureau of Land Management followed suit on
its land. Loans through the SBA and Area Redevelopment
Administration were available upon request for any
producer, the Defense Department had awarded 95% of lumber
procurement contracts to U.S. firms, and funds for building
access roads were allocated under the Highway Act,'^^
Kennedy satisfied the industry by making good on his lumber
program.
In lumber, Kennedy not only received unanimous support
from injured producers but averted a restrictive trade
agreement. When the Tariff Commission in early 1963
rejected the industry's plea to invoke the escape clause,
the first case heard under the TEA, the administration
removed the threat of retaliation against Canada. Under
the new concept of injury, the TEA required that a tariff
or quota could be applied only if an industry showed its
injury was caused by a former trade concession. The
Commission pointed instead to Canada's depreciated dollar,
its cheaper shipping and rail rates, and higher U.S. timber
73
prices as responsible for American lumber hardships.
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In conclusion, the fair-trade design helped lumbermen
without diverging from trade liberalism. In fact, during
the next five years under the TEA' s authority, the trade
regime in lumber and bilateral commercial relations in
general, benefited Canada. Softwood imports from Canada
rose throughout the 1960s, and jumped in 1968 by 16%, the
biggest increase of the decade, after the U.S. eliminated
its lumber duty at the Kennedy Round of GATT
. That same
year also marked the first time since the war that America
suffered a trade deficit with Canada. '^'^
Kennedy championed a policy of seeking mutual benefits
in the global trade regime. The U.S. became so generous
with Canada, however, that it lost its trade surplus.
Surely, the views of the comparative-advantage school are
more than accurate in this case in that American leadership
was beneficial for all.
Textile trade is more important for assessing aims and
outcomes because the U.S. created a restrictive regime.
The LTA regime of the 1960s was not representative of trade
liberalism nor an example of the comparative-advantage
principle at work. Yet Kennedy's program was a compromise
in a long-disputed problem in world commerce and a clear
instance of the fair-trade doctrine in practice. The
reasoning behind import restrictions had some foundation,
since several nations had virtually flooded the U.S. market
with cotton goods. Their superior comparative advantage
186
caused a quickening decline in the American textile
industry
.
Fair-trade meant that the burden of such injurious
imports would be equitably distributed among trading
partners. Kennedy also interpreted the doctrine to mean
that there was no point in liberalizing trade if lower
barriers destroyed a domestic or foreign industry or, most
critical, derailed passage of the TEA. The cotton textile
accords were the fairest approach possible, considering the
economic factors and, above all, the domestic restraints on
Kennedy. In sum, America forged a mutually acceptable
textile regime which actually helped the LDCs
.
One target of American protectionism was Hong Kong.
That nation had captured approximately 28%, of the U.S.
cotton textile market by the 1960s. Its cotton textile
exports shot up 67.8 million yards, a stunning thirty-two
fold increase from 1958 to 1961, and nearly $11.2 million
in value. This rise was crucial to Hong Kong's cotton
textile industry which employed 45% of the country's
manufacturing workers, accounted for 50% of industrial
exports, and made the textile industry the top export
sector. Throughout the 1960s, textile jobs and exports
expanded. Hong Kong's overall production also rose,
diversifying the economy and fueling a climb out of LDC
status. The LTA provided the nation with more market
opportunities in Europe, Canada, and Australia and America
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took an increasingly larger share of Hong Kong's exports,
and at just a slightly slower growth rate. Thus, Hong Kong
quickly rebounded from the U.S. restrictions of April 1962,
became the most successful textile exporter under the LTA,
and benefited additionally from the free-trade effects of
the TEA."^^
In general, U.S. leadership created a regime which made
world cotton textile trade less restrictive than would have
been the case without the LTA. The thirty-country pact
compelled importers to relax restrictions over the next
five years. America led all nations until the mid-1970s in
filling its quotas and importing cotton textiles from the
LDCs
.
Under authority from the TEA, the U.S. cut its
tariffs on various cotton textile categories by 21%. at the
Kennedy Round of GATT
.
Partly as a result, Asian textile
exports to the U.S. increased by half in value during the
second half of the 1960s. In addition, U.S. textile and
apparel imports tripled from 1961 to 197 0 and over the same
period, the ratio of imports to domestic consumption more
than doubled until the Nixon administration slowed the
increases by imposing more stringent quotas under bilateral
accords in 1971 and the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) of
1974."^^
The regime also served to increase access to the Common
Market and boost LDC export markets throughout the world.
While the EEC lagged behind America in liberalizing
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barriers, the Six reluctantly increased access and admitted
that the new burden was not excessive. Only Japan's share
of the cotton textile market declined, but Tokyo would soon
make up the losses in other sectors. During the period
1961-1965, the LDCs' share increased from 21 to 24% and
their exports to the developed nations outpaced the overall
growth rate for all countries by 4%. The renewal of the
LTA in 19 67 slowed this increase somewhat and an outburst
of American protectionism at the end of the decade led to
the limits imposed by the MFA. Yet as a result of the
Kennedy initiative, the LDCs share of cotton textile
markets in the North expanded to 28% by 1969 and brought a
more equitable sharing of imports within the North than
7 7before the accord.
Thus, America sought and largely achieved mutual
benefits in global textile and lumber trade. The cases
validate the argument of the comparative
-advantage school
because these products were one in which the country had
suffered import injury and could have easily raised
prohibitive trade barriers. The concessions might have
jeopardized, but did not indicate a retreat from, Kennedy's
goal of free-trade, as the hegemony school charges.
Instead, they constituted a fair-trade compromise compelled
by the pluralist decision-making process in U.S. trade
policy.
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In essence, the American political system determined
decisions on trade. The ultimate motive behind Kennedy's
actions on textiles and lumber was politics. The Trade
Expansion Act, his top priority legislation for 1962, was
in the hands of free-traders and protectionists on Capitol
Hill. Blocking its passage were large blocs of legislators
who represented equally large and powerful import
-competing
interests. Congress wanted concessions from Kennedy before
giving him the TEA in return.
Bureaucrats formulated and implemented policy, but were
not central to the decision-making process. Despite
differing priorities, Hodges and Ball held the same views
on textile and lumber policy. The Commerce Secretary, as a
former textileman, was sympathetic to industry complaints.
Since his job was to usher the TEA through Congress, Hodges
championed free-trade over protectionism and did not break
with the State Department line. Ball fought the textile
accords and limits on lumber imports, eventually losing out
on the first and winning the second. Still, he followed
Kennedy's wishes in both instances, even devised the cotton
textile Arrangements, and did not compete with other
officials to change presidential policy. These bureaucrats
agreed on free-trade, the need to pass the TEA, and the
tactics of concessions to domestic interests to do so. In
sum, Kennedy' s fair-trade doctrine molded decision-making
and precluded bureaucratic infighting on the TEA.
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A combination of government and economic elites did not
control policy-making, either. Appeals for protection came
from labor-intensive industries which promoted, contrary to
Kennedy's policy, import restrictions rather than export
expansion. Thus, not only were there sharp differences in
private and public sector aims, but corporatism is not
applicable because the rising export sector of capital-
intensive firms did not dominate decisions. In addition,
private interests did not work through the administration,
they exerted pressure through Congress. Thus, again, the
corporatist analysis of a supposed consensus between the
government and textile and lumber elites is off base.
Interest group pressure on Congress was important in
pushing legislators to pressure the President. But neither
textilemen or lumbermen got key requests granted by the
administration. In the case of textiles. Congress refused
to force Kennedy to make the LTA more restrictive, include
other fibers in the accord, or provide an equalization fee
before the TEA came to a vote. Lumber interests could not
prevail in winning their 10% import limit plan or in the
end, restrict Canadian softwood sales. Furthermore,
legislators with textile and lumber constituents, backed
the TEA bill even with the knowledge that lower trade
barriers might injure these industries and, consequently,
hurt their chances of re-election. Interest groups
therefore won concessions but not full satisfaction.
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Instead, the modus vivendi reached by Kennedy and
Congress, according to the inter-branch politics model, was
the basis of decision-making. The congressional textile
and lumber blocs pressed for help; Kennedy shrewdly
responded because he needed their vote. These blocs heard
the complaints of their constituents but then, with some
autonomy on the issues, reached bargains which satisfied
them but oftentimes not the voters they represented. The
process boiled down to horse-trading between Congress and
the administration, in which both sides laid their cards on
the table, reached an accommodation, and folded up and
returned home. In any case, Kennedy's tactics, called
brilliant by experts and aides alike, cut out "the heart"
of two major protectionist coalitions and preserved the
7 RU.S. aim of promoting liberal trade.
In short, horse-trading confirms the pluralist nature of
trade policy. A difficult issue such as trade, as well as
the President's weak position on Capitol Hill, forced him
to compromise by using, in correspondent Carroll
Kilpatrick's words at the time, "favors, pork, patronage,
and charm" to win the TEA. The activist Reverend Theodore
Hesburgh even linked the trade bill to civil rights. He
claimed that Kennedy skirted the issue in 1962 out of a
79fear of losing southern votes on the TEA. Not validated
by other sources, this analysis nonetheless seems plausible
especially after considering the great lengths the
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President went to woo various congressional blocs. His
relationship with Congress overrode all other concerns.
In part, appeasing the textile and lumber congressional
blocs enabled Kennedy to take the negotiating authority won
under the TEA to the Kennedy Round of GATT and bargain with
the Common Market. These blocs were two of the critical
obstacles to the trade bill, but they were not the only
ones. Coal and oil producers and carpets and glass
manufacturers also stood in the way of the TEA, and
required the President's attention to ensure a legislative
victory
.
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: OIL AND TARIFFS
Despite the assistance for textile and lumber interests,
the President shrewdly calculated that the Trade Expansion
Act would encounter problems on Capitol Hill without
attention to the oil and coal industries and, to a lesser
extent, glass and carpet manufacturers. Again, Kennedy
deviated from a defense of free-trade ideals by forging a
private deal with Congress to limit oil imports and by
raising tariffs to restrict glass and carpets from abroad.
But these tactical manuevers, aimed to win the TEA, did not
obscure the goal of liberal trade.
The oil and tariff cases provide another look at the
American decision-making structure. Bureaucratic politics
shaped options for the President but again, Kennedy's
concern not only with the international implications of his
policy but the political constraints placed on him by
Congress overrode departmental aims . Interest
intermediation reflected the pluralism of the private
sector-congressional-Executive branch triangle. Thus, the
corporatist, interest group, and inter-branch models more
likely apply.
Kennedy eventually met oil and glass and tariff demands
from the private sector and Congress. His concessions
greased the TEA past legislators who were concerned about
the impact of free-trade on import -competitors back home
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,n
(and the consequent effects on their election chances i
November 1962) and who felt pressure from or sympathized
with influential protectionist blocs on Capitol Hill. The
fair-trade doctrine determined the President's handling of
the TEA on the two issues; concede protectionism now for a
few vulnerable but politically potent interests, and win
the trade bill and mutually expansive and beneficial
commerce for all trading nations later.
Concerning oil imports, the problem stemmed from
conditions in the immediate postwar era. Requiring more
oil for its industrial plant, America became a net importe
of petroleum in 1948 for the first time since World War I.
The cold war provided a further impetus for purchases
abroad. The U.S. hoped to keep this vital commodity
available to industrial countries and buoy the economies o
oil-dependent Middle Eastern and South American nations,
tying them to the Western camp. Yet rising imports had a
downside; the inflow began to displace independent oil and
domestic coal producers in the American market.
These well-organized forces pressured Congress to limit
imports. Oil-state legislators attached the national
security amendment to the trade bill of 1955, providing fo
restrictions when imports impaired domestic production of
commodities deemed necessary in an emergency. Two years
later, rising imports compelled "voluntary" controls by
U.S. importers of foreign oil, limiting sales to 12% of
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estimated domestic demand east of the Rockies. The
Eisenhower administration soon replaced these faltering
restraints with the Mandatory Quota Program in March 1959.
The program restricted imports to 9% of estimated domestic
demand but exempted Canada and Mexico from quotas since
their overland supplies would be critical in a defense
crisis. Imports of residual fuel oil, a heavy petroleum
product used for heating factories, schools, and hospitals
along the Atlantic seaboard, were given a ceiling at their
1957 level and kept under review.
The aim of controls was to bolster stagnating production
in U.S. oil and coal regions, but restrictions hurt fuel
oil users who chafed at the prospects of energy shortages
during the winter months and paying higher prices. On the
foreign front, Venezuela was particularly vulnerable to the
program. This nation relied on revenues from oil to prop
up its depressed economy and fledgling democracy. Yet
Caracas received no exemption from quotas like Canada and
Mexico, because it transported oil by sea. The controls
also damaged Venezuela's residual fuel exports, of which it
provided most of America's supply. Inimical to liberal
trade, the quota program was well ensconced by the time
Kennedy arrived in Washington.^
Kennedy's prior stand on oil issues burdened the new
President, however. Of all the presidential aspirants in
1960, he had been rightfully singled out by the oil press
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as the most "openly hostile" to the industry. a prominent
foe of the depletion allowance, which gave tax breaks to
producers, and the quota program, he was one of twelve
members of the New England Senate Delegation who argued
against limiting residual fuel oil. The oil and coal
industries suffered not from imports of residual, he
claimed, but from the switch by consumers to other forms of
energy and the concentration by independents on crude
production. Failing to persuade Eisenhower to exempt fuel
oil from limits, Kennedy censored the quota program as a
"completely unjustified, uneconomic and shortsighted
action" which not only raised prices but "cuts athwart our
trade position, unnecessarily damages our relations in this
hemisphere,
. . .
and does not contribute to our national
2defense and security".
Such a view did not sit well with domestic oil and coal
interests. As a result, during the presidential campaign
in 1960, Kennedy toned down his remarks. He stressed
instead regional redevelopment and modernization to aid the
coal industry. Wary of inviting "howls" of complaints from
oilmen, where his support was weak, his campaign staff
requested that he not depart from the quota program. He
complied. Nevertheless, partly because of his position on
oil, he won only Texas among the oil states, and this state
thanks to his Vice-Presidential running mate Lyndon B.
Johnson, and lost nine of the ten major coal states.
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Energy interests were uneasy, and hoped that the pro-oil
Johnson would temper Kennedy's stand on import controls .
^
The new President played it safe. Secretary of the
Interior Stewart L. Udall revised the rules of the quota
program and increased imports of fuel oil. Since this
product affected the coal industry, such measures worried
Appalachia more than the Southwest. Oil interests warned
that easing residual controls signaled the imminent
collapse of the quota program, but most paid little
attention to the coal bloc at this time. Asked about the
future of fuel oil limits, Kennedy responded guardedly that
"we have to consider the needs of the coal industry and
domestic producers, the needs of New England, and we are
trying to reach a balance which will protect the public
4interest". Despite a rise in crude quotas in the last
half of 1961, producers expressed satisfaction with this
fair-trade statement regarding oil.'^
Nevertheless, oilmen asked a fundamental question about
the import program. Would Kennedy swing the concept of
controls away from national security, and protection of
domestic production, and toward reducing quotas for the
sake of Western cooperation and foreign aid? Assistant
Secretary of the Interior and oilman John M. Kelly argued
that domestic health should be the top priority on the
grounds of national defense. Total petroleum imports had
risen over 63% since 1954, and while foreign crude
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production was up an average of 29%, the output of the U.S.
independents had not kept pace. For the sake of the
nation's security, Kelly and Udall suggested cutting import
quotas by 50,0 00 barrels a day .
^
However compelling, the potential injury to the LDCs and
Kennedy's opposition to trade restrictions and high fuel
prices offset the Interior argument. Kelly and Udall were
the sole supporters of oil protectionism within the
administration and found their proposed quota reduction
tabled. Presidential policy supplanted bureaucratic
politics; as oilmen had feared, Kennedy shifted the focus
of import policy from the national to the international
level in order to ensure close trade relations with other
nations. He did not seek an end to the quota program, and
critics pointed out the inconsistency of pursuing free-
trade in tandem with oil import controls. Yet in general,
Kennedy was a staunch believer in freer trade in order to
correct the payments deficit and prevent inroads by the
7Soviet bloc into the LDCs.
In fact, the Soviet Union was a catalyst to Kennedy's
trade program as well as his resistance to oil import
restrictions. Moscow had chosen petroleum as a weapon in
its economic offensive against the West, becoming the
second-ranking producer behind the United States . Italy
had already responded to Soviet overtures by selling or
bartering construction materials for East-bloc oil. The
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state Department now worried over Soviet penetration in the
politically unstable LDCs, many of whom turned to Russian
financing for exploration and drilling when international
oil companies refused such help.^
Regarding communist penetration, Venezuela, the largest
source of American petroleum imports, was a major worry for
Kennedy. Enjoying the highest per capita income in the
region, Venezuela was a gauge of the effectiveness of his
Alliance for Progress and of democratic government in Latin
America. The world's top oil exporter, the nation also had
become the sixth best customer for the U.S. goods, buying
over $1 billion worth thanks to its petroleum revenues and
the help of bilateral trade agreements with the United
States. Venezuela was also considered the bellwether of
the Latin American oil industry.^
Washington recognized that all was not golden in
Venezuela, however. The country had endured a severe
recession in 1959-1960, with unemployment at 12%, a decline
in drilling by 42% since 1959, and a deficit of over $800
million. Oil investment was down and petroleum exports,
comprising one-fourth of Venezuela's GNP and over 90% of
its overseas sales, were sluggish. The world oil surplus
consequently weakened prices and thus reduced earnings for
the country. And, the new, moderate leftist President
Romulo Betancourt frightened some investors, both domestic
^ ur 10and foreign.
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Politically, Venezuelans remembered Eisenhower's
tolerance of the brutal dictatorship of Perez Jimenez, and
had shown their disfavor to Vice-President Richard Nixon in
1958 during his visit to Caracas. Now, Kennedy courted
President Betancourt, in order to cushion Venezuela's new
democracy from economic and political turmoil. Betancourt
had recently survived a bombing attempt on his life from
insurgents on the Left. From the Right, he faced an
oligarchic and entrenched ruling class which resisted land,
government, and other reforms. As White House aide Arthur
Schlesinger warned, Betancourt' s ousting or death would
guarantee a Castro or Peron."^-^ A prosperous economy,
undergirded by a healthy oil industry, would benefit
Betancourt and U.S. aims in the region invaluably.
But since its inception, the quota program had been a
problem for Venezuela, and its first Minister of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, sought
compensation. Perez Alfonzo adhered to the ideas of
Brazilian economist Raul Prebisch, who claimed that the
terms of trade gave the manufactured goods of the North a
price advantage over the raw materials of the South, and
thus permanently impoverished the LDCs . The Minister, a
believer in government intervention in the petroleum
industry, addressed this problem by trying to raise world
prices of oil, reduce output, and control exports. To
these ends, Perez Alfonzo helped form Organization of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in I960, which proved
effective a decade later. in the early 1960s, though,
Caracas seemed merely to alienate Venezuelan oilmen, which
further depressed the economy and enhanced leftist inroads
12m its democracy.
The oil quota program was a focus of Venezuelan
grievances, although Caracas was sympathetic to its
political necessity. The program had stabilized prices and
allowed a sustained growth of exports, yet Venezuela feared
losing its historically favorable position in the U.S.
market to cheaper Mideast and burgeoning Canadian oil.
Opposed to a reduction in quotas, Perez Alfonzo complained
that Venezuela did not receive a preferential overland
exemption from the program like Canada and Mexico.
Betancourt was more strident. In 1961, he sent a letter to
the Departments of State and Interior, noting the harmful
effects of quotas, and asked UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
to end the "abuses and injustices" of oil restrictions . "^"^
These complaints were the principal theme during
Kennedy's visit to Venezuela in December 1961, the first
ever by a U.S. President. Drawing on arguments by
Interior's Kelly, the President responded that the program
actually helped Venezuela. Because of the overland
exemption, for instance, Canada's Western provinces were
not subject to U.S. controls and sold oil profitably in the
American upper Midwest. Thus, Canada saw no need to build
a oil pipeline to its eastern provinces, a large market
dependent on petroleum from Venezuela. Furthermore,
decontrolling fuel oil would lower prices, impairing
Caracas' exchange rate. Also, Venezuelan oil was not in
bad shape in the U.S. market. Residual fuel was not overly
limited and Kennedy had abandoned plans to reduce crude
14quotas
,
Nevertheless, always sensitive to the developing
nations, Kennedy recognized Venezuela's democracy was
teetering on the edge of political ruin. In response, the
U.S. had doubled its loans to the nation to $100 million in
1961 and urged Venezuela to boost all LDC exports through
regional economic integration under the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) , a common market similar to the
European Economic Community. As a fair-trader, Kennedy
accepted LAFTA discrimination against U.S. goods because he
believed that the body was essential to economic viability.
He also affirmed that the importing countries of the north
must recognize the region's dependence on exports. Kennedy
promised to hold consultations with Betancourt before
changing the quota program, even installing a "hot-line"
between the Oval Office and Betancourt 's chambers to effect
V. • ^ • 15such communications
.
Back home, Kennedy prepared for the task of placating
domestic interests in order to net votes for the TEA.
Returning from the Army-Navy football game in early
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December 1961, he had announced a review of the Mandatory
Quota Program by the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP)
.
This study, due out in mid-1962, did not comfort oilmen
about the future of controls. It did win praise from the
coal industry, which thought the quota program was
inadequate. Overall, the energy sector believed that the
administration lacked a clear-cut oil policy, but that 1962
would be a "showdown year" over trade and other issues.
Well before the TEA campaign, though, the coal and oil
factions began the battle against imports. Indeed, the
coal industry was in a sad state. While world coal
production had risen by 35% from 1950-1962, U.S. output had
dropped 13%. Even economically distressed Britain
registered an increase. Of the ten principal coal-
producing states, only three small producers, Virginia,
Tennessee, and Missouri, mined more coal in 1962 than 1950.
Meanwhile, nearly one-fifth of American mines closed and
employment dropped by 65%, or 272,000 workers. But these
conditions existed because exports to Canada and Europe had
been halved while railroads had shifted to diesel and
consumers to natural gas. To be sure, residual oil imports
had captured the Eastern seaboard, but that market provided
1
7
a minor part of coal's traditional purchasers.
The industry wanted Kennedy to increase exports,
particularly to West Germany and Canada which restricted
U.S. coal. Producers attacked Canadian restrictions on
U.S. coal on the grounds of receiprocity
; Ottawa received
free entry of its oil through the U.S. overland exemption.
The U.S. also reproved Germany, which discriminated against
American bituminous while discreetly importing cheaper East
Bloc coal, Bonn criticized U.S. restrictions on residual
oil, but Senate free-trader Paul Douglas retorted that West
German duties on U.S. coal were just as bad."^^
But most observers, however erroneously, perceived
imports as a bigger problem. The major coal associations,
companies, and the United Mine Workers (UMW) cited residual
oil imports as injurious to Appalachia, a testing ground
for the New Frontier economic recovery program. The UMW,
demanding a "permanent rigid quota" on residual oil
imports, opposed the TEA, while management, having not yet
announced its position, criticized oil import policy.
Kennedy preferred modernization plans already drawn up,
such as a coal slurry, to stake out a certain portion of
the eastern market for coal producers and help them compete
with residual oil. Such efforts, though, only led a West
Virginia legislator to point out that "the President is
killing us with kindness" but "we're not going to get what
19
we really want" . They wanted limits on fuel imports
.
The oil industry, in an unusual concert with coal
interests , drummed up similar arguments . Independents
cared more about crude than residual imports , since oilmen
supplied only 10% of the fuel oil consumed in America. Yet
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they allied with the coal industry because this percentage
still added up to 900,000 barrels a day (bbl./day) in sales
and because they feared that further decontrols on any
petroleum product might signify an easing of crude quotas.
Spokesman for oilmen, the Independent Petroleum Association
of America (IPAA) and state groups, were disappointed that
Kennedy refused to cut quotas by 250,000 bbl./day, or even
by 50,000 following Udall's recommendation
.
The independents cited imports, which they claimed had
absorbed market growth, and loopholes or overly liberal
quotas, as the causes of stagnations in production and
exploration. They complained that the overland exemption
enabled Canada's western provinces to dominate the U.S.
upper Midwest. A major loophole which irked them was the
"Brownsville Shuffle", a deceptive transhipment manuever
around American customs houses which Mexico exploited to
avoid U.S. oil restrictions. In the interest of "national
security", the IPAA offered a plan to limit total imports
to 14% of domestic production, instead of estimated demand,
in order to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Oilmen
girded for a "tough fight" with Kennedy, willing to trade
21support on the TEA for a tightening of the quota program.
Oil imports were partially to blame for the industry's
problems
. Indeed, production of crude in the country still
more than doubled the output of the closest competitors,
Russia and Venezuela. Since 1950, production had risen by
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25% and output in 1961 had topped the previous boom year of
1957. Residual fuel production had fallen but this drop
was by choice, since the independents wished to concentrate
on refining the more profitable crude. Nonetheless,
surplus world production and eroding prices had increased
imports, which took an increasing share of U.S. demand.
Excess capacity, coupled with rising imports, idled
drilling and prompted worker lay-offs. In Texas,
exploration fell 44% from 1958 to 1961, as the glutted
market limited production from an average of 21 days a
month in 1952 to just over 8 days a month in 1961.
Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico suffered
22similar fates.
Calls for import limits found sympathetic ears in
Congress, since lawmakers viewed the TEA vote as an
opportunity to take a stand for their constituents. Many
faced re-election and many in the Southwest relied on
oilmen to bankroll their campaigns. Though gratified by
Kennedy's attention to Appalachia in his domestic agenda,
coal-state members had soured on oil imports. West
Virginia, led by Arch A. Moore, Jr. (R) and the venerable
Cleveland M. Bailey (D) , and Pennsylvanians under
protectionist John Dent, whose special hearings on trade
focused first on coal and residual oil problems, mobilized
the House coal bloc. One indication of its influence was
the position of Thomas Morgan (D-PA) , Chairman of the House
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Foreign Relations Committee, who opposed the TEA as an ally
of the UMW.^"^
The House oil bloc marched with their coal cohorts, with
Representative Tom Steed (D-OK) leading protectionists.
Steed's hearing on oil imports under a subcommittee of the
House Small Business Committee in late 1961 had been a
platform for independent producers to criticize what they
viewed as an over-liberal quota program. with Arch Moore,
Steed proposed an amendment to the TEA which endorsed the
IPAA plan of limiting imports to 14% of domestic
production. He described the Steed-Moore amendment as a
weapon with which the oil-coal alliance would make a
"final" stand against oil imports.
Protectionists united by an impressive margin in April
1962. For instance, 33 congressmen introduced bills
identical to the Steed-Moore amendment. A bipartisan group
of 110 House and Senate members endorsed a pamphlet
published by the National Coal Policy Conference calling
for import restrictions. A few signed the pamphlet to
voice discontent about foreign discrimination of U.S. coal
exports. But in general, the 79 House members attacked
imports, and 84 congressmen from 23 states expressed
similar disgruntlement in the New York Times
. Kennedy
could not help but notice the outcry, especially since it
involved several members of the Ways and Means Committee,
which directed hearings on trade legislation in the
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House. 25 Signs pointed to success for interest groups in
their fight against oil imports.
If the revolt against oil imports had been as clear-cut
as the one by the textile industry, Kennedy might have
responded promptly with restrictions. But Venezuelan
interests, and more immediate, the position of the
"consumer" bloc, prevented a hasty move. The New England
Council and the Independent Fuel Oil Marketers of America
spearheaded efforts toward relaxing restrictions. They
argued, like Senator Kennedy, that residual imports were
not responsible for coal problems. They claimed that these
imports were consumed on the Atlantic seaboard where coal
was no longer a significant source of energy and because
fuel oil was too heavy for economical transport inland.
Anyway, consumers said that they were willing to buy U.S.-
made residual if produced in sufficient quantities.
Meanwhile, import controls made consumers pay high fuel
prices and had forced three large New England fuel oil
marketers out of business.
Consumers had a plausible case. Since 1950, stocks and
production of residual fuel in the U.S. had fallen by 17%
and 30% respectively due to slackening demand. Fuel oil
for industrial and heating purposes had not filled the gaps
in the market created by the switchover to other energy
sources by railroads
,
utilities, and ocean-going vessels
.
Also, since producers earned about $1 less per barrel for
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residual than crude, the yield of fuel oil since 1959 had
been halved as independents concentrated on the more
lucrative crude. Before the war, residual accounted for
over half the output of U.S. refineries; in 1962, the
production ratio was only 9.6%. Even the Oil and Gas
Journal, a voice of the petroleum industry, conceded that
removal of fuel oil controls would have little effect on
producers, would hurt coal interests only if prices dropped
appreciably, and that perhaps Venezuela should supply
America's fuel demand. Consumers did not make Kennedy's
decision on oil any easier.
The illogicality of import controls on residual oil
prompted pressure for their removal by the House consumer
bloc during the TEA campaign. The Massachusetts delegation
of Republicans Silvio Conte and Hastings Keith and Democrat
Thomas Lane were at the vanguard of these Atlantic seaboard
forces. In all, the House bloc included New England,
several Atlantic states, and Florida, numbering roughly 75
members. They urged the President to "show his genuine
belief in freer trade by removing barriers to residual oil
2 8imports" and ending "protection gone wild".
This line-up of consumer and oil-coal blocs placed
Kennedy in a difficult position, yet he leaned toward freer
trade in oil . Udall raised the ceiling on residual imports
by 10% in April 1962, an action that enraged the coal bloc
but pleased the consumer faction. A continued refusal to
amend the TEA with the Steed-Moore limit brought
"rumblings" from Steed, who visited the President in March
1962. Kennedy and Udall opposed the Steed-Moore amendment
on the grounds that other commodity interests would attempt
to tack on special clauses to the trade bill and that help
for oil could be accomplished "administratively" through
the quota program. Though aware of the depressed
conditions in the oil industry, the administration believed
security interests would be better served by not cutting
off LDC producers from the American market and throwing
them into the laps of the Soviet bloc.^^ As a matter of
general policy, cold war concerns overruled the demands of
domestic producers.
For the political short-term, however, Kennedy decided
passage of the TEA took precedence, and thus handled the
coal-oil with care. To pacify oilmen, Kennedy kept the
national security provision intact in the TEA. Though
Steed adamantly refused to back off his 14% amendment,
rumored to be a losing proposition because of presidential
opposition, Kennedy privately assured key congressmen that
he had considered revising quotas along the lines of
Steed's proposal. Thus, Steed returned from the White
House encouraged by Kennedy's "understanding". In
addition, despite rising fuel oil imports, the recovery
program for Appalachia, as well as a tariff increase on
glass imports, convinced many coal bloc members of
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Kennedy's concern for their region. Such were the
initial results of interest group pressure working through
inter-branch cooperation.
Most important, Kennedy had developed key friends in
Congress which bettered prospects for the TEA. One ally
was Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, who managed to
defeat the Steed-Moore amendment in the committee by a vote
of 15-10 on 23 May 1962, arguing that it would unduly tie
the President's hands in trade policy. The action
bolstered Kennedy' a hopes for winning votes, even from oil-
31state congressmen.
On 28 June 1962, the trade bill sailed through the
House, and the application of the fair-trade doctrine to
oil imports was a major reason. Of the 108 representatives
who had the signed publications calling for more oil
restrictions, 71 voted for the TEA. Congressmen who
tallied against included 24 anti-New Frontier Republicans
and intractable protectionists such as Steed, Moore, and
Dent. The coal states backed the bill, including two-
thirds of the West Virginia delegation and over half of
Pennsylvania's members. Two-thirds of the oil-state
legislators from Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, and
New Mexico sided with Kennedy, as did 20 of the 33 co-
sponsors of the Steed-Moore amendment. Not surprisingly,
32four-fifths of the consumer bloc favored the bill.
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This win secured, Kennedy's tightrope act on oil imports
faced a similar challenge in the Senate. The vote could
prove sticky because the OEP report on the quota program
was due and might draw a hostile response from oil
interests. Kennedy wisely delayed the report's release
until September, though oilmen criticized his "vague
promises that never seem to materialize". Their last "thin
thread of hope" for protection was the Senate.
The battlelines were drawn immediately in the Senate.
The New England Delegation, the 12-member bipartisan
collection of senators of which Kennedy had been a member,
represented the consumer bloc. The voice of the coal
forces was newcomer Robert C. Byrd (D-WVA)
, backed by
legislators from several states, while Robert S. Kerr (D-
OK) directed the oil bloc. Earlier, 27 oil- and coal-state
senators had complained to Secretary Udall about the
adverse effect of oil imports. Eighteen had warned the
President that imports jeopardized the nation's security,
and 30 had endorsed the same pamplet or advertisement
signed by their counterparts in the House. All together,
the oil-coal bloc consisted of 39 senators from half the
34
states in the union.
The real strength in the bloc belonged to Robert Kerr.
The second-ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee (which
had jurisdiction over the TEA) and part owner of Kerr-McGee
Oil Company, Kerr had reached the apex of his power as New
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Frontier legislation made its way through Congress in 1962.
He had been instrumental in handing the administration one
of its worst defeats on Capitol Hill over the Medicare
bill. Regardless of this independence, however, he was one
of Kennedy's few friends of influence on Capitol Hill.
The power of Kerr, the "King of the Senate", was not
lost on the President. As the story goes, Kennedy, looking
ahead to his legislative agenda for 1962, announced he
would visit Kerr's ranch in late October 1961. Before the
trip, a jealous Oklahoma Governor J. Howard Edmondson, a
possible replacement for Lyndon Johnson as a vice-
presidential running mate in 1964 and a Kennedy intimate,
hysterically telephoned and then flew to Hyannisport, found
the President on a golf course, and demanded to know
Kennedy's purpose. The President responded, "Why Howard,
I'm going to Oklahoma to kiss Bob Kerr's ass". Kennedy had
become Kerr's "legislative captive", and the administration
, ..35knew it
.
This relationship gave Kerr much leverage. His allies,
senior senators called "whales" by LBJ, dominated the
President's "minnow" friends. Persuading these veterans on
votes enabled Kerr to win concrete advantages for Oklahoma.
Biographer Ann Morgan explains how Kerr suggested that
Kennedy trade a tax bill for pork, an allusion to the
senator's pet public works proposal, the Arkansas River
Navigation Project. Kerr reported that he could not break
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the logjam in Congress on the tax bill before the President
moved on the project. A smiling Kennedy replied, "You
know, Bob, I never really understood the Arkansas River
bill before today", and accepted the bill. Kerr also
chaired the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee which
funded NASA and could reject Kennedy's plans to send a man
to the moon.^^ He could also make or break the Trade
Expansion Act.
In order to win favors for Oklahoma, promote his image
in the senate, and undercut the power of his rival on the
Finance Committee, Chairman Harry Byrd, Kerr single-
handedly bargained with Kennedy over oil imports. He had
opposed the last two trade bills, helped write the national
security amendment in 1955, and pushed for the Mandatory
Quota Program. Now, willing to abandon the protectionist
camp, Kerr advocated liberal trade as a benefit to Oklahoma
and responded tepidly to the Steed-Moore amendment. The
national security clause would be sufficient, he argued, if
the President tightened up the quota program. ^'^ Kerr's
support of the TEA hinged on this trade-off.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1962, Kerr visited
the White House. His only "understanding" with the
President was a vague avowal that Kennedy was interested in
accommodating the oil-coal bloc. Kerr pledged to make this
goal easy for Kennedy and planned to reach an accord after
hearings on the TEA ended in mid-August. Yet, he received
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heat back home for not supporting the Steed-Moore
amendment. When the oil press reported that he would guide
the TEA through the senate, which meant he could not back
Steed, Kerr claimed that the amendment was a political
impossibility, promised his position had not changed on
limiting oil imports, and proclaimed that he would oppose
the TEA if he thought Oklahoma and oilmen might suffer.
The eventual deal lived up to these assurances. Kennedy
agreed to limit crude imports to 12.2% of domestic
production, instead of estimated demand, taking 1961 as a
base period. The new plan exempted residual oil from the
formula, it was less than the 14% Steed-Moore-IPAA
proposal, and it retained the overland exemptions for
Canada and Mexico. But it adopted the Steed method of
allocating quotas, restricted imports more effectively than
the current program, and expanded consumption of domestic
crude especially on the oil-deprived West coast. The plan
reduced imports an estimated 70,000 bbls/day, limited
Canadian oil in the U.S., and did not increase imports
faster than domestic output. In return, Kerr did not
introduce an oil amendment to the TEA. Most important, he
3 9promised to corral votes for the bill.
Kerr did just that. In a remarkable turnaround for an
erstwhile protectionist, Kerr campaigned for the TEA. His
persuasion won votes from the senior members of the oil
bloc, 34 of the 39 senators who had endorsed restrictions.
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and unanimous consent from the Southwestern oil states.
Every senator but two from the coal states followed suit,
including bloc leader Robert Byrd. Meanwhile 9 of the 12
New England Delegation members sided with Kennedy. Dissent
came from either staunch protectionists or the President's
Republican enemies /° The fair-trade strategy of conceding
protectionism in oil in return for general trade
liberalization under the TEA was a success.
There remained two loose ends to tie up before the
administration could relish its victory. The first dealt
with the OEP report, cagily released in Septeinber after the
Senate vote. When the OEP recommended liberalizing quotas,
the watch-dog Kerr readied a special bill to tighten them
in case Kennedy did not. At once, the President told
reporters that the OEP proposal was "not acceptable" and on
30 November 1962, he had Udall announce a revised Mandatory
Quota Program identical to his deal with Kerr. Earlier,
the IPAA gave Kerr a standing ovation for his efforts and
thanked Kennedy for the special treatment.'^''"
The other loose end was the foreign response to the
revised program. Over the past two years, Canada had
sought to boost its exports in the American market, and
though its oil might be indirectly hurt by the new program,
the U.S., in fact, did not squeeze off the burgeoning flow
of crude from Canada nor revoke the free entry status of
the overland exemption. Thus, Canadian oil sales in the
U.S. surpassed those of the Middle East by 1966 and top
exporter Venezuela by 1972, resulting in an overall rise of
21% from 1962 to 1973. America also sustained the level of
Mexico's negligible exports at 30,000 bbl./day, continued
the overland exemption from quotas until 1971, and even
accepted the tricky "Brownsville Shuffle".^^ American oil
trade policy was more than fair; it was overly generous.
For Venezuela, the situation was more complicated.
During 1962, Betancourt had quelled several leftist
rebellions, thus stabilizing the transition to democracy.
Recovery from the recent depression underway, oil
production began to increase. Also, relations between
Washington and Caracas grew more cordial after the Kennedy
visit. Even oil minister Perez Alfonzo, though still
demanding preferential treatment for Venezuelan oil in the
American market, had toned down his recriminations against
the import quota program during a trip to the U.S. in April
1962. Indeed, he realized Venezuela would be the chief
beneficiary from the raised residual oil ceiling that
43occurred that month.
Yet the revised program threatened to derail these good
feelings
.
The American embassy in Caracas reported private
and government indignation over the new restrictions.
Betancourt "had worked up quite a head of steam" after a
briefing by Perez Alfonzo, and was reconsidering his
proposed visit to Washington in early 1963 unless
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concessions were forthcoming/^ Kennedy took this
complaint seriously and dispatched White House aide Myer
Feldman to Venezuela for consultations.
Betancourt and Perez Alfonzo issued their grievances to
Feldman. The revised program contradicted Kennedy's pledge
never to change the system unilaterally, asserted Perez
Alfonzo. Also, Venezuela was America's oldest and most
important supplier of petroleum in the hemisphere, yet did
not enjoy an exemption from the quota program like Canada
and Mexico. This lack of preferences "entirely
disregarded" that Venezuela was an "integrated Sister-
Republic" with the United States. Despite the continued
dominance of its oil in the eastern Canadian and American
residual market, moreover, Venezuela was left with "the
bones" of fuel oil sales as opposed to the more profitable
crude
.
Another gripe was a new method of "quota trading"
. The
revised system reduced the percentage of imports allocated
to "historical" importers, those U.S. companies who bought
foreign, and mostly Venezuelan, oil before 1957. The rules
now allowed "inland" refiners, which did not directly use
imported oil, to swap their quota allotments for domestic
petroleum. Quota trading cut imports; Venezuela estimated
a loss of revenue of $35 million. Betancourt wished to
eliminate quota trading, charging that the allocation of
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permits for imports encouraged speculation by greedy
refiners. He desired that they use Venezuelan oil.^^
Feldman responded with a sympathetic yet firm defense of
the Kennedy program. On preferences for others and not
Venezuela, he repeated that without the overland exemption,
Canada would have cut off Venezuelan exports to the
Montreal area by building a pipeline from its oil-producing
provinces. Besides, Canada's position in the U.S. market
was fixed under the quota exemption while Venezuela had an
increased sales potential once American consumption
expanded. Anyway, Venezuela's rising exports during 1962
confirmed the nation's competitiveness in the United
States
.
Admittedly, the revised quota program would slow
Venezuelan crude sales, said Feldman, but Caracas could
look forward to increased demand in Europe and in the many
markets it dominated, such as Puerto Rico, other Caribbean
countries, and Canada. Though residual oil did not reap as
high profits as crude, it still offered "attractive
opportunities". Venezuela virtually owned the American
fuel oil market, supplying about 86% of the residual
consumed in the U.S. either directly or through the
Netherlands Antilles. These exports had climbed 30% over
the past three years and could rise further, depending on
Kennedy's response to a pending OEP report on residual oil
quotas
.
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Like Betancourt, Kennedy did not like the speculation
involved in quota trading, and promised a solution. But
Feldman explained that quota trading aided domestic
producers, who were required to expand their sales to
inland refiners penalized by the allocation advantage of
historical importers under the previous system. Phasing
out this competitive edge for importers was only fair.
Besides, an elimination of quota trading would actually
hurt Caracas by forcing inland refiners to transport oil
from the coast at an uneconomical cost, thereby depressing
prices and bringing in less revenue for Venezuela
.
In the end, Betancourt and Perez Alfonzo accepted the
U.S. position. Purely for home consumption, Betancourt
pledged in January 19 63 to end the "Sword of Damocles" by
which the U.S. could unilaterally make decisions taken"
affecting Venezuelan oil in the American market. But the
following month, he privately expressed to the President
his satisfisfaction with the revised program. Meeting
Betancourt in Washington, Kennedy promised to inform him of
. 47any changes in the import program.
As time would tell, the administration's claim that
Venezuela would encounter steady growth in exports was
borne out. From 1962 to the first oil crisis in 1973, its
exports to America increased by 83 million barrels, a
feeble 8 million barrels a year. Yet since Venezuela also
produced nearly all of the oil exported from the
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Netherlands Antilles, it gained an additional 100 million
barrels over the period, or 18 million barrels per year.
While the nation remained the top oil supplier to America,
dropping to third behind Canada and the Middle East by
1975, Venezuela remained in first place in the U.S. market
until 197 6 when Caribbean sources are added to its export
total.
Furthermore, Kennedy rejected the recommendation of the
OEP in February 1963 to eliminate controls on residual oil,
but began a trend toward liberalization that ended in
abolishing limits in 1966. While American imports of crude
rose by 15%, to 483,293 thousand barrels a day, residual
imports more than doubled to 557,845 thousand barrels a
day, thus topping crude imports, by the end of the decade.
Significantly, the ratio of residual imports to U.S.
domestic consumption leapt from 48.2% in 1962 to 69.4% in
1970. Since it sent nearly nine-tenths of this fuel oil,
Venezuela profited considerably.'^^
Increased exports to America showed that the controls
imposed by the Kennedy fair-trade approach to oil imports
were limited in their effect on trade. They were not
limited in their effect on congressional treatment of the
TEA, however. The revision of the Mandatory Quota Program
was a sop to oilmen; the refusal to junk restrictions on
residual fuel a bone to coal interests. In the end,
Kennedy's oil import policy, based on the delicate balance
of the fair-trade doctrine, satisfied all parties. Oil and
coal producers were protected, while consumers enjoyed the
general trend toward trade liberalization. Canada and
Venezuela initially criticized but accepted the revised
program. And Kennedy won a strategic victory which helped
win him the trade bill and the essential power to transform
his liberal trade goals into reality.
Kennedy granted the most explicitly protectionist of all
of his concessions well before he signed the TEA, by
raising tariffs on glass and carpet items. Based on a
unanimous recommendation by the Tariff Commission to invoke
the escape clause, which released an industry from a prior
trade agreement and enabled an increase in barriers to
imports, the action was the first and only tariff hike he
ever made. The duties were too drastic to explain away as
mere economic assistance, especially since the
administration was in the midst of trying to inject
liberalism into the international trade regime. Instead,
they indicated the lengths to which Kennedy would go to
pass the TEA.
The President raised tariffs on wilton and velvet carpet
imports as another part of his aid for the textile
industry. The inflow of carpets from abroad reached a
record high $8.2 million square yards in 1961, almost
double the level of 1958, which compelled congressional
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representatives of major producing areas, particularly
Congressman Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY) from upstate New
York, to lobby the President for limits. The textile
industry joined this appeal. Kennedy, of course, had
already exerted much effort on behalf of textile
manufacturers, thus his help for wilton and velvet carpet
manufacturers added to his good standing within the
industry and on Capitol Hill.^'^
More revealing of the motives behind and the impact of
the tariff hike was the issue of sheet glass imports.
Sheet glass, used for windows, had been rejected twice for
a duty increase by Eisenhower despite Tariff Commission
suggestions to the contrary. Kennedy kept the glass
industry in mind during the 19 60 campaign as a possible
focal point for a "trade adjustment bill" in the event he
won the election. He had lost, however, a majority of the
top nine glass-producing states, including West Virginia
and Oklahoma, two of the three largest. In the
presidential politics of glass trade, he did not succeed.
Now in office, he had his chance to act on the findings
of a Tariff Commission hearing in May 1961. Before the
Commission, major companies - Libbey-Owens-Ford,
Pittsbutgh Plate Glass, and American-St. Gobain - as well
as the United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America,
the Window Glass Cutters League, and the Ohio,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Indiana Glass Workers
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Protective League, complained about imports. They
testified that the steadily declining tariff since the war,
labor and material cost advantages of foreigners, and
parity in technological expertise and productivity among
domestic and overseas firms gave imports a competitive
, 52edge
,
The Tariff Commission agreed with them, finding imports
to blame for the decline in sheet glass production. Sales
of domestic manufactures had decreased by one-quarter
between 1955 and 1960, employment had dropped 16%, and the
four major manufacturing firms suffered net operating
losses of over $1.1 million. A discriminatory factory
distribution arrangement, which drove unfavored buyers to
turn to cheaper imports in order to compete with
"recognized" factory and consumer distributors, caused some
of these problems. Yet the industry had also lost nearly
one-quarter of the domestic market to imports during the
past decade. In order, Belgium, Japan, and other European
countries had accounted for 32% of these sales in 1959,
when just nine years before they had less than 3% of the
market. Overall, the percentage share of U.S. sheet glass
consumption for domestic manufacturers had fallen from
97.8% to 75.4% from 1950 to 1960. Based on its findings,
the Commission recommended in June 19 61 invoking the escape
clause
.
252
Yet, the President, suspicious particularly of the
discriminatory distributor practice, postponed his decision
to act on the recommendation. Aware of the seriousness of
a tariff increase on foreign relations, Kennedy wanted more
information in order to consider fully the "national
interest" without "unduly restricting fair competition"
from abroad. He figured that the predicted imminent
economic recovery in the country, fueled by expanding
production in the construction, automobile and aircraft
sectors, would benefit window-makers and reverse the
depressed conditions in the sheet glass industry. Also, by
delaying, Kennedy shrewdly avoided inciting Congress to
override him in the event he rejected the Commission's
recommendation
.
This approach angered Congress, however. The
postponement induced Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) to
introduce a bill which made Tariff Commission
recommendations binding on the President. That three
presidents had accepted only 13 of 36 recommendations for
tariff raises since 1950 frustrated protectionists. The
six House members at the Commission hearing had also backed
calls for restrictions on foreign sheet glass. They
concurred with the demand of the four-state Glass Workers
Protective League to know "plainly and promptly" where
Kennedy stood on the import issue, for they had received to
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date "no encouragement-only the opposite" - from the White
House.
Surely sparking Kennedy's attention was Congressman
Dent's self-proclaimed "crusade" for restrictions on sheet
glass imports. Dent was an irreconcilable protectionists-
Kennedy could not hope to woo him to the TEA. But he was
also an articulate opponent of liberal trade and might
rally fellow legislators who accused the administration of
giving "second-class consideration" to American workers and
industries. The sheet glass problem was an example of
Kennedy's "perverted" trade policies, he said, which
permitted imports of goods in which there already existed a
surplus, particularly in his home district in Pennsylvania
where the world's largest glass factory had recently
closed. Not very subtly. Dent pointed to the President,
saying that "it does not take a Harvard graduate to make
two and two equal four" in relating imports to economic
stagnation
.
Dent gathered a collection of House and Senate
supporters of the tariff increase on sheet glass imports.
These legislators hailed from the nine major glass-
producing states and even included administration allies
such as Senators Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) and J.W.
Fulbright (D-Ark.)
. Added to them was Robert Kerr and the
entire Oklahoma congressional delegation, minus House
majority whip Carl Albert. This informal "glass bloc"
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paralleled to a large extent the regional make-up of the
coal-oil forces and numbered around 90 House and 15 Senate
members
.
The interim between the decision to postpone action in
late June 1961 and the time tariff hikes were instituted
eight months later allowed Kennedy to weigh the various
elements of the case. The Department of State reminded hir
of the international implications of tariffs. Japan would
be sorely hurt at a time Tokyo was sorting out its trade
relationship with the West. Restrictions could enrage
Premier Ikeda, disgruntled over the limits on cotton
textiles, and might heighten pressure within Japan to shut
out some important American exports.
The potential difficulty with Belgium and the rest of
EEC demanded the most attention, however. Belgium had
endured a series of foreign and domestic setbacks. Its
grant of independence to the Congo had led to political
chaos and war which had not served Belgian interests.
Brussels was also the sole member of the Six whose economy
lagged, and the GATT textile accords, which pried Belgium
open to cheap imports made the nation ever-more sensitive
to further economic burdens and foreign harrassment. But
the U.S. also counted on the moderate and long-time Belgian
statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak, to sustain an outward-looking,
liberal-trading Common Market.
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The EEC had stepped in this direction during the Dillon
Round of GATT, which was drawing to a conclusion by early
March 1962, around the same time Kennedy would decide on
the tariff issue. An American tariff raise, warned the
State Department, would be "counterproductive, both
psychologically and practically" to the participants at the
Round. Restricting carpets and glass might set off a
"chain reaction" of retaliation by the Common Market and
doom the emerging trade relationship of the U.S. and the
Six that was the raison d'etre of the TEA.^^
Once again, Kennedy found himself in a familiar no-win
situation. He would gladly close out the Dillon Round,
move on to the TEA, and open the next GATT round without
raising tariffs. But timing was on the side of
congressional protectionists; the desire of the President
to gather votes on the TEA brightened the prospects of
escape clause action. Besides, glass interests were
adamantly opposed to free-trade. The President of Libbey-
Owens-Ford, for instance, stated that "we're in favor of
protection", and his company joined three other major
producers in staunchly rejecting the TEA. The
congressional bloc followed suit. Dent foresaw "nothing
but disaster" for producers (and presumably the TEA) unless
5 9Kennedy protected jobs.
Facing the TEA vote in Congress, and with the Tariff
Commission in support, the President opted to raise tariffs
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on 19 March 1962. He did refuse to boost duties on
baseball gloves and ceramic mosaic tiles on the grounds
that domestic production had not been directly affected by
imports. But sheet glass and carpets, with organized
protectionist blocs behind them, received favorable
treatment. Aide Theodore Sorensen explained that Kennedy
acted on behalf of these industries to show that under U.S.
trade laws, there still existed the principle of
selectivity in choosing some industries for protection . ^°
Since neither carpets nor sheet glass contributed much to
the gross national product or to imports or exports
relative to other products, this principle took on a
distinct political meaning. Kennedy traded protectionism
for support on the TEA.
That politics overrode other considerations is shown by
the subsequent reaction of the parties concerned. The
sheet glass industry continued, despite the tariff hike, to
resist the trade bill. in fact, the day the hikes were
announced, nine industry witnesses testified against the
TEA before the House Ways and Means Committee. When
Kennedy delayed the tariffs for 90 days to give importers a
chance to find new sources of supply, the industry
criticized him. But manufacturers then turned around and,
against the wishes of the President, raised prices and
received the full benefits of owning a greater share of the
6
1
market. Interest groups won their demands, but the
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industry and the White House were still at odds on general
trade policy.
If the industry and the President were out of step,
Kennedy and Congress certainly were not. Members of both
houses noted the linkage of the tariff action with the
upcoming votes on the trade bill. Time Magazine responded
that the duties cast in doubt upon Kennedy's sincerity for
promoting free-trade, but they won him votes. Many
legislators expressed their "delight" with the move.
Escape clause originator Cleveland Bailey pointed out that
since Kennedy had shown a genuine concern for injured
industries by raising tariffs, the congressman would vote
for the TEA. Congressman Ed Edmondson (D-OK)
, like Bailey
one of the six House members who attended the Tariff
Commission hearing, said after the hike that "I feel that I
can not only go along with the [trade] bill, but work for
its passage".
Winning over protectionists was the outcome envisioned
by the administration. The duty hike on carpets earned the
votes of the two concerned New York congressmen, Samuel
Stratton and Steven B. Derounian (R) . Senator Harry Byrd
later attributed the passage of the TEA to the seven-point
textile program coupled with the carpet duty action.
Legislators from glass producing areas in West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois who, as Business Week
claimed, had been "100% against" the legislation earlier.
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were now divided. m the House, four of the six n.enU3ers
who demanded an escape clause ruling by the Tariff
Coitunission now voted with Kennedy. The 90-meinber glass
bloc split down the middle on the TEA, with the intractable
Dent and congressmen from the nine glass states in
opposition. Yet 34 of those against were the Republicans
from whom Kennedy could not expect any help. m the
Senate, all but two of the 15-member bloc, one of whom was
free-trader Fulbright who did not record a vote, the other
Republican Homer Capehart (R-Ind.), tallied in favor.
The Common Market did not publicly acknowledge the
politics of glass trade in criticizing the tariff hike,
which occurred just twelve days after the end of the Dillon
Round. With Belgium in the lead, the Six denounced the
increases which raised tariffs on wilton and velvet carpets
from 21 to 40% and on sheet, crown, and cylinder glass from
1.3 to 3.5 cents per pound. Belgium had already recalled
its delegate to GATT and its Ambassador to the United
States for consultation. Foreign Minister Maurice Brasseur
now called the hikes a "brutal" and "immoral" step. France
joined Belguim in claiming that the new tariffs further
indicated that any European industry which competed
successfully in the American market would be penalized. In
its entirety, the EEC was more diplomatic, dismayed that
the measures were "not in the spirit of the recent [Dillon
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Round] talks or of the coming talks" to be held after the
passage of the TEA.
The Conunon Market might have recognxzed the constraints
on Kennedy, however. Quite justifiably, the Six retaliated
in June 1962 by raising tariffs from 19 to 40% on certain
U.S. chemical, man-made fiber, and paint exports. Yet the
reprisals were not politically injurious to the President.
That is, the American chemical industry, primarily an
exporter, incurred the brunt of the European duty raises.
The few chemical manufacturers who were import-competitors
cared more about retaining the restrictive American Selling
Price than protection from tariffs. They also viewed
Europe as a temporary outlet until the U.S. market could
absorb their products. Thus, the Six very likely picked
the healthy chemical industry, and not more vulnerable
producers, so as not to arouse protectionists in Congress
any further against the TEA.^^ The EEC understood that
inter-branch politics underlay Kennedy's decision to raise
tariffs
.
The EEC, though, still questioned the utility of future
negotiations with America if the President could enact such
blatant protectionism just after a round of tariff cuts.
U.S. imports of wilton and velvet carpets plummeted from
the high of of 8.2 million square yards worth $28 million
in 1961 to a low in 1966 of 560,000 square yards valued at
only $3.1 million, and never rose above the 1961 levels
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during the next decade. The new tariffs provided similar
severe cuts in sheet glass imports. Belgium's share of
these carpet and glass imports actually rose during the
decade, but did not register real gains since this market
was obviously much smaller. In addition, Brussels ran
alternative trade surpluses and deficits with the U.S., but
when in the red, Belgium's deficit grew from $146 million
in 1962 to $232 million by 1970. Trade tended to favor
America
.
The effect of the tariffs, though, ranked second to the
trade bill in Kennedy's mind. He justified the tariffs by
citing Belgium's favorable payments balance and healthier
glass and carpet industries relative to American producers,
and before the EEC retaliation, meekly argued that the TEA
would stimulate employment on both sides of the Atlantic.
After the EEC reacted, he said that protectionism was
regrettable. But reminding Americans of link between the
duty raises and the trade legislation, Kennedy preferred to
emphasize that if the TEA had been in effect, "we could
have then offered an alternate package which I think would
6 7have prevented retaliation".
Clearly protectionist, the carpets and glass tariff
hikes served their purpose of winning adherents to the
trade bill. Indeed, it is difficult to determine exactly
how heavily economic motives weighed in the President's
actions, but politics took precedence. Aide Myer Feldman
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in August 19 62 echoed his boss in writing a chemical
industry leader that it was precisely to avoid the type of
mini-trade wars which had occurred during the carpets and
glass episode that the TEA must be passed,^® It is
unlikely that Kennedy would have risked upsetting his
carefully cultivated relationship with Europe and future
trade negotiations for the sake of selfishly protecting two
rather minor industries. Instead, he decided to lose a
battle to protectionists and enrage the allies now, and win
the war later by passing the TEA and reducing overall trade
barriers in negotiations with Europe,
The action on carpets and glass, like the measures for
oil and coal, lumber, and textiles, indicated that Kennedy
was not an ideologue on trade, despite his penchant for
lofty rhetoric. He pragmatically balanced the domestic and
international elements inherent in the fair-trade doctrine.
The President seemed already to have mastered the domestic
political element. He learned that legislative leadership
depended on compromise which broke down resistance to his
bills. The TEA, his top priority for 1962, required extra
effort toward this end.
One example of his conciliatory tactics related to an
incident involving Senator Russell Long (D-LA) . After
giving a pitch for the TEA to a group of senators, Kennedy
fielded their questions. Long, upset about the
administration's previously announced intention of shutting
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down some military bases around the country, demanded an
explanation about the closure of Louisiana's Fort Polk. An
irritated Kennedy informed Long that the meeting concerned
trade, not bases. "I understand trade and I hope you do
to", replied the senator, "I'll trade you that fort for a
vote on the Trade Expansion Act"
.
In short, Kennedy perceived he had little choice but to
forge these agreements. By resisting protectionists, the
TEA would surely lose. By meekly submitting to them, as
Eisenhower had done, the trade bill could be altered and
its effectiveness as an instrument of trade liberalization
undermined. His fair-trade tactic was a middle course that
preserved the basic outline of the TEA and appeased
Congress at the same time. As Theodore Lowi wrote, inter-
branch bargaining on the TEA signified a most "vulgar
7 0pluralist view of American politics".
Decision-making reflected this pluralism. Private
elites, including potent independent oil producers who
pressed for import restrictions during the TEA battle, did
not enjoy an informal, consensual relationship with the
Kennedy administration. Even adherent David Painter
singles out the domestic oil industry as incompatible with
the supposed corporatist international petroleum
7
1
structure. Leaders in the glass industry certainly did
not see eye-to-eye with Kennedy trade policy. In essence,
government and private sector leaders were not in alliance
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and corporatism does not explain decision-making in these
cases
Bureaucrats indeed took distinct positions on both
issues, but in the end their views merely provided the
President with a list of opinions. Interior Department
official Kelly and George Ball were surely at odds on oil
import policy, for instance, but Kennedy knew the options
available to him and the ones that were feasible in light
of the TEA. Very likely nobody in the administration
wanted tariffs raised, but the timing of the TEA and the
Tariff Commission report virtually made the hike a fait
accompli. In actuality, Kennedy had decided his course,
guided by his political instincts. Buying votes did not
require policy prescriptions from advisors.
The dependent variable for Kennedy was Congress. In the
oil and tariff issues, interest groups achieved their
goals. Oilmen came very close to getting the full slate of
their demands, including levels and the method of limiting
imports
.
Coal interests received sympathy for overseas
export barriers and much government attention to
development. Consumers were assured of freer trade and
lower prices in fuel oil. Glass and carpet manufacturers
won higher, nearly prohibitive tariffs. Yet the very
tangle of rival parties, especially regarding oil imports,
also casts doubts on relying entirely on the interest group
model as an explanatory tool for the decision-making
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process. Kennedy juggled all concerns and satisfied
industries, yet not because of direct pressure from the
private sector. Interest groups got the President's ear,
but only through their congressmen.
Instead, both cases represent interest group politics
succeeding through inter-branch, regulatory bargaining.
The deal with Kerr over oil imports epitomizes this
process. Kerr discreetly but firmly informed the President
that the demands of the oil industry would have to be met
before Kerr wielded his considerable clout in the Senate
and pushed the oil bloc to vote for the TEA. Kennedy
acquiesced, granting the independents their demands. At
the same time, he preserved his goal of fair-trade by
winning votes from all three congressional blocs on the
TEA, giving foreign producers a slowly growing share of the
U.S. oil market, and offering the potential for more access
on other goods once he used the TEA to bargain down trade
barriers through GATT
.
The President's concentration
on domestic politics certainly had an impact on
international affairs, the other half of the fair-trade
doctrine. Trade in textiles, oil, and carpets and glass
became more restrictive because a recalcitrant Congress
forced Kennedy to limit imports of these products. Some
scholars cite this parochial congressional power over the
more global strategies of the President as the reason for
eroding liberalism in economic regimes during the last
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twenty-five years
.
"^^
^^^^^^ ^^.^^ _^ ^^^^
Congress had considerable control over American policy in
the international trade regime.
The notion that Congress got the upper hand through
inter-branch politics at the expense of U.S. and foreign
trade interests can only be taken so far, however. The
special treatment accorded to the several industries by
Kennedy, which ended up restricting trade, strayed from
commerce based on the principle of comparative advantage.
But the halving of the American merchandise trade surplus
by the end of the 1960s bears witness to the fact that
other countries did not unduly suffer from U.S. trade
policies, and that America did. Canada, Japan, Venezuela,
and the EEC, all affected by Kennedy's protectionist
arrangements, soon developed surpluses with America.
For instance, critics of U.S. trade policy blame
American oil import limits for reducing Venezuelan gains in
crude oil exports and thus hindering that nation's lack of
diversification of its oil-based economy. But blame can be
just as easily placed on Venezuela. The country's high
cost structure, due to its lofty tariffs and overvalued
exchange rate relative to LDCs and other nations,
restrained growth in export sectors other than petroleum.
Venezuela was not successful in using its considerable
earnings from oil exports to build a solid industrial base
73
necessary for economic diversity and growth.
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The hegemony scholars also overlook the fact that U.S.
imports rose at America's own expense. Fuel oil imports
climbed while coal exports to Europe and Canada continued
to plunge until 1970. Oil imports grew by 65% from 1962 to
1973, the U.S. share of world production dropped, and
purchases from overseas filled a growing percentage of
demand and consumption, taking more of the market away from
domestic producers and giving it to other nations. '^^
American oil and coal producers were hurt in trade.
At the same time, the effects of the Trade Expansion Act
sent American trade into the red, and not only with
Venezuela. Critics contend that this deficit was warranted
by America's overall world trade surplus and its domination
of the Venezuelan economy. Yet as Secretary of State Rusk
informed Betancourt in late 1962, the oil import program
would in no way effect the growing tide of other Venezuelan
exports to the United States. He was right. The U.S.
trade deficit with Venezuela more than doubled between 1960
and 1976, when it totaled $896 million. By 1976, moreover,
the U.S. suffered a global trade deficit of almost $6
billion, when fifteen years before it had enjoyed a $5
75billion surplus. The benefits brought to others in
commerce, added to the injury domestic producers suffered,
proved that America was a magnanimous fair-trader.
Indeed, at last glance, the oil quotas did not grant
American producers immunity from import injury. The door
remained ajar to U.S. markets at the expense of the
independents. The pay-off was that under the authority of
the TEA, America would reciprocally boost exports in which
it enjoyed a comparative advantage and maintain leadership
over the global trade order. Regardless, increases in oil
imports, decreases in coal exports, and the halving of the
American trade surplus by the end of the 1960s bears
witness that other nations did not unduly suffer from U.S.
trade policies, and that America, to an extent, did.
Again, considering the political constraints on Kennedy,
trade was as fair as possible.
In other cases, other nations fared well under U.S.
trade policy. Hong Kong in textiles and Canada in oil and
lumber registered gains in trade, and the latter earned an
overall trade surplus with the United States. Belgium in
carpets and glass and Japan in textiles were hurt, yet the
former used the muscle of the EEC to bargain down tariffs
later in the decade and the Japanese enjoyed a steadily
burgeoning trade surplus with America by 1968 and
7 6thereafter. It should be noted also that all of these
nations were not innocent from protectionism, and
restricted U.S. exports of certain significant goods. In
sum, America was not very successful in maintaining its
postwar trade power in the global economy of the 1960s and
beyond
.
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To a considerable degree, the U.S. sacrificed its home
markets to foreign competition in order to retain its shaky
leadership over the world trade order. Kennedy believed
such a trade-off worthwhile because he sought a reciprocal
opening of doors abroad for American exports. This goal
undergirded his hope, soon to be somewhat dampened, that
most Americans would understand the importance of the Trade
Expansion Act in promoting exports and helping the country
achieve the domestic and foreign aims envisioned by the New
Frontier
.
269
1,Douglas R. Bohi and Milton Russell, Limiting Oil
Imports: An Economi c History and Analy .c.n.. (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), chps
. 1-3; Gerald D
Nash, United States Oil Poli cy, 1890-1964 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), 202-206; Edward W.
^^^^ter. United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy: A
Twentieth Century Overview (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press
1983), chps. 1, 3, 140-157; Kaufman, Trade and Aid
, 89-90.
2 Senator Kennedy to George Mills, 19 March 1959, oil-
1/6/59-5/16/59, box 724, PPP
. See also "Oil Could Be Top
Topic in Congress", Petroleum Week 11 (8 January 1960) : 13
"A Look at the Record Shows How the Oil Industry Might
Fare", Oil and Gas Journal 58 (18 July 1960) : 62; Speech,
"The Economic Problems of New England: A Program for
Congressional Action", no. 3, 25 May 1953, Residual Fuel
Oil-5/18/53-1954, box 774; Kennedy to Charles T. Conrad, 1
January 1959; New England Senate Delegation to the
President, 5 March 1959, Oil-1/6/59-5/162-59, box 724;
Speech, "New Uses for Coal", 3 October 1959, "New Uses for
Coal", box 916, PPP.
3Briefing Paper from Bill Brubeck and Myer Rashish,
Oil Import Situation, 1960, Briefing Papers: Oil Imports-
River Basin Development, box 993, PPP; J. Allan Sherier to
Congressman Tom Steed (D-OK) , 5 February 1962, box 307, Oi:
import hearings. Papers of Tom Steed, Carl Albert
Congressional Research and Studies Center Congressional
270
Archives, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma,
(hereafter cited as Steed papers); White, The Making of the
President. 1960, 420-421; "The Election is Important to
0^1"' Petroleum Week 11 (22 July 1960): 11-13.
4 The President's News Conference of 1 March 1961,
Public Papers, 1961, 138. See also Justinus Gould to
Congressman Wright Patman (D-TX) on Dept. of Interior
Hearings on Mandatory Oil Import Program, 16 May 1961,
Legislative: Small Business, Oil Imports, 1961, box 288,
Steed papers; "U.S. Raises Quota for Residual Oil", New
York Times, 18 February 1961, 25; Telegram, Senator Robert
C. Byrd (D-WVA) to the White House, 17 February 1961,
Tariff-Trade-Import Controls, 2/61-10/61, box 23, Feldman
files; "Residual Controls: Is the Game Worth the Candle?",
Oil and Gas Journal 59 (27 February 1961) : 53; "Government
Moves Quickly Into Oil", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (27
February 1961) : 56; Bohi, Limiting Oil Imports
,
149-150.
5
"After Six Months of Kennedy
. . .", National
Petroleum News 53 (August 1961) : 85; "Oil Import Levels
Slashed", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (19 June 1961): 75.
"The New Defense Concept Threatens JFK Import
Control", Oil and Gas Journal 60 (8 January 1962) : 29;
Study by John M. Kelly, In Support of Proposals to Amend
the Oil Import Program (Charts 6 and 7) , 21 November 1961
Tariff-Trade-Oil Import Controls, 11/16/61-11/21/61, box
23, Feldman files.
'^Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental
Committee of Undersecretaries on Foreign Economic Policy,
13 December 1961, Foreign Economic Policy-Ball, box 32,
Gordon papers; Myer Feldman to the President, 14 December
1961, Feldman, Myer, 1961, box 63, POF; U.S., House
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Select Committee
on Small Business. Small Business Problems Created by
Petroleum Imports, pt
. 1, 87th Cong., 1st sess
.
, 1961
(hereafter cited as Petroleum Hearings-I or Clarence
W. Nichols, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs, 198.
8S^ummary Record of Meeting on World Oil Problems,
Department of State, 15 January 1962, Foreign Econ . Policy
(State-Ball Com. II), box 33, Gordon papers; George
Feldman, "The OECD, the Common Market, and American Foreign
Policy", attached to Lawrence O'Brien to Congressman John
McCormack, 10 January 1962, FO 3-3, 1/1/62-1/14/62, box
237, WHCF-JFK; Remarks of Stewart L. Udall to the American
Petroleum Institute Meeting, 27 July 1961, folder 4, box
93, Papers of Stewart L. Udall, Special Collections,
University of Arizona; "News", Petroleum Management 34
(April 1962) : 1
.
9
"The Bright Spots in Oil Abroad", Oil and Gas Journal
59 (25 December 1961) : 81; "Oil Imports Detailed", New York
Times, 31 August 1961, 39; "Conference Table". Petroleum
Management 34 (May 1962) : 12; Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to
OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), viii, 109-
110, 123-129; Schlesinger, A Thousand Day s. 766.
"Venezuela's Dilemma", Wall Street Journal . 3 July
1961, 1, 10; "1960: Bleak Year for Venezuelan Oil",
Petroleum Week 12 (6 January 1961): 40; William G. Harris,
"The Impact of the Petroleum Export Industry on the Pattern
of Venezuelan Economic Development", PhD. Dissertation,
University of Oregon, 1967, 1; General Economic Situation,
5 December 1961, President's Trip to Venezuela and
Columbia-12/61 Briefing Book-Venezuela-Background Papers
Tabs C-E, box 235-238, NSF-JFK.
11Rabe, The Road to OPEC
, 97-14 0; Marvin R. Zahniser
and W. Michael Weis, "A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard
Nixon's Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958",
Diplomatic History 13 (Spring 1989) : 180-183; Romulo
Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1979), 387-388; Current Political
Situation in Venezuela, 6 December 1961, President's Trip
to Venezuela and Columbia-12/61 Briefing Book-Venezuela
Background Papers Tabs A-B, box 235-238, NSF-JFK; Arthur
Schlesinger, The Current Crisis in Latin America, Part I,
Latin America-General-1960-1961, same folder title, box
121A, POF.
273
12
Rabe, The Road to OPEC. 117-120, 158-160/ R.K.
Pachauri, The Political Economy of Global Energy
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 56-
58; Telegram, American Embassy Caracas to Secretary of
State, 5 May 1961, Venezuela-General, 1/61-6/61, box 192,
NSF-JFK.
13Foreign Service Dispatch, Caracas to the Department
of State, 5 December 1961, Tariff
-Trade-Oil Import Program,
12/61-6/63, box 24, Feldman files; Position Paper, The
President's Visit to Venezuela and Colombia, Oil Import
Program, 6 December 1961, Trips and Conferences-President's
Trip to Venezuela and Colombia, 12/61, Briefing book:
Venezuela, Position Papers, Tabs F-J, box 235, NSF-JFK;
"Looking Ahead in Washington", Petroleum Week 12 (10 March
1961) : 24; A Request for Elimination of Restrictions on the
Import of Residual Oil Filed with the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization by the New England Council, the Oil
Users Association, and American Public Power Association,
Petroleum Hearings-I
, 309,
14Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics
, 38 9;
Assistant Secretary John Kelly to Myer Feldman, 22 October
1961 and Myer Feldman to the President, 14 December 1961,
Tariff-Trade-Oil-Presidential Proclamations, 10/61-12/61,
box 24; Myer Feldman to the President, 15 December 1961,
Tariff-Trade (Oil Import Controls) 11/27/61-12/21/61, box
23, Feldman Files.
274
15Joint Statement Following Discussions with the
President of Venezuela, 17 December 1961, Public Papers,
1961, 808. See also "Eximbank Increases Loan to Venezuela",
Foreign Commerce Weekly 66 (11 September 1961) : 39;
"Charter of Punta del Este [Alliance for Progress]",
Department of State Bulletin 45 (11 September 1961) : 463-
464, 467-469; Briefing, The President's Trip to Venezuela
and Colombia, December 1961, Background Papers on Regional
Integration in Latin America, President's Trip to Venezuela
and Colombia, Briefing Book-General, Tabs E-I, box 235,
NSF-JFK; Remarks Upon Arrival at Maiquetia Airport,
Caracas, Venezuela, 16 December 1961, Public Papers, 1961
,
804; John M. Kelly Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston, Massachusetts, (hereafter cited as Kelly Oral
History) , 21
.
1
6
"Imports Battle Must Be Fought All Over Again", Oil
and Gas Journal 59 (11 December 1961) : 50-51; Secretary
Stewart Udall to the President, 2 February 1962, Trade-
Tariff-Oil Import Controls, 2/62, box 23, Feldman files;
"Steed Fears U.S. Oil Policy Not Adequate", Oklahoma City
Times
, 24 November 1961, 1, Steed papers; "Watching
Washington", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (11 December 1961) : 51;
"1962 Will be a Showdown Year for Kennedy on Oil", Oil and
Gas Journal 60 (8 January 1962) : 3.
275
^
'^Commodity Yearbook. 1963
.
82-83; Petroleum Hearina..-
I, 185 (Chart I)
.
The other major coal states were AL, CO,
111, Ind, KY, OH, PA, UT, and WVA.
18^ 1coal and the Trade Expansion Act, 30 March 1962 and
Energy Policy: Coal, Hydroelectric Power, Natural Gas, and
Oil- Department of State, 2 February 1962, Foreign Trade
Fact Book-Special Industry and Commodity Problems, box 31,
Petersen files; U.S., House Subcommittee on the Impact of
Imports and Exports on American Employment of the Committee
on Education and Labor, Impact of Imports and Exports on
Employment (Coal and Residual Fuel Oil), Pt . 1
, 87th Cong.,
1st sess., 19-20 June, 1961, (hereafter cited as Coal and
Residual Import Hearings ), Harry Gilroy, "U.S. Coal Men
Face New Woes in Declining European Market", 199; TEA-
House, pt. 3, Thomas Kennedy, UMW, 1714); Senators Robert
C. Byrd and Jennings Randolph (D-WVA) to Lawrence O'Brien,
28 June 1961, Coal-General-7/61-8/61, box 5, Feldman files;
TEA-Senate
, pt . 2, Douglas, 568; Paul H. Douglas, In the
Fullness of Time: The Memoirs of Paul H. Douglas (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1972), 480-481.
19
"Buying off the Opposition", Business Week
, no. 1699
(24 March 1962) : 32. See also Coal and Residual Imports
Hearing
, G. Don Sullivan, National Coal Association, 38;
Petroleum Hearings-II
, C.J. Potter, Rochester and
Pittsburgh Coal Company, 4 65; TEA-House
,
pt . 3, Thomas
Kennedy, [UMW], 1714; Henry Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, 20
276
December 1961, Meinoranda-12/16/61-12/31/61, box 3, Wilson
files; Mike Manatos to Lawrence O'Brien, 14 March 1962,
Memoranda-3/10/62-3/31/62, box 1, Manatos files; Joseph
Moody [National Coal Policy Conference] to Secretary
Stewart Udall, 3 May 1962, Coal-General-4/62-5/62 folder 3,
box 5, Feldman files; Thomas Kennedy to President Kennedy,
28 June 1961, LE/NR, box 489, WHCF-JFK; "Fuels Group
Rejects End-Use Controls:, Oil and Gas Journal 60 (24
September 1962): 85-86; The President's Special News
Conference with Business Editors and Publishers, 25
September 1962, Public Papers, 1962 , 709; Letter to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
Transmitting a Bill to Stimulate Construction of Coal
Pipelines, 20 March 1962, Public Papers, 1962 , 249-250, the
industry pushed for a national fuels study (rejected by
Congress) and the slurry, which piped coal into regions
where residual enjoyed little competition.
20
"Oil Men Placing Hopes in Congress", New York Times
,
17 December 1961, III, 1, 7; "Independents Plan Fight for
Import-Control Legislation", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (18
December 1961) : 40; Press Release, Texas Independent
Producers and Royalty Owners Association (TIPRO)
Information Service, 11 March 1962, Tariff-Trade-Oil Import
Controls-3/62-6/62 , box 23, Feldman files; Memorandum,
TIPRO, Information Service to President James F. West, 2
April 1962, Thomas Finney-Chronological File-5/1/52-
8/20/62, box 14, Petersen files; E.A. Smith, Oklahoma
Independent Petroleum Association to Robert Bleiberg, 8
December 19 61, and Joseph Moody to Congressman Tom Steed,
December 1961, box 288, Legislative-Small Business-Oil
Imports, 1961, Steed papers.
21TEA-House
,
pt
, 3, Harold Decker, IPAA, 1724;
Memorandum for Meeting with Prome Minister Diefenbaker,
undated, Canada-Security-1 961 , box 113, POF; Chester,
United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy
, 138-139.
22Commodity Yearbook, 1963
, 245, 247; Petroleum
Hearinqs-I, 66 (Table 1); Petroleum Hearinqs-II
, 540; Bohi
Limiting Oil Imports
, 22-23, and 25.
23An example of oil campaign bankrolling is in Robert
A. Caro, The Path to Power: The Years of Lyndon Johnson
(New York: Vintage Press, 1983), 663; Congressional
Record-Appendix
,
v. 108, Reel 11, 10 January 1962, Bailey,
A12, A14, and 7 February 1962, Moore, A943; Coal and
Residual Imports Hearing
,
Dent, 139; Legislative
Highlights, 26 February 1962, Legislative Files-2/62, box
50, POF.
24
"Oil Still Leery of Kennedy's Business Views", Oil
and Gas Journal 60 (7 May 1962) : 63; "Steed Group Backing
Cut in Imports", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (4 December 1961):
102; "Steed Hearing Indicates There is No Long-Range
Imports Policy", Oil and Gas Journal 59 (27 November 1961)
64-65; Petroleum Hearings-I
,
Steed, 2, 413; Minutes of
278
Meeting, Subcommittee No. 4, House Small Business
Committee, 18 July 1961, and Record of Meeting between
Steed and leaders of the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum
Association, 21 December 1961, Legislative-Small Business-
Oil Imports 1961, box 288, Steed papers. Congressional
Record-House, v. 108, pt
. 5, 18 April 1962, Steed, 6958 and
pt. 11, 20 July 1962, 14385; Steed and Moore to Colleagues,
12 April 1962 and attached bill, folder 18, box 307, Steed
papers
.
25
"Congress Speaks on Domestic Fuels, Oil Imports, and
National Security", National Coal Policy Conference, Inc.,
March 1962, pamphlet title, box 30, Petersen files/
Congressional Record-House
, v. 108, pt . 8, 13 June 1962,
Exhibit 1, Advertisement from the New York Times
, 1 April
1962, 10429.
2 6John K. Evans, Independent Fuel Oil Marketers of
America to the President, 28 August 1962, Tariff-Trade-Oil,
Evans, John K., 7/62-10/63, box 23, Feldman files; Coal and
Residual Import Hearings
, statement filed by Humble Oil and
Refining Co., 128-130; TEA-Senate
,
pt . 2, John H.
Lichtblau, Petroleum Institute Foundation, Inc., 566; John
Evans to Myer Feldman, 30 April 1962, Tariff-Trade-Oil
Import Controls-3/62-6/62, box 23, Feldman files; Petroleum
Hearing -I
,
Charles W. Colsen and James S. Couzens, New
England Council, 2 91, 2 94-2 95; TEA-House
,
pt . 3, Edward M.
Carey, Independent Fuel Oil Marketers of America, 1830.
^'^
CoimnoditY Yearbook. 1963
. 247, 245, 248; Petroleum
Hearinqs-I
, 445 (Tables 2, 3) and 446 (Table 4); "Would
Unlimited Resid Imports Hurt?", Oil and Gas Journ;.1 59 (27
February 1961): 57-58.
2 8Congress ional Record-Appendix
, v. 108, reel 11, 7
March 1962, Keith, A1980, and "Protectionism in Oil",
Boston Herald
, 30 December 1961, A1718. See also
Congressional Record-Appendix
, v. 107, reel 11, 12
September 1961, Dante B. Fascell (D-FL)
,
A7167, and Conte,
A7542/ Mike Manatos to Lawrence O'Brien, 8 November 1961,
Memoranda-10/3/61-12/31/61, box 1, Manatos files.
29Henry Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, 23 February 1962,
Steed, Tom, Oklahoma-D, House File, box 14, O'Brien files;
Lawrence O'Brien to the President, 6 March 1962 and
Memorandum (attached) from Steed, My Proposed Conference
with the President, Legislative Files-3/5-20/62
, box 50,
POF; Address by Secretary Stewart Udall to the IPAA, 30
April 1962, folder 1, Udall papers; "Petty' s Oil Letter",
in The Oil Daily
, 28 March 1962, attached to James West to
Lindley Beckworth, 6 June 1962, Chronological File-5/1/62-
8/20/62, box 14, and Question to Harold Decker, IPAA, on
his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee,
undated. Petroleum Industry, box 10, Petersen files.
30TEA-House
,
pt . 2, Udall, 804; Howard Petersen to
Johnny Mitchell, 25 April 1962, ND, 4-3-2 Petroleum, box
599, WHCF; Proposed Exchange of Letters between the
280
President and Congressman Clark Thompson, 11 May 1962,
Tariff-Trade-Oil Import Controls, box 23, Feldman files;
Truman Richardson [Steed's assistant] to Ross Porter, 14
March 1962, folder 18, box 307, Steed papers; Congressional
Record-Senate, v. 108, pt. 9, 5 July 1962, Cleveland
Bailey, 12798.
31.,Ways and Means vote in "Oil/Gas and the November
Election", World Oil 154 (1 August 1962): 23; Myer Feldman
to the President, 25 June 1962, attached to Memorandum for
Congressman Clark W. Thompson, Tariff
-Trade-Oil Import
Controls-7/62-8/62, box 23, Feldman files; W.E. Turner to
Tom Steed, 28 March 1962, 1962 Correspondence, box 307,
Steed papers
.
32
"House Extends Defense Production, Export Control
Act; Enacts Kennedy Trade Bill After Defeating
Substitutes", Congressional Quarterly-Almanac 18 (1962),
618-619.
33
"Oil/Gas and the November Elections", World Oil 154
(1 August 1962): 14, 18. See also "Piatt's Oilgram" 4 May
1962, attached to Henry Wilson to Myer Rashish, 10 May
1962, Chronological file-5/1/62-8/20/62, box 14, Petersen
files; "Key Oil Decisions Coming Soon", Oil and Gas Journal
60 (27 August 1962): 43-44.
34Congressional Record-Senate
,
v. 107, pt . 2, 20
February 1961, Letter from [New England Delegation] to the
President, 7 February 1961, 2363; Mike Manatos to O'Brien,
281
7 April 1962, Senate Correspondence, box 327, O'Brien
files; Senator Harry Byrd to the President, 12 April 1962,
ND 4-2-2 Petroleum, box 599, WHCF; Coal and Residual
Hearings, Sullivan, National Coal Association to Udall, 9;
Congressional Record-House, v. 107, pt . 3, 2 March 1961,
Byrd, 20801 and 18 Senators to Kennedy, 3137-3138. Coal-oil
bloc senators came from AL, Ala., Ark., CO, 111., ind., KS,
KY, LA, MD, MO, Mont., ND, Nev., NM, OH, OK, PA, Tenn
.
,
TX,
UT, VA, Wash., WVA, WY
.
35A^nne H. Morgan, Robert S. Kerr: The Senate Years
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977), 221,
also 209-210, 232-233, 242. See also Rashish Oral History,
28-30; Luther Hodges to the President, 20 August 1962,
Legislative Files, 8/13-20/62, box 51, POP.
36Morgan, Kerr
, 210, 233. The "whales" included
veterans Richard B. Russell (D-GA) , Carl Hayden (D-AZ)
,
Allen Ellender (D-LA)
,
and James Eastland (D-Miss.).
37Kerr to John H. Cosey, 4 May 1955, folder 8, box 34;
Kerr to Cleo C. Ingle, 13 April 1955, folder 9, box 34;
Kerr, "The Reader Writes: Senator Kerr's Amendment",
Christian Science Monitor
, 26 July 1958, folder 79, box 1;
Address to the Midyear 1958 Meeting of the IPAA, 2 9 April
1958, folder 40, box 8; Press release, Kerr and Senator
A.S. Monroney (D-OK) , 28 February 1959, folder 99, box 18;
Transcript of Television Show on the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, Washington, D.C., 14 June 1962, folder 28, box 25,
282
Papers of Senator Robert S. Kerr, Carl Albert Congressional
Research and Studies Center, Congressional Archives,
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma (hereafter cited
as Kerr papers); Press Release, 28 March 1962, Kerr, Robert
S. (OK), box 56, Petersen files; "Watching Washington", oil
and Gas Journal 60 (23 April 1962): 65; Morgan, Kerr, 233.
3 8
"What Kerr Says About Changing Import Controls", Oil
and Gas Journal 60 (30 July 1962): 90; Press Release, Kerr
and A.S. "Mike" Monroney (D-OK)
, 20 June 1962, Kerr, Robert
S. (OK), box 56, Petersen files; "Producer Given New Hope
on Imports", Oil and Gas Journal 60 (30 July 1962) : 89;
Harris Bateman to Kerr, 5 April 1962, folder 21, box 4;
Kerr to M.E. Dale, 29 January 1962, box 25 folder 29;
"Kerr, Steed on Different Sides on Oil Amendment",
Oklahoman
, 1 April 1962, folder 18, box 307; Kerr to W.L.
Pickens, 4 April 1962, folder 26, box 24; Kerr to Thomas E.
Williams, 16 April 1962, folder 22, box 4; Kerr to J.
Howard Edmondson, 21 May 1962, folder 21, box 4, Kerr
Papers; E.A. Smith to Kerr, 27 March 1962, folder 9D, box
69, Papers of Congressman Page Belcher, Carl Albert
Congressional Research and Studies Center Congressional
Archives, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, for
report by Oilgram News Service of 25 March 1962 that Kerr
traded non-oil projects for the TEA.
283
^Vlly Oral History, 43-46/ Luther Hodges to Myer
Feldman, 2 August 1962, Tariff
-Trade-Oil Import Controls,
7/62-8/62, box 23, Feldman files; Kerr to E.A. Smith, 8
October 1962, folder 21, Kerr papers; "Other Major
Developments Related to 1962 Trade Act", Congressional
Quarterly-Almanac 18 (1962), 289; Harold Decker to members
of IPAA, 12 October 1962 and attached copy from the
Congress ional Record
, Russell Long (D-LA)
, folder 53, box
11, Kerr papers. A rumor circulated that Kerr put a signed
agreement of the deal with Kennedy in his safe, but no
written accord turned up in the Kerr or Kennedy papers.
Kerr said that a speech by Udall to the IPAA in September
1962 was the only "positive assurance" on the revised plan
that he received from the administration. Senator Long said
he. Senators Frank Carlson (R-KS)
,
Ralph Yarborough (D-TX)
,
Ellender, and Kerr, received Kennedy's pledge on import
limits and that independents would get a greater share of
the U.S. market.
40Transcript of Television Show on the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, Washington, D.C., 14 June 1962, folder 28, box
25; Statement by Senator Robert S. Kerr, Trade Bill-
Compensation for Import Damage, 9 October 1962, folder 49,
box 25; Statement by Senator Robert S. Kerr on Trade, 9
October 1962, folder 49, box 11, Kerr papers; "Senate
Passes Trade Bill After Rejecting Escape Clause, Farm
Import Restriction, Shorter Duration; Ratifies Treaty",
284
Congressional Quarterly-Almanac 18 (1962), 688, Homer E.
Capehart (R-Ind.) and Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) opposed.
A Report to the President by the Petroleum Study
Committee, OEP, 4 September 1962, Tariff
-Trade-Oil Import
Controls-9/62-12/62 and undated, box 23, Feldman files; The
President's News Conference of September 26, 1962, Public
Papers, 1962, 715/ Proclamation 3509, 30 November 1962,
Tariff-Trade-Oil Import Controls-9/62-12/62 and undated,
box 23, Feldman files; Bohi, Limiting Oil Imports
, 107;
"Kennedy Stiffens Oil Import Rules to Aid U.S. Output", New
York Times
, 1, 29; Kelly Oral History, 42; Myer Feldman to
Harold Decker, 19 December 1962, White House Replies, D-I,
1962, box 13, Petersen files; Kerr to E.A. Smith, 8 October
1962, folder 21, box 4; Remarks of Senator Robert Kerr to
the IPAA Annual Meeting, Dallas, Texas, 29 October 1962,
folder 53, box 11; "Kerr's Magic Sways Oilmen", Oklahoman,
4 November 1962, folder 53, box 11; Statement by Harold
Decker, IPAA, 30 November 1962, folder 27, box 25, Kerr papers
42Report by the United States Delegation to the United
States-Canadian Discussions of Petroleum Policies and
programs, 13-14 December 1962-Oil Imports, box 104, POF;
Bohi, Limiting Oil Imports
, 107, 132-134; Rabe, The Road to
OPEC
, 198. Under the revised program, Canada's estimated
imports for each year were figured into the total amount of
import quotas available for allocation under the program,
thereby reducing its imports by lowering the overall sum of
285
quotas. To Ottawa's benefit, the U.S. consistently
underestimated Canadian imports, causing Canada's oil and
overall total imports to overshoot the 12.2% level.
Airgram, USAID-Caracas to the Department of State,
21 September 1962, Venezuela-6/8/61-12/31/63, box WH-23,
Schlesinger papers; "Venezuela Survives Buffeting of 2
Revolts, Exchange Reform", International Commerce 68 (2
July 1962)
: 33; "Venezuela Business Prospers Despite
Revolts and Currency Reform: Outlook Optimistic",
International Commerce 68 (27 August 1962) : 47; "Oil
Output, Exchange Reform Brighten Venezuelan Outlook",
International Commerce 68 (29 October 1962) : 68; Robert J.
Alexander, Romulo Betancourt and the Transformation of
Venezuela (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books, Rutgers
University, 1982), 554-557; Telegram, Ambassador C. Allan
Stewart, Caracas, to the Secretary of State, 2 July 1962,
Venezuela-General-7/1/62-8/19/62; CIA, Reference Biographic
Register of Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, and Memorandum, Visit
to the United States of Venezuelan Minister of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, Dr. Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, April 1962,
Venezuela-General, 4/62, box 192, NSF-JFK.
44Telegram, Ambassador C. Allan Stewart to the
Secretary of State, 18 December 1962, Venezuela-General-
12/62, box 192, NSF-JFK.
286
45Report of Myer Feldman on Discussions with President
Betancourt on the United States Oil Import Program,
Caracas, Venezuela, Attachment 1, New Regulations on the
Oil Import Restrictions, First Personal Impressions, by Dr.
Juan P. Perez Alfonzo, Oil Imports-12 /2 9-30 / 62 , box 104,
POF; Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics
, 390-391.
46Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics
, 391; Report
by Myer Felditian on Discussions with President Betancourt on
the United States Oil Import Program, Caracas, Venezuela,
attachments 1 and 2, Oil Imports-12/29-30/62, box 104, POF;
cable. White House Situation Room to General McHugh for the
President, 23 December 1962, Venezuela-General-12/62, box
192, NSF-JFK.
47Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics
, 390;
Telegram, Ambassador C. Allan Stewart, American Embassy,
Caracas to the Secretary of State, 2 January 1963, Tariff-
Trade-Oil-Venezuela- 12/61-6/63, box 24, Feldman files;
Joint Statement with the Venezuelan President, 20 February
1963, U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register
,
National Archives and Records Service, 1964)
,
John F. Kennedy, 1963, 188 (hereafter cited as Public
Papers, 1963 ) .
48 Telegram, Department of State, Ambassador C. Allen
Stewart to the Secretary of State, 30 December 1962,
Venezuela-General-12/62, box 192, NSF-JFK; Rabe, The Road
287
to_OPEC, 198; Magin A. Valdez, "The Petroleum Policies of
the Venezuelan Government", Ph.D. Dissertation, New York
University, 1971, 6-7.
49Edward H. Shaffer, The Oil Import Program of the
United States: An Evaluation (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1968), 95; Bohi, Limiting Oil Imports
,
Commodity Yearbook, 1971 , 254. The oil import issue
persisted when the U.S. lifted fuel oil restrictions and
later when the country feared shortages oil during the Six-
Day War of 1967, see Lee White to the President, 30 March
1965; Stewart L. Udall to Marvin Watson, 30 March 1965; Lee
White to the President, 4 April 1965, TA6/0il, 1-1-
65/5/31/65, White House Central Files-TA (hereafter cited
as WHCF-LBJ) ; Memorandum from Anthony M. Solomon, The
Middle Eastern Oil Problem, 9 June 1967; Stan Ross to Joe
Califano, 27 June 1967, Pricing files: oil, Jan. -June 1967,
box 14, Aides Files-John E. Robson and Stanley Ross,
(hereafter cited as Robson/Ross files), in Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
50American Carpet Institute, Basic Facts about the
Carpet and Rug Industry (New York, 1960), 8 and (1965), 12,
The Carpet and Rug Institute Library, Dalton, Georgia
(hereafter cited and Carpet and Rug Institute)
;
Congressional Record-Appendix
,
v. 107, reel 10, 1 June
1961, Stratton, A3944; Leddy and Norwood, "The Escape
Clause and Peril Points", 172; Resolution [Board of
288
Directors, ACMI] Supporting Tariff Commission Carpet
Industry Finding, 3 August 1961, folder 1095, box 100,
NACM-NTA papers
.
51
"The Glass Industry, I960: A Review", Glass Industry
42 (February 1961) : 67/ White, The Making of the President
.
420-421
.
52
"The Glass Industry, I960: A Review", Glass Industry
42 (February 1961): 69-70/ "The Tariff Situation", Glass
Industry
, 42 (August 1961) : 432.
53
"The Tariff Situation", Glass Industry 42 (August
1961) 431/ U.S., House, Subcommittee on the Impact of
Imports on American Employment of the Committee on
Education and Labor, Impact of Imports and Exports on
Employment (Glass, Pottery, Toys), pt . 3
, 87th Cong., 1st
sess., 1961, (hereafter cited as Glass Import Hearings )
,
Donald J. Sherbondy, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 36.
54President's Statement, TPC draft package for the
President, 27 June 1961, Trade Policy Committee-5/61-6/62,
box 26, Feldman files/ "The Tariff Situation", Glass
Industry 42 (August 1961) : 430/ Domestic Industry
Production and Shipments [glass]
,
undated. Sheet Glass
Industry, box 10, Petersen files/ "U.S. Trade Policy
Approaching Major Crisis", Congressional Quarterly-Weekly
Report 19 (4 August 1961) : 1349.
289
^^"The Tariff Situation", Glass Industry 42 (August
1961): 432, the congressmen were Ed Edmondson (D-OK)
,
William Bray (R-Ind. ) , Overton Brooks (D-LA)
, James Trimble
(D-Ark.), Dent, and Bailey; Glass Import Hearings
. OH, PA,
WA, Ind. Glass Workers Protective League to President John
F. Kennedy, 22 April 1961, 119-120.
56^ . , 'Congressional Record-House
, v. 107, pt . 2, 20
February 1961, Dent, 2456. See also Congressional Record-
House^, V. 107, pt
. 3, 13 March 1961, Dent, 3801-3804/ John
Dent to a Friend, undated [1962], item 71, box Trade-
Tariffs-GATT, Dent Collection.
57_TGlass Import Hearings
, Jennings Randolph to John
Dent, 11 July 1961, and telegram. Senator Robert C. Byrd to
the President, 3/ Overton Brooks to the Executive Office of
the President, 27 May 19 61, attached to Lawrence O'Brien to
Congressman Overton Brooks, 8 June 19 61, Senator J.W.
Fulbright to the President, 25 May 1961, attached to
O'Brien to Fulbright, 29 May 1961; Senator Estes Kefauver
to the President, 13 June 1961, attached to O'Brien to
James G. Fulton (R-PA) , 29 May 1961, TA 2 Earth-
Earthenware-Glassware TA 2-TA-201, box 945, WHCF-JFK;
Oklahoma House and Senate Delegation to the President, 15
January 19 62, folder 30, box 25, Kerr papers. There were 7
concerns operating 14 sheet glass plants, 4 in WVA, 2 each
in OK and PA, and one in Ark., 111., Ind., LA, OH, and Tenn
290
58 L^ucius Battle to Myer Feldman, 4 December 1961,
Trade Policy Committee-5/61-6/62, box 26, Feldman files.
59Gresham to Barrie, on statement of G.P. MacNichol,
President, Libbey-Owens- Ford, 6 March 1962, box 23,
Petersen files; Manufacturers of Flat Glass Products
statement, undated, Trade Record 50-100, Sen. 87A-E8, U.S.
Senate, 87th Congress, Committee on Finance, HR 11970,
Record Group 4 6, Senate Finance Records, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Sen. Finance-RG 4 6;
Congressman John Dent to the President, 15 December 1961,
LE/FO 3-3 1-20-61-3-6-62, box 478, WHCF-JFK.
60Press Release, White House, 19 March 1962 and
attached, President Kennedy to Ben Dorfman [chairman of the
Tariff Commission], 19 March 1962, Press Releases,
Government agencies and departments-3/7/62-6/6/62 and
undated, box 20, Petersen files; Myer Feldman to
Congressman Samuel Stratton, 25 June 19 62, White House
Replies-6/9/62-10/23/62, box 13, Petersen files; Sorensen
Oral History, 113.
6
1
TEA-House
^
pt . 4, Robinson F. Barker^ Glass and
Fiber Glass Groups, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 2268
and Mildred Homko, OH, PA, WA, Ind, Glass Workers
Protective League, 2330/ Petersen to the President, 28
March 1962, Support and Non-Support (General) , box 23,
Petersen files; "Sheet Glass and the Tariff", Glass
Industry 43 (March 1962): 240-242.
Report on American Opinion, State Department, 3/13-
4/12/62-Chronological File-Correspondence, Memoranda, and
Background Notes, 4/18/62-4/30/62, box 14, Petersen files.
See also Congressional Record-Appendix
, v. 108, reel 11, 4
April 1962, Capehart, A2614; Mike Manatos to Lawrence
O'Brien, 20 March 1962, Memoranda, 3/10/62-3/31/62, box 1,
Manatos files; Congressional Record-Senate
, v. 108, pt . 9,
5 July 1962, Bailey, 12798.
63 S^enator Harry Byrd to President Lyndon Johnson, 21
January 1964, TA6/Carpets, box 12, WHCF-LBJ; "Buying of the
Opposition", Business Week
, no. 1699 (24 March 1962), 32;
Comments on Administration's Trade Bill, 17 April 1962,
attached to Peter Jones to Myer Feldman, 17 April 1962,
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 2/62-11/62 and undated, box
26, Feldman files; House Extends Defense Production, Export
Control Act; Enacts Kennedy Trade Bill After Defeating
Substitutes", Congressional Quarterly-Almanac 18 (1962)
:
618-619, 688.
64
"Europe Protests U.S. Tariff Rise", 23 March 1962,
New York Times
, 1, 14. See also "Tariff Raise Called
'Immoral'", 31 March 1962, New York Times
, 4, and "Belgian
House Protests", New York Times
,
13 April 1962, 16, and
"U.S. Tariff Rises Anger Europeans", New York Times
,
1;
Glass Import Hearings
,
Rene Lambert, Permanent
Representative for the Belgian Sheet Glass Industry in the
U.S. and Canada, 29-30.
292
^^"Tariff Reprisals", Chemical and Engineering n^wc 40
(11 June 1962)
: 7; "A Wary Eye on the EEC", Chemical Week
90 (16 June 1962) : 39.
6 6Carpet and Rug Institute Industry Review, (1968) : 9,
(1970)
: 16, (1978-1979) : 16, Carpet and Rug Institute;
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1966 (New
York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1968),
87-88, 863, and 1970-1971 (New York: Economic and Social
Affairs, 1973), 53, 796, 798.
6 7 The President's News Conference of 14 June 1962,
Public Papers, 1962
, 496. See also The President's News
Conference of 29 March 1962, Public Papers, 1962 , 277.
6 8Myer Feldman to John H. Randolph, 27 August 1962, TA
1 Chemicals-Oils-Paints, box 945, WHCF-JFK.
69John Meagher and Harald Malmgren, "A Historical View
of Congress' Impact on Trade Legislation and Negotiation",
in Congress and U.S. Trade Policy
, ed. LTV Corporation
(Dallas: The LTV Corporation, 1983), 39-40. For Kennedy's
pragmatism, see Parmet, JFK
,
355 and John L. Paper, The
Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of John F.
Kennedy (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1975), 270.
70Lowi, "American Business and Public Policy", 685.
71David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The
Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),
206-207
.
293
72 S^usan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost
Hegemony", 572.
The Road to OPEC. 116; Magdoff, The Age of
Imperialism
; Williams, The Tragedy of American Dip 1nn,.ny
are critics. See Harris, "The Impact of the Petroleum
Export Industry on the Pattern of Venezuelan Economic
Development", 12, 77, 93, 102.
'^^Commodity Yearbook, 1971. 93, 253/ Bohi, Limiting
Oil Imports
, 23
.
75Rusk to the American Embassy Caracas, 20 December
1962, Venezuela-General, box 192, NSF-JFK; Rabe, The Road
to OPEC
, 194.
7 6Historical Statistics of the United States
, pt . II,
884/ Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1970-1971
,
796.
294
CPIAPTER 5
KENNEDY DRIVES fOR EXPORTS
After mollifying the major protectionist blocs, Kennedy
assumed he could round up votes for the TEA from export-
minded legislators. His belief was well-grounded:
exporters were usually efficient producers who would
benefit, under the law of comparative advantage, from
tariff reductions. Indeed, by the early 1960s, a wider
acceptance of liberal trade existed in agricultural, labor,
business, and industrial circles, and increasingly on
Capitol Hill, than ever before. The newly-recovered
nations presented capital-intensive enterprises with
attractive trade and investment opportunities, leading many
in Congress to stress export expansion, especially with an
eye on Europe. America seemed primed to export.
Yet two tendencies within the American economy boded ill
for the trade expansion effort. First, producers
oftentimes lacked a will to search for overseas outlets.
In many cases, the actual orientation of the private sector
toward exploiting the domestic market overshadowed the
opportunities available in foreign trade. When producers
sought markets abroad, moreover, they encountered stiff
resistance from other countries and failed to sell enough
to make exporting worth their while. A passivity,
indifference, or hostility toward exchanging tariff
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reduction for expansion into foreign markets was prevalent
among U.S. producers.
Second, the essential pluralism at the societal level-
of-analysis endangered Kennedy's trade program. In
general, the private sector, exporters included, eyed each
other and the adminstration with suspicion and diverged on
trade policy. In other words, agricultural, labor,
business and industrial interests competed against each
other for the benefits of trade, and many ran into conflict
with Kennedy. The divergent views within the private
sector and between these interests and the White House
exemplified behavior among exporters.
These themes are clearer after a look at the perspective
and policies of the three trade sectors in the U.S.
economy: agriculture, labour, and manufacturing. Contrary
to hegemony school theory, prctectionism was more powerful
than the search for overseas markets, even in segments of
the export-oriented farm community, because selling in the
home market still took precedence. Furthermore, even when
exporters went abroad, they were often stymied by foreign
restrictions. Kennedy encouraged exports as the main
benefit of his fair-trade doctrine. The inherent tendency
of Americans to turn inward, especially in matters
affecting the economy, however, compelled him to promote
the TEA as more than just an aid to trade expansion.
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Not counting solely on economic argument to win the TEA,
the administratxon and its allies in Congress promoted the
bill as a critical part of American security. Along with
military programs, trade was a part of Kennedy's "Grand
Design", his U . S .
-European policy aimed to unify and
strengthen the Western allies under an "Atlantic
partnership". Reversing the balance-of
-payment s deficit by
expanding exports served these objectives. Exports helped
finance the country's considerable outlays for overseas
military and aid programs, which provided the bases of
alliance security. The hypothesis that the push for
exports came from cold warriors in the administration and
Congress and not from the American private sector thus
illuminates the arguments of the comparative-advantage and
hegemony schools.
This debate also sets up a test for the models of
interest intermediation. The bureaucracy agreed on the
need to win the cold war by every means, including trade.
Thus, it can be assumed there was no fundamental
differences among officials with Kennedy policy.
Corporatism provides a more relevant paradigm, for
expanding exports was a goal in which private and public
elites promoted in unison. Thus, the decision-making arena
may have included links, either institutionalized or
informal, between the rising capital-intensive export
sector and the administration. Or, as in the protectionist
cases, the most applicable models might be those in which
Congress is the central focus of interest group or inter-
branch politics.
Since export expansion was Kennedy's reason for
introducing the Trade Expansion Act, corporatism is a
compelling explanation of the decision-making process. But
it is flawed. A public-private partnership on trade, such
as the corporate-led Randall Commission under the
Eisenhower's "industrial administration", did not exist in
Kennedy policy-making. The only bodies for formulating
trade policy were bureaucratic entities, such as the inter-
departmental Trade Policy Committee or the Petersen task
force. The latter, though drawn from the private sector
and instrumental in the formulation of the TEA, was limited
to the campaign in Congress. A candidate for testing the
corporatist analysis, though, was the Committee for a
National Trade Policy (CNTP) , an effective lobby for
liberal trade.
While it included on its rolls the major U.S. corporate
executives, the CNTP was not a forum for policy-making, nor
was it asked to be. Some of the 2000 members of the CNTP,
founded in 1953, included Ford Motor, Standard Oil, Chase
National Bank, Gillette Safety Razor, Burroughs
Manufacturing, IBM, General Mills, ITT, Pillsbury, H.J.
Heinz, and Crown Zellerbach. All of these firms backed the
TEA. In additions, many of the architects of postwar trade
298
policy had been members of the CNTP; founders George Ball,
William Clayton, and Paul Hoffman had served in key
government or related positions. But the CNTP engaged in
educating the public, giving its opinion on trade measures,
and acting as one of Petersen's liaisons with Congress and
private interests. However influential, the organization
was devoid of a corporatist decision-making role in the
Kennedy administration.^
Nevertheless, the administration appreciated the CNTP's
efforts in persuading Americans to accept exporting as a
necessity for the 1960s. The President fought to convince
Congress and producers to ignore their natural proclivities
to turn inward and exploit the U.S. economy. Yet Seymour
Harris pointed out that the stress on exports over imports
had a limited appeal since many producers believed that
GATT negotiations tended to increase imports, not exports.
Kennedy could also not ignore the most telling fact about
U.S. trade; only an estimated 5% of all American
3manufacturers sold abroad.
Kennedy hoped to convert these unwilling or apathetic
interests into exporters by an impressive propaganda
campaign for the TEA. He discussed the salutary effects of
overseas sales to the domestic economy, and tried to
present exports as a crucial part of American foreign
policy by linking commerce to political goals. "Be export-
minded", he told the National Association of Manufacturers,
in order to offset the payments deficit and permit the
country "to meet our commitments" in aid and defense/
The entire administration helped in the campaign. The
TEA was a foreign rather than an economic policy, echoed
Petersen, in attempting to give the bill a broader meaning.
Policy planner Walt Rostow added that without American
business expansion (including exports), the U.S. would
complicate the adjustments occurring in the Atlantic
community, damage the interests of the LDCs, and hearten
Soviet leaders who feared a resurgent West. Ultimately,
the President himself had to convince the public. America
could either "trade or fade", he warned, with the obvious
consequences of losing more power in global economic and
political terms if the latter happened.^
Indeed, upon entering office, Kennedy seized the
initiative, instructing Secretary of Commerce Hodges to
boost Eisenhower's export expansion program. Hodges set
out to reverse the previous complacency of his department
and businessmen in trade. He began trade fairs,
conferences, and centers abroad, and revitalized the
overseas commercial services organization to aid exporters.
Under State Department jurisdiction, foreign country
surveys, product lists, directories, and personnel
available to U.S. businessmen had suffered neglect. The
State Department pledged to expand the services and elevate
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employees to ministerial rank in exchange for continued
control over the services.^
To reward exporters, the President introduced the "E"
(export) flags in recognition of businessmen who built a
large export trade. The flags had flown over the most
productive factories during World War II. He also approved
the expansion of credit for exporters through the Export-
Import Bank, and credit guarantees. Under Eisenhower and
Kennedy, the expansion program played an important role in
increasing merchandise exports by almost $6 billion from
1959 to 1963."^
But such efforts did not have an effect on changing the
attitudes of the private sector toward foreign trade.
Ambassador to Belgium Douglas MacArthur II attributed the
poor showing of American goods in foreign markets to the
U.S. business sector's loss of "vigor", while an Export-
Import Bank official called the export performance
"pathetic". Hodges complained that even U.S. ambassadors
downgraded the commercial services to the point where they
were inadequate
.
At a White House conference on export
expansion, 40 trade associations rejected free-trade and
demanded more protection, prompting Petersen to conclude
that Americans were "not strong seekers of export
g
opportunities"
.
The public shared this view. Parochialism, the impact
of imports, and the inability of producers to see the
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benefits of exports undercut the President's appeal. The
public response to the TEA revealed either an unawareness
of market opportunities abroad or no convincing evidence of
support for liberal trade. Asked if they had heard of the
Common Market, over three-quarters of the people polled by
George Gallup responded "no". Nearly half had no knowledge
of Kennedy's bill in January 1962; by April, after the
informational campaign by Petersen was underway, this
figure had worsened to 54%. Of those that did know about
the TEA, 60% saw no reason to change or lower duties or had
no opinion at all. Failure to win the TEA, acknowledged
Petersen's staff, would not be due to a lack of
persuasiveness by the administration, but because of public
9ignorance
.
The export figures which Petersen brought to the Oval
Office showed Kennedy the reason behind this unconcern.
Exports accounted for 35% of the Netherlands' gross
national product and 10 to 19% of the GNP of the Common
Market, Britain, Sweden, and Canada. The world leader in
export volume, the U.S. earned nearly $20 billion from
sales in 1961, or one-sixth of the global total. Yet only
3.8% of the American GNP in 1962 was attributable to
exports, and this figure had not moved above 6.8% since
1920. It rose to only 4.4% by 1970. '^
A novel "export origin" study by the Commerce
Department in 1962 showed that all 50 states benefited from
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overseas markets, but agriculture was the only sector
reliant on these sales. Only eight states accounted for
60% of manufacturing exports and fewer than one of every 25
manufacturers exported. With justification, protectionists
complained that the study, which claimed that 6 million
workers were employed in plants that produced for
exporting, was misleading since only a small percentage of
the total output of these plants went abroad. In effect,
America did not need to export its industrial goods out of
necessity as other nations did, a reality which backs up
the comparative-advantage school's argument but hurt the
campaign for the TEA."'""'"
Kennedy was happier with the response of farmers to his
bill and about the trade figures for agriculture, where
exports were much more important. Fourteen states sent
abroad farm produce worth more than $100 million. The farm
export total of $5.1 billion out of $35 billion produced,
which accounted for 14% of farm income, was impressive, but
it must be noted that $3.2 billion were earned dollars
while almost $2 billion went abroad as aid or gifts. An
overall farm commodity surplus of $1.4 billion in 1962 grew
larger as the decade progress, though America ran a deficit
in dollar exports until 1970. Farmers were nonetheless
America's export champions. One of every six acres
harvested and 15% of farm goods, as opposed to 8% for non-
agricultural production went abroad. Broken down into
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commodities, production as a percentage of exports ranged
from 57% for rice to 20-49% for barley, tobacco, cotton,
soybeans, wheat, and 14% for sorghum. "Make no mistake
about it", said Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to
Congress. "The prosperity and stability of the American
farmer is directly dependent upon our exports".
As a result. Big Agriculture was the most consistent
supporter of liberal trade, and the most demanding of
access into the lucrative Common Market. The EEC took
close to 30% of U.S. farm goods but its common agricultural
policy, already instituted for a few commodities, was a
troublesome protective device. Though farm-state
legislators urged lower barriers to trade, Kennedy feared
that agricultural interests would sour on the TEA when they
perceived little chance for reciprocity from Europe. To
secure votes for the bill, he fought for access into the
EEC, though the Six dodged his efforts on the grounds that
the CAP was still in its formative phase. Poultry exports
emerged as the weapon in Kennedy's crusade.
The celebrated "chicken war" grew from a squabble over
EEC trade restrictions into a dramatic stand by America
against the CAP. The problem stemmed from a six-fold
upturn in U.S. poultry (broilers and eggs) exports
beginning in 1959, and a rise by 36% in 1962.
Technological advances in breeding and management had
caused an oversupply of chickens at home and prompted a
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search for new markets. Unfortunately, the explosion was
ill-timed; exports ran headlong into the integration
process and a similar poultry production revolution in the
Common Market. After rancorous inter-EEC negotiations, the
Six approved the CAP in mid-January 1962 and readied
variable levies on poultry imports for 30 July of that
year. CAP Regulation 22 sought to harmonize internal EEC
poultry prices, restrict U.S. and Danish exports, and
reserve the lucrative West German chicken market for Dutch,
French, Belgian and, to a lesser extent, Italian
1
3
producers
.
But American raisers already controlled one-quarter of
the German market, with exports valued at $49.5 million and
growing. The levy, and a special "sluice gate" provision
which set a minimum import price, raised the cost of U.S.
chickens in West Germany by nearly 10 cents per pound. The
EEC had declined to negotiate the fee, though it was one of
the two CAP levies set at the time of the Dillon Round. As
a result, the "standstill agreement" of 1961 on poultry did
not assure the U.S. of its historic share of the EEC
market. As Ross Talbot explains, this stalemate allowed
the chicken export issue "to fester and irritate" . "'"'^
By the time the levy was in place at the end of July
19 62, just before the Senate hearings opened on the TEA,
pressure had built for a major conflict. The American Farm
Bureau Federation and the National Farmer's Union demanded
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that the EEC agree to maintain America's share of the
German market. The influential Institute of American
Poultry industries, an amalgam of chicken and egg producers
with offices in Washington, D.C. and Frankfurt, West
Germany, mobilized producers and congressmen to lobby
Kennedy for "fair-play" from Europe. The subsequent visits
and mail to the White House from poultrymen, delegations of
governors from 17 states, and chicken bloc legislators were
considerable
.
The President surely felt the need to take action
because, like textiles, the poultry industry was centered
in the South. The fact that chicken producers were free-
traders while textile manufacturers were protectionist did
not matter. Southern congressmen controlled key
committees, and thus much Kennedy legislation, and demanded
solutions to the chicken problem. Congressman Harold
Cooley (D-NC)
,
for instance, chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee, could tie up the beleaguered Kennedy
farm program indefinitely. And no less than Ways and Means
Chairman Wilbur Mills, from one of the top chicken-
producing states, was a member of the poultry bloc. He
warned Kennedy that the TEA would not pass if the President
failed to persuade the EEC to lower the CAP or give
adequate compensation. Mills said that it was ridiculous
to grant Kennedy tariff reduction authority which later
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ers
would be dissipated by bargaining down the very barri
that the Common Market had raised arbitrarily
.
In the Senate, another administration ally and Arkansan,
Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright, the powerful
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made known his
discontent. He scorned the EEC's farm trade policy,
calling it "trade strangulation". Joining Fulbright, who
was also a member of the Senate Finance Committee, were
other key Southern Senate veterans who held important
posts, such as Richard B. Russell (D-GA)
, John L. McClellan
(D-Ark), Allen J. Ellender (D-LA)
, and John J. Sparkman (D-
AL)
.
Kennedy also expected pressure from Atlantic state
legislators, especially Maryland. Interest groups worked
through inter-branch politics to achieve their aims.
Such concerted pressure sent White House aides
scampering to help the poultry industry. Not that the
administration did not favor action; indeed Freeman,
Petersen, and Kennedy had been disappointed with EEC
agricultural policy at the Dillon Round and the restrictive
CAP. Now they plotted an approach to Europe. Not
surprisingly, Myer Feldman insisted on avoiding
congressional recriminations, and so opposed waiting until
the TEA passed before working out a bargain with the EEC.
He also ruled out appeals to the EEC, realizing the Six
would merely ignore them, and also turned down an option
calling for a meeting of Common Market agricultural
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ministers. To bring the entT-rp. vvriy n ri e EEC to a conference table
to discuss unfair and untimely European trade barriers,
furthermore, put Kennedy in an uncomfortable spot. Talks
would come on the heels of EEC retaliation to the
inopportune American tariff hikes on carpets and glass.
Instead, the President opted for a bilateral approach by
sending a letter to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in
June 1962, before the poultry levy was activated.
Kennedy's goal was not increased access but to maintain
America's share of the EEC market. Basing his request on
the fair-trade doctrine, Kennedy called the levy "unfair
and inconsistent" with the principles of GATT
. The fee
harmed Atlantic community relations and might doom the TEA.
Kennedy warned that American disfavor of the EEC could be
"an important adverse factor in the consideration of the
Trade Bill now before Congress". Noting the pressure from
Capitol Hill, he asked Adenauer to defer the imposition of
the levy from 30 July until, preferably, after passage of
the TEA.^
Adenuaer's response was encouraging, but negative, due
to constraints on his options. He promised to look into
the fee but that the EEC Commission determined the levy.
Indeed, on 20 July 1962, the Chancellor requested the
Common Market to lower poultry duties and maintain this
level until the end of the year. The administration was
delighted; the State Department remarked that the German
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effort would at least "earn us some credit in this matter"
with Congress. The EEC Commission, resisting pressure from
large farm organizations in Europe to institute the fee at
the same level, authorized the reduction in the German levy
subject to approval by the Bundestag. Since German farmers
had considerable political influence and sought to protect
their market, however, the parliament never acted. The
poultry levy went into effect on schedule on 30 July
1962.^°
Thus, over the next year, the poultry issue erupted into
the Chicken War. The congressional poultry bloc
appreciated Kennedy's understandably limited actions
against the Common Market, and voted overwhelmingly for the
TEA, choosing to take their hostility out instead on the
EEC. USDA Secretary Freeman met with EEC leaders and
futilely berated them for the levy. in June 1963, the
chickens had made such an impact on diplomacy that Kennedy
raised it during his trip to West Germany, though the
President regretted the fact that the issue had become so
protracted. But the conflict was not resolved until
December 19 63 when the United States retaliated, raising
tariffs amounting to $26 million on items that particularly
injured West Germany, France, and the Netherlands, the main
2
1
poultry protectionists.
At the very least, the Chicken War showed that the
future of expanding agricultural exports under the CAP was
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quite limited. By 1971, U.S. poultry exports to the EEC
fell to less than one-fifth of their high levels of 1962
and almost half of sales in 1959. Though overall U.S. farm
exports to the Common Market rose in value, they declined
as a percentage of EEC imports. Thus, the U.S. did not
retain its historical share of access commensurate to the
rise in total global farm imports into the EEC.22 America
possessed a comparative advantage in chickens but the Six
refused to trade fairly. Contrary to the claims of the
hegemony school, the U.S. could not force Europe to keep
the door open to exports despite persuasive efforts and
ultimately, the threat and reality of retaliation. The
issue indicated how far American strength had waned.
In general, most agricultural interests took the same
expansionist position on trade as the poultry industry, but
their views did not mean they supported the TEA right down
the line. For instance, the American Farm Bureau
wholeheartedly backed freer trade and greater access for
farm goods into the EEC. But the Bureau, as an opponent of
government intervention in the economy, disliked the
Kennedy domestic farm program of subsidies and price
supports and the adjustment assistance provision and the
export subsidies in the trade bill. The National Grange
and National Farmers Union backed trade expansion, too, as
did major export commodities, but there were enough
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discrepancies between them to confirm the pluralism within
the farm sector.
For instance, the Farmers Union, a family-farmer
oriented organization with import
-competing members,
advocated adjustment assistance in opposition to the Farm
Bureau. Other farmers hurt by imports flocked to
Washington to complain, too. Among those demanding
protection were livestock and dairy producers, whose
legislators accounted for two-thirds of the votes against
the TEA. Also, a plethora of California specialty crop
farmers, Pacific fishermen, and vegetable and fruit growers
from all over the nation opposed Kennedy. Most
significant, cotton producers, who enjoyed a comparative
advantage and exported half their production abroad, backed
protection. Cotton farmers feared losing the two-price
cotton subsidy which textilemen opposed, and denounced the
Farm Bureau's liberal trade stance.
Corporatism was not a trait among farmers in trade.
Some analysts questioned the utility of exporting to solve
the domestic farm surplus problem, asserting that overseas
markets only partly helped. A Farm Bureau official
admitted he had a "damn tough job" of even interesting
farmers in the trade expansion goals of the TEA. As Lauren
Soth writes, those who generalize about farm opinion stand
25on "dangerous ground"
.
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Legislators were not immune from import
-competing farm
interest groups. Both senators from New York claimed that
their state sold only 1% of its produce abroad, while
agricultural imports displaced workers. The inflow of
strawberries could provoke noise from congressmen from
several states, noted the TEA task force, while
Representatives Al Ulman (D-OR) and Clair Engle (D-CA)
pressed for restrictions on a host of non-basic specialty
commodities. The lumber bloc already pushed for
restraints, and Senator E.L. Bartlett sought to limit fish
imports. These legislators listened to the Western Growers
Association when it argued that "foreign trade should be
fair trade"
.
Kennedy expected, and received, however, solid support
from the farm bloc because of the TEA' s promise of export
benefits. The Farm Bureau delivered, for example, all but
one member of the Kansas delegation. Kennedy did not buy
votes in the farm sector with special concessions, as he
had with textiles and lumber. His inaction, wrote an
administration analyst, implied that he was willing to risk
losses in upcoming elections in agricultural districts in
order to gain them in industrial areas. Yet farmers had
leverage over him through inter-branch pressure. Indeed,
their demand for access abroad forced the President to
answer to Congress and plead, often in vain, with the EEC
for retaining or increasing U.S. farm exports. By doing
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so, he most likely hoped to alleviate his political
weakness xn the Midwestern farm states, which he lost in
the 1960, before the next election. ^"^
In the labor sector, where, contrary to farm states,
Kennedy's political stock was high, he expected and
received solid support for the TEA. But its backing came
with a price tag, qualifications, and deep disagreement
with the business community. It was also unclear if
workers recognized the importance of exports, but they
certainly realized the effects of imports on their jobs.
Administration and labor leaders exaggerated the
employment benefits of foreign trade, especially in
lowering the jobless rate. About 3.1 million workers,
nearly one-third of these farm labor, relied on exports.
Thus, 13.2% of agricultural workers benefited from sales
abroad. Yet, only 5% of all non-government, non-
agricultural jobs and 7.7% of manufacturing workers
depended on exports. As Vice-President George Harrison of
the AFL-CIO explained, since the percentage of employment
attributable to exports and imports (7.5%), as well as the
ratio of the GNP to foreign sales was so small, the U.S.
was not reliant on trade for domestic economic security.
Exports of merchandise created jobs, said Senator Albert
Gore (D-Tenn.) in assessing Kennedy's contention that
foreign sales were critical to domestic well-being. But
exports were certainly not of such great magnitude that a
reasonable increase could absorb enough workers and lower
unemployment to an acceptable level, he concluded. ^8
That the administration counted on labor support for the
TEA stemmed not just from the perception that more exports
would create jobs but from the cold war views of AFL-CIO
President George Meany. A fervent ant i-communist, Meany
linked liberal trade to a unified Atlantic community joined
with the LDCs. The Soviet bloc was anathema; he opposed,
for instance, inviting Moscow to agreem to a code of fair
practices. For Meany, the foreign affairs involved
capitalism versus communism. "in this struggle", he told
Congress, "the economic well-being of the free nations, our
own included, is of paramount importance . "^^
Security concerns aside, the AFL-CIO nevertheless made
adjustment assistance a condition of its support for
Kennedy. Because unions were one of his key political
bases, the President had to satisfy worker demands on trade
policy. Big Labor had sided with all the Reciprocal Trade
Acts since 1934 as part of New Deal legislation. But
unions signaled that without some form of unemployment
compensation to cushion workers after the TEA eliminated
the "no-injury" criteria, that is, little reliance on the
escape clause and peril points, they would oppose the bill.
The AFL-CIO even requested the retention of the no-injury
measures at the Democratic convention in 1960. Now, AFL-
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CIO endorsement was "wholly contingent upon inclusion of
these trade adjustment assistance provisions"
.
Of course, this requirement was not a burden on Kennedy.
He welcomed the AFL-CIO demand since he had sought
adjustment assistance for the RTA of 1953 and made it a
centerpiece of his fair-trade doctrine under the Trade
Expansion Act. AFL-CIO adamancy, however, restricted his
flexiblity in changing parts of the provision to suit
conservative, anti-labor industry leaders and congressional
foes of adjustment assistance.
Labor intransigeance on adjustment assistance indeed
posed a problem for Kennedy, since it sparked criticism by
the business community as yet another dole for the welfare
state. A reporter goggled at the rare sight of labor and
business leaders walking into the Capitol together when the
TEA hearings began, but the sight belied the tensions below
the surface in this expedient union against
31protectionism. Adjustment assistance laid bare the
fundamental schism between both sectors on societal values,
the role of government in the economy, and the continuation
of the New Deal. These differences put in doubt the
corporatist view that a firm alliance existed between
business and labor.
The AFL-CIO issued, for instance, numerous statements
which took indirect jabs at the corporate "enemies of
progress", who claimed that the payments deficit resulted
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from high labor costs which priced American goods out of
domestic and foreign markets. The deficit, competiti
abroad, and cheap imports were favorite "fronts" f
"those" who advocated wage restraints on U.S. labor, argued
labor leaders. In reality, high wages permitted workers to
buy more goods, so boosting corporate profits and mutually
benefiting everyone. "Honest businessmen and bankers" knew
that feeble salesmanship by industry explained the lack of
exports and the persistent deficit
. Economic and
ideological differences caused a pluralistic divergence
among these societal interests.
Pluralism existed within the labor movement as well.
Some unions opposed freer trade, and though small in
number, they were influential. Unions of carpenters and
joiners, shoemakers, potters, and glass and textile workers
rejected the AFL-CIO stand on liberal trade. Higher
tariffs and the textile program showed the protectionist
influence of the latter two on the Congress and Kennedy.
The 1.7 million member Teamsters brotherhood also expressed
"serious reservations" about the trade bill, viewing it as
a major departure from other RTAs . The TEA made "no
provision for fair trade" by equalizing international wages
or eliminating non-tariff barriers. Like many others, the
union accused Kennedy of inconsistency with his more
33protectionist Senate record.
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In sum, workers were not "free traders in the usual
sense", as Solomon Barkin of the Textile Workers Union
explained. Labor support was highly qualified, both by an
insistence on adjustment assistance and a demand by some
unions for protection for industries which suffered market
disruption. Kennedy recognized and acted on these
propositions, and won the majority to liberal trade. As
Meany contended, "I would support any legislation that
would be helpful to our country's position in the world,
and at the same time find some way to help protect our own
34workers". Such was the fair-trade balance necessary to
win labor's support.
The fair-trade compromise ran into more opposition from
the business community, where protectionism held its
ground. Manufacturers were at odds with labor and the
administration on trade and other issues to the point where
a partnership of private interests with the government was
unworkable. But the factor that stands out in the business
community perspective is the pervasive influence of
protectionism. Unlike agriculture and labor, Kennedy
struggled to convince industrialists of export
opportunities abroad. In the end, he marshalled the
strength of congressional liberal traders to dampen down
protectionism.
As scholar Robert A. Dahl discovered, pluralism on trade
was prevalent in the two major business organizations, the
on
united States Chamber of Commerce and National Associati
of Manufacturers (NAM)
.
A spokesman for local merchants
and trade, business, and professional associations, the
Chamber consisted of export industries as well as import-
competitors. This variation explained why the Chamber had
always supported the RTA but only with the inclusion of
protectionist safeguards. In 1962, the organization's vote
on its resolution for the TEA provoked a stormy session.
Protectionists blocked endorsement of the bill and united
against adjustment assistance as an answer to import
injury. The Chamber's board of directors managed to
reverse some votes and win support for Kennedy, but many
members agreed with Monsanto' s Thomas J. Dewey that such a
"wide diversity" existed within the Chamber that no policy
statement should be made at all. in the end, the one
Chamber reservation, in conflict with Kennedy, concerned
federal funding for adjustment assistance . "^^
NAM, the voice of Big Business, remained neutral. Split
between export- and import
-competitors and firms with no
interest whatsoever in foreign trade, this 22,000 member
organization had maintained a consistent neutrality since
the 1940s. Rejecting both extremes of free trade and
protectionism in fair-trade fashion, NAM hoped for expanded
trade but not at the expense of domestic producers.
Officials doubted that liberal trade was advantageous to
America since it opened up domestic markets to competitive
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forces. But its neutrality was so deep-rooted that NAM'
s
Economic Advisory Committee routinely discussed all facets
of foreign economic policy except tariffs, to which it left
the "widest discretion" to its membership. Though not
promulgating an official resolution on the TEA, NAM firmly
opposed adjustment assistance, sought a one year extension
of the RTA, and desired to reduce presidential authority
over tariff s."^^
The cold to lukewarm reception to the trade program from
NAM and the Chamber showed not only variation within the
private sector between industry, labor, and agriculture,
but discord between business and the administration.
Recent scholarship on the 1960s draws the picture of a
president who was the consummate "corporate liberal",
vigorously pursuing tax and trade policies which assured
corporate hegemony in the domestic and foreign economy. in
reality, the President encountered much resistance from
private interests, a condition borne out by the steel price
crisis, tax and investment policy, and resistance to his
trade bill. And, as Jim Heath notes, even when agreement
occurred, Kennedy acted not for businessmen but in the
national interest of updating and invigorating the
37economy
.
No doubt a substantial portion of the business community
fell in behind Kennedy's call for freer trade.
Transportation, consumer goods, and heavy machinery
manufacturers joined banks and insurance companies in
stressing the "amazing opportunities" which were opening up
in Europe for exports. The liberal CNTP and the Committee
for Economic Development, a political think-tank, added to
these forces. Producers and service industries sought an
end to the "vicious circle" of trade restrictionism for
diplomatic reasons, but the profit motive served as a major
catalyst. Take away the national income derived from
exports and imports, commented an industrialist, and the
cushion between profit and loss would be eliminated.
Even among such capital intensive enterprises, however,
the support was mixed in its intensity and diverse in its
reasoning. One trend was clear: the TEA represented a
"sweeping change" in business attitudes away from
protectionism and toward liberal trade, said business
analyst Gene Bradley. The urge to export and invest abroad
converged in the early 1960s to build this enthusiasm. For
many, though, tariffs were not important. Automakers like
Chrysler Corporation, for instance, admitted that road and
other taxes doubled the price of their cars in Europe, so a
duty cut of even several hundred dollars would make little
difference in sales. Aircraft giant Boeing remarked that
tariff cuts were not a concern since most of its foreign
and domestic buyers were government -owned and would pay any
39price. These firms backed the TEA, but not actively.
I
!
I
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other rising industries were not so forthcoming.
Political scientist James Lindeen found in his survey of
testimony in the RTAs since 1934 that the more competitive
the producer, the more inclined toward liberal trade. Yet
some firms seemed apathetic to the free-trade cause. The
CNTP reported several members were delinquent in donating
to the organization, including Texaco, Coca-Cola, American
Radiator and Standard, and F.W. Woolworth. Still other
multinationals, such as Caterpillar Tractor, were concerned
with exports but more with maintaining subsidiaries
overseas. And competitive, high technology industries in
the chemicals, coal, steel, and aluminum sectors straddled
the fence between the TEA and protectionism.
The products of the fast-growing electronics industry,
for instance, with export sales accounting for 6% and $613
million of its output, would fall under the dominant
supplier provision of the TEA and therefore enjoy free
access into the Common Market. But the industry predicted
that European advances in technology and production would
soon squeeze out American competitors like Westinghouse
.
Anyway, the main market for radios, televisions and semi-
conductors was at home, claimed manufacturers. Thus, the
Electronics Industries Association issued a resolution
calling for trade restrictions which disappointed the
administration and enraged the CNTP. Because Japanese
imports threatened domestic production, electronics
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manufacturers requested a cotton textile-type quota
agreement to limit these products, the retention of
existing protectionist devices in the TEA, and additional
enforcement measures. Here was a capital-intensive
industry that turned inward as well as outward.
This tnedency also showed up in the chemical industry.
On the surface, this industry was a prime candidate for the
export club. With 6% of sales going overseas, chemical
manufacturers ranked fifth in total sales and fourth in
assets among all American producers and boasted a growth
rate that was three times the national average. They
accounted for 8.7% of U.S. exports in 1961, grossing $1.7
billion, while imports amounted to less than $400 million.
Not only did exports more than quadruple imports, but total
trade had climbed over the $2 billion mark beginning in
1960 and continued to rise. Market surveys predicted rapid
growth in investment and trade, especially in competitive
but capital-starved Western Europe. "Never before has the
chemical industry played so heavy a role in the U.S. export
trade", proclaimed Chemical Week
.
Chemicalmen were a paradox, however. Their knee-jerk
reaction against imports dominated the industry's trade
stance. Strident protectionism stemmed from the struggle
against German dye manufacturers who had dumped their
products on the American market just after World War I and
nearly destroyed the fledgling chemical industry. In order
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to protect its infant industry against powerful German
concerns, the U.S. raised tariffs and introduced the
American Selling Price (ASP) method of customs valuation in
1922. Reinforcing the prohibitive 60% chemical rates of
the Fordney-McCumber tariff, the ASP standard undercut the
price advantage of foreign manufacturers in organics (dyes)
by basing duties on the current American price of chemicals
instead of the value of the goods. While high tariffs fell
over the next 4 0 years, the ASP remained intact and limited
organics imports to 20% of their potential in the American
market
.
The revival of British and EEC chemical cartels, soon to
be united under the Common Market, exacerbated American
fears of destructive competition. West Germany, France,
Italy, and Great Britain had experienced tremendous growth
in chemical production since the late 1950s and as a
result, cut into America's global share of markets.
Despite the boom in U.S. production. Western European
output rose one-third higher. Free-traders pointed to the
huge surplus of exports over imports, but chemicalmen
predicted a leveling off of overseas sales and a six-fold
jump in imports. Manufacturers hoped Kennedy would
increase access for chemicals in Europe, while protecting
-, . . 44 .less competitive sectors . The industry was ready for some
fair-trade persuasion.
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Influencing chemical producers in this direction proved
to be a difficult task, though, and one compounded by
differences between the industry and the administration on
trade and other matters. Manufacturers were content but
not enthusiastic about the new export credit guarantee
program, for instance. The program, administered by U.S.
insurance companies in agreement with the Export
-Import
Bank, issued coverage for financial institutions which
granted credit to exporters. Since their main European
markets were low-risk trade areas, chemicalmen were not in
dire need of the program. Kennedy's approach to business
also revealed the rifts. His confrontational rollback of
steel prices in May 1962 upset chemical leaders, as did the
lack of more liberal depreciation allowances to help plant
45
modernization.
Kennedy' s plans to change the overseas investment tax
deferral privilege was another point of discord.
Corporations did not pay federal tax until earnings of
their subsidiaries were remitted to the parent company.
But Kennedy sought to tax subsidiaries in order to
discourage investment and slow the outflow of capital which
worsened the payments deficit. Between 1957-1960, capital
investment in Europe and Canada exceeded the dividends
remitted to the parent company by $655 million. Kennedy
withdrew the plan under industry and congressional
pressure, but his action angered chemicalmen, who claimed
324
that producing at home was expensive compared to the
advantages of cheaper labor, transportation, and
manufacturing costs in Europe. They could compete in the
EEC only by skirting around the common external tariff to
set up plants in Europe. Putting this view into practice,
the industry set up 55 new plants in Europe from 1957 to
1962 and increasing the output of American subsidiaries by
84%. Export expansion was not the industry's top
concern
.
Kennedy and producers were also at odds on trade. At
the Dillon Round, the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturers Association (SOCMA)
, backed by the industry's
trade organization, the Manufacturing Chemists Association
(MCA)
,
revolted when many chemical products appeared on the
list of goods eligible for tariff cuts. Demanding higher
tariffs instead, the MCA remarked that the list looked like
it had been prepared by foreigners eager to enter the U.S.
market. Chemical Week cautioned against such sarcasm, but
implored negotiators to remember that "there is no stigma
attached to considering U.S. interests ". '^'^
The Dillon Round provoked animosity over chemical trade
on both sides of the Atlantic. Charges of chemical dumping
flew both ways in late November 1961; the EEC protested the
flood of U.S. polyethylene while Americans denounced cheap
imports of antibiotics from Europe. A British producer
called Americans "two-faced" because they wished to sell
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without reciprocally lowering chemical protection. The ASP
standard was particularly nettlesome because it more than
doubled the price of European chemical products. Anyway,
argued the Europeans, the reasons for American
protectionism in chemicals had disappeared long ago since
other products had assumed a much greater export
significance in trade than those covered by the ASP
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system.
Americans were accurate, however, in claiming that the
EEC had higher chemical tariffs than the United States.
Senator Paul Douglas, for instance, called European tariffs
"astronomical" and "unrealistic", and urged their
reduction. In the end, the EEC included chemicals in its
initial tariff cut offer at the Round, but withdrew
concessions on products that it considered too heavily
restricted in America and on which the U.S. had refused to
negotiate. The U.S. still got the better deal, receiving
244 cuts valued at $203 million on chemicals while granting
80 concessions worth $25 million and retaining the ASP."^^
U.S. producers won their protectionist cause.
Despite the gains, the Round left chemicalmen with a bad
taste for the Kennedy trade program. Even before the TEA,
they girded themselves for one of their "stiffest battles
with the government in years" over tariff policies.
Linear, or sectoral, tariff cuts, would leave them in
"complete uncertainty" in future negotiations and
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discourage development of new, but vulnerable, products.
Other spokesmen accepted tariff reductions as long as
Kennedy did not water down the escape clause and peril
point provisions, which he in fact did. in stiff
opposition were synthetic organic producers, who predicted
an evisceration of the ASP valuation if the TEA passed
Congress.^^
Diverse enough opinion on the TEA ran through the ranks
of the chemical industry to make a statement of policy
impossible. But there was no doubt that regardless of the
"split personality" of exporters and militant
protectionists, the industry leaned toward more
restrictions. Welcoming the bill were executives of
American Cyanamid, Cabot Corporation, Pfizer International,
and Baird Chemical, who confidently predicted that U.S.
chemical products could penetrate the EEC. Others, such as
Reichhold Co. and National Distillers and Chemicals were
resigned to the inevitablity of tariff cuts as long as they
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were gradual.
Opposition to the bill was overwhelming, however, and
much resistance came from chemical giants who were major
exporters. Dow Chemical and Monsanto, both with a high
volume of foreign sales, opposed the TEA. Dow wanted
"reasonable" controls on imports and saw a "definite peril"
to employment and research from liberal trade. Monsanto
actually proposed a five-point program designed around
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item-by-item reductions. Criticizing the TEA for its lack
of insurance for true reciprocity, Monsanto spokesmen took
their cue from founder Edgar Queeny's 40-year old stress on
protectionism, which still prevailed in the company. ^2
Dupont's exports comprised 6% of total sales, yet the
dye and chemical division dominated policy. Vowing to
"fight for our very existence", dyemakers pushed President
Crawford Greenewalt to offer four amendments to the TEA
which would safeguard their interests. These measures
strengthened the escape clause and retained the peril
point, eliminated adjustment assistance, and assured
reciprocity in negotiations in which industry advisors
would be present. Dupont supported Senator Prescott Bush's
protectionist amendments, but much of the industry
predicated support for the TEA on the Dupont amendments
.
Protectionists translated their views to the major trade
associations. As expected, synthetic organic producers
denounced the bill as a "reckless" piece of legislation
that squandered U.S. economic strength. As of March 1962,
moreover, the MCA, representing 182 producers who accounted
for 90% of chemical sales, edged toward a revised TEA
instead of defeat or acceptance of the bill in its present
form. Indeed, Chairman Robert Semple sided with export
promotion as a goal in commerce and, like Kennedy, sought
to establish "fair trade rules so that the U.S.
manufacturer operating abroad has an equal break with the
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foreign competition delivering his products to our
shores". Semple backed the Dupont amendments to the TEA
and opposed giving the President more authority, and
Congress less, over tariff s.'^^
The MCA position concerned the Kennedy forces which,
like the CNTP, had predicted that all chemicalmen except
for organics would be at the "vanguard of liberal trade".
Petersen told the MCA that the industry was a model of the
laws of comparative advantage: it possessed substantial
investment capital, cheap raw materials, and enviable
production and marketing efficiency to exploit overseas
markets. Imports were negligible, moreover, accounting for
only 5% of U.S. consumption.^^
The President reiterated this message during a visit of
MCA officials to the White House on 9 April 1962. Semple
accompanied General John Hull, President of the MCA and
former aide to General George C. Marshall, to discuss
chemical issues, including the four Dupont amendments and
retention of the ASP system. Kennedy promised to take the
four amendments under "earnest consideration" and make a
careful determination of which chemical items to reserve
from the "zero" list at the negotiations under the dominant
supplier clause, the provision of the TEA which eliminated
duties on products in which the U.S. and the EEC accounted
for 8 0% or more of world trade. Upon the advice of
Petersen, the President also pledged to retain the crucial
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ASP. Though he was disappointed at the industry's
intransigeance, Kennedy agreed not "to disturb" the
chemical sector. Hull later thanked Kennedy and Semple
gave qualified approval to the TEA, but surely, as Petersen
aide Myer Rashish concluded, the industry was "one of those
squeaky wheels that get the grease".
Kennedy relied on Congress to deal with the chemical
industry. When organics producers complained, Wilbur Mills
called Carl Gerstacker, SOCMA chairman and Dow President,
selfiish. Exports way above imports for the industry as a
whole. Mills noted, so inefficient sectors must adjust or
bow under to competition for the good of all chemicalmen.
Congressman Sidney Yates (D-Ill.) asked producers to look
at the export origin study by the Commerce Department to
discover how beneficial chemical exports were for every
state. To Kennedy's relief. House and Senate conferees
refused to attach the Dupont amendments to the TEA.^^
Interest groups failed to move Congress.
In the end, administration allies in Congress secured
the chemical industry for the TEA. Though Chemical Week
was resigned to "make the best" of the TEA, for instance,
the journal conceded that the legislation had a "silver
lining" since it would lower EEC restrictions on U.S.
59exports. The interaction reflected more interest group
politics than inter-branch relations, as Congress fended
off pressure from organic producers and convinced the rest
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of the industry of the advantages of reduced tariffs.
Free-trade legislators also took up the TEA banner for the
President and fought chemical protectionists.
The promise of lower tariffs and increased exports came
true in the Kennedy Round. Subject to congressional
approval of a complex agreement eliminating the ASP
standard, the EEC, United Kingdom, and other chemical
importers would drop duties by 4 9%. The accord hinged on
an American pledge to reduce by half its tariff on chemical
products. The industry and Congress later balked at the
arrangement, but exports and total foreign sales to the EEC
continued to rise throughout the decade. Such were the
results of Kennedy's onerous push for fair-trade for an
industry that to most observers seemed a confirmed liberal
trader. ^°
Other manufacturers showed a similar resistance, some an
indifference, to the Kennedy trade program. Many
businessmen demonstrated a reluctance to accept tariff
reductions which might hurt fellow producers. Some refused
to speak out publicly for the TEA out of a fear of risking
boycotts from Americans injured by imports. Others were
apathetic. Elmo Roper pollsters found that though most
sided with Kennedy, only 27% of the 500 largest
corporations answered their survey. A Research Institute
of America survey of 30,000 businessmen found 57% in favor
of the TEA but one-quarter against and 17.3% undecided. At
the local level, of 262 industrialists polled in Cleveland,
Ohio, 164 opposed or had no opinion on the bill. Finally,
a Business Week sampling of 150 executives found fully one-
half undecided but concerned about the effects of the TEA
on local industry, and the other half split between
supporters and opponents of the bill. a "solid minority"
of opposition, in Heath's words, when added to fence-
sitters, revealed the diversity in the business sector.
In many cases, the administration failed to convince
U.S. businessmen to become export
-minded. Lumbermen, for
instance, sent a trade mission to Europe in 1963 and
considered gearing production according to foreign
specifications. Yet giants Georgia-Pacific and Weyerheuser
remained skeptical of exporting. U.S. labor and management
in general, admitted Kennedy, remained "largely
unconcerned" about opportunities abroad. Only a handful of
companies, he told some bankers in February 1963, gave the
export market "the attention it deserved" because they
thought the risks were greater than the potential benefits,
the profit margin for exports was much less than that of
the domestic market, and foreign restrictions limited
62
sales.
Conflict between the administration and the private
sector, moreover, outnumbered the agreements. Kennedy
playfully but accurately told NAM that the organization was
not one of his staunchest supporters. Though comfortable
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with a labor audience, he also had disputes with uni
over wage-price guidelines. m addition, many agricultural
interests opposed his farm program. Businessmen abroad,
such as a member of the International Chamber of Commerce,
noted the close relationship of governments to the private
sector in other countries but adinitted that a similar
relationship in America was "more difficult to achieve".
Erecting bridges between business and government was an aim
that the President found taxing and often unfruitful.
To overcome hostility or apathy to his trade policy,
Kennedy banked on muffling protectionist legislators with
concessions but also looked to a "liberal trade" bloc in
Congress for help. This bloc is hard to identify since
many of its members remained silent in order to avoid
arousing import-competitors in their districts. One
unidentified midwestern congressman perceived little
political gain in voting for the TEA but recognized the
need for new trade legislation to meet the Common Market.
Yet he preferred to cast his vote with Kennedy and then
"keep quiet about it and hope nobody notices".
Other liberal traders in Congress were bolder, such as
the 22 congressman who wrote Kennedy urging an aggressive
bill because trade liberalization helped more than it hurt.
This group was indicative of support he could expect from
legislators representing major exporting states, such as
California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New
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York, and Texas, many of which he had won in the elect
i
and expected to win in 1964. He counted on farm-stat^
votes, too, for the TEA, and hoped for their support in
1964. Guarding against defections within these states, and
to offset the sizable protectionist forces, the President
also welcomed recent converts won over by concessions on
textiles, lumber, oil, and carpets and glass
.
The heart of the pro-Kennedy forces was a bipartisan
segment on Capitol Hill which looked beyond local
conditions to the national and international interests.
Like the President, they recognized that a trade war with
Europe or failure to reverse the payments deficit would
impair America's strength in the cold war. Kennedy's
diplomatic scheme for American-European relations, a Grand
Design which promoted an Atlantic partnership between the
Common Market and the United States, appealed to them.
Indeed, the idea of an Atlantic partnership had been
enunciated many years before and most recently by
Eisenhower in response to the rise of the EEC. The
partnership meant that the U.S. accepted Europe as a
decision-maker on matters pertaining to the Atlantic
alliance. Since trade legislation was the only expression
of the partnership available, trade policy became the
testing ground for the Grand Design. Equality was based on
two commercial partners of the same strength. Two
"pillars", one American, the other European, joined by the
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common purpose of trade liberalization under the TEA,
seemed a real possibility.^^
The Grand Design implied that America was no longer the
sole great power in the West and that the country must
orient itself toward cooperative, and not unilateral,
endeavors in foreign economic policy. The OECD was a start
toward this end. As the President wrote one journalist,
"We have sought among our European allies not a band of
followers, but a strong partnership capable of sharing with
us the leadership" of the West.^"^
The concrete forms of the partnership remained vague,
and many of its proponents erroneously tended to think that
the EEC would logically and easily accept the idea. The
concept was glamorous as a call to unite the West, and
Europe responded generally in favor. The full integration
of the EEC was a requisite for the partnership to succeed.
To the administration, this aim hinged on whether Britain
entered the Common Market. For Charles de Gaulle and other
suspect Europeans, this reliance on Britain raised again
the specter of U.S. infiltration into European affairs
using London as a disguise. Did the partnership cloak
Kennedy's intention of preserving U.S. dominance at the
expense of a truly European Common Market, they asked? Yet
EEC officials, such as Commission President Walter
Hallstein, Vice-President Robert Marjolin, and others said
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that a partnership would avert protectionism on both sides
of the Atlantic.
Kennedy emphasized that the EEC had instigated a new,
more equitable relationship among the Atlantic powers. In
his "Declaration of Interdependence" on July 4, 1962, a
statement directed at foreign as much as domestic
listeners, he explained the Grand Design. The speech
summed up his view of Europe's place in his fair-trade
ideology by stressing American-European trade "on a basis
of full equality". Kennedy recognized that the "cement" of
healthy U.S.
-EEC relations did not depend on complete
agreement on all political and economic matters. The
United States did not aim "to please all of our European
allies", but only wanted "the benefits of this kind of
7 n
union to be shared".
Basically, Kennedy knew that the era of U.S.
predominance was over and his Grand Design sought to
redress the economic balance-of
-power in ways acceptable to
all. The EEC was a trade rival, and the idea of an
Atlantic community to keep Europe open to American goods
and preempt Gaullist nationalism took on a greater urgency
than ever before. Indeed, as Ball explained, any U.S.
trade disadvantages incurred because of Europe would be
more than offset by the increased volume of trade under a
free-trade regime. Under the TEA, America would enter
trade negotiations with Europe which would create, as
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Kennedy exclaimed, "the greatest market the world has ever
known
... a trillion dollar economy, where goods can move
freely back and forth. "'^'^
Defense imperatives underlay this goal. The
administration hoped that a trade partnership would spread
to aid and military spheres, as Europe assumed more of the
financial burden while the U.S. shared decision-making
power in nuclear policy. Without the TEA, however, the
economies of Europe and America would drift apart, a
fissure which the Soviets would gladly exploit. Above all,
Moscow feared a U.S. -EEC front which would enhance European
integration, build up the Atlantic economy, strengthen
NATO, and turn its full attention to the LDCs, reported
Roger Hilsman of the State Department. Thus, the success
of U.S. foreign policy, added Kennedy, relied on trade to
solidify Western political unity. A partnership would
frustrate communist hopes for a capitalist trade war and
fund the military deterrent of the alliance, thereby
dooming Soviet "efforts to split the West" to "failure".
Thus, said Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric
to Congress, "while defense provides the essential security
72of the alliance, trade provides the substance."
Understanding the relationship of the TEA to national
security, liberal traders in Congress pushed for the TEA.
Senator Fulbright reiterated that a trade partnership was
more than a dream, it was a necessity in the cold war. A
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trade war with Europe, warned Senator Vance Hartke (D-
ind.), would "only delight the communists". Congressman
John R. Lindsay (R-NY) claimed that Soviet encroachment in
the LDCs and America's need for raw materials were reasons
enough for a free-trade program. Rep. William S. Moorehead
(D-PA) argued that winning the cold war outweighed the
consideration of economic injury to America. "Much more
[was] at stake" than U.S. employment and expansion, added
Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY). The TEA addressed "the
economic strength and military power of the nations
confronted today by a massive and multi-faceted Soviet
challenge
.
""^^
If the cold war lay at the ideological base of the TEA,
the fair-trade doctrine emerged as the practical foundation
of support for the bill. Critical to passage were
amendments, worked out by House and Senate conferees, which
ensured a liberal trade bias but satisfied congressmen
worried about injury. Wilbur Mills spearheaded this
effort. He tacked on a change in congressional veto power
over presidential escape clause decisions from two-thirds
to merely a majority vote. Also, the President could not
reduce tariffs for five years on items which the Tariff
Commission deemed injured by imports. In addition, the TEA
provided for a bipartisan delegation of two House and two
Senate members to accompany the new Special Representative
!
I
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for Trade Negotiations (STR) to the upcoming tariff
talks
.
'^^
The creation of the Special Trade Representative was the
most novel of the fair-trade amendments. This official,
working out of the White House, would preside over a
revamped committee within the administration charged with
formulating trade policy, thereby replacing the State
Department as chief negotiator at GATT
. While Rusk and
Ball grudgingly accepted the position, the Commerce
Department and Kennedy supported it as a concession to
Congress and the business community, both of which had
previously accused the State Department of being too
generous with tariff reductions. Upon the advice of Ball
and others, the President selected ailing former Secretary
of State Christian A. Herter as STR. Some disagreed with
the choice; Congressman Henry Reuss (D-Wis
.
) wanted someone
capable of confronting the EEC "who smokes a cigar without
lighting it and doesn't smile very often", rather than the
75genteel Herter. Yet Herter hoped to spend more time in
Washington as a coordinator, leaving the bargaining to his
deputy. Thus, Congress was happy when J. Michael
Blumenthal, a seasoned, tough negotiator who Ball had
tapped to forge difficult international commodity
agreements (including the GATT cotton textile accords)
,
7 6became Herter' s man in Geneva.
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Ironically, the most significant defeat for ardent
liberal traders came from the administration itself.
Predicting British failure to join the Common Market,
Congressman Reuss and Senator Douglas proposed an amendment
to extend the dominant supplier provision, to eliminate
tariffs on items in which the U.S. and EEC provided 80% of
world trade, to the British-led, seven-member European Free
Trade Association. Noting that Britain had a hand in most
of the products covered by the provision, the Douglas-
Reuss amendment allowed for the cuts regardless of EEC
action
.
The amendment sparked a dispute between the two
legislators and the administration. Ball opposed the
measure, fearing that the EEC would interpret it as an
interference in the delicate UK-Common Market talks. Other
officials believed that by supporting the provision, the
U.S. would signal that it had lost confidence in Britain's
chance to join the EEC. Reuss and Douglas retorted that
America had already injected itself into the talks by
siding with British entry. Howard Petersen disagreed,
arguing that the U.S. had not urged Britain's application
and that anyway, the dominant supplier was the best means
to achieve a true Atlantic partnership. In any event, de
Gaulle crushed the hope for zero duties by rejecting
77British membership in 1963.
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The ardent liberal traders in Congress were thus victims
of international policy beyond their control, but on
Capitol Hill, they succeeded in winning the TEA without
vitiating its ability to bargain down tariffs with the
Common Market. Crucial to this outcome was the defeat of
37 crippling protectionist amendments authored by Senator
Bush that would have eliminated adjustment assistance,
boosted import restrictions on farm products, and restored
the "no-injury" criteria by reinstating the peril point and
escape clause procedures. The amendments, believed the
administration, would have "nullified" the TEA.
Regardless, when the votes were tallied, Kennedy racked up
the fifth highest total in the House and accumulated the
most votes ever in the Senate on the 12 votes on reciprocal
trade legislation since 1934."^^
Congressional liberal traders helped Kennedy coax other
legislators and amenable elements of the private sector
toward acceptance of tariff reductions. Congress and the
President worked out a bill suitable to the disparate band
of exporters, import-competitors, and a vast segment of the
population who cared or knew little about foreign markets.
Senator Eugene T. McCarthy (D-Minn.) summed up the bill
accurately the day it passed the Senate. The TEA was, "in
reality, a 'fair trade' bill. Its aim is to insure those
conditions around the world which will foster and guarantee
the age-old right to exchange goods and services in a free
and open market place. It is designed to protect the
American businessman in his right to compete fairly around
the world [while] it protects American workers and firms
from unfair competition".'^^
Kennedy had completed a grueling campaign for his top
priority legislation of 1962. Placating key protectionists
had been especially hard, but luring exporters by a pledge
to increase their access access abroad was another burden
necessary to win the bill. Along the way, convincing
Americans of the importance of foreign trade, stirring
their enthusiasm for exports, and steering them away from
the domestic marketplace and toward an interest in economic
opportunities abroad had been particularly wearisome. He
was not always successful in these tasks, as the general
apathy or sizable opposition to the TEA, recalcitrance from
exporting industries, or disagreements with big trade
associations showed.
A sure win for the TEA had not been assured back in
January because of the divisions and opposition within the
private sector. Not only were protectionists resistant to
the bill, but the President could not count on a tight-knit
coalition of exporters in agriculture, labor, and business
to support him. Many of these interests, in general,
leaned toward freer trade. But intra- and inter-industry
divisions, a concern among multinationals more for their
subsidiaries abroad than for exporting, and the relative
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unimportance of exports to the U.S. economy, even in parts
of the farm sector, rendered support for the trade program
tepid or even neutral in many sectors.
Thus, Kennedy did not enjoy homogeneous support for his
TEA within the private sector. According to corporatism,
the linear or sectoral method of cutting tariffs under the
TEA gave large sectoral "syndicates" control over
decisions. These associations supposedly united to decide
trade policy administratively, that is, "outside
parliamentary channels". Yet the existence of such a
coalition, and even such unity within each syndicate, is
questionable. Export interests were Kennedy's best allies.
But they did not monopolize policy positions because of the
diversity between and within sectors. They also did not
have a decision-making role in the trade process.
Instead, in the politics of liberal trade. Congress
played a predominant part, though not mediatory as in the
textile, lumber, oil, and tariff cases. The common purpose
of free-trade precluded any infighting within the Executive
branch; thus, the bureaucratic politics model is not
pertinent. The interest group model also does not apply.
Exporters did not pressure Congress, like import-
competitors did, since they agreed with the substance of
the TEA. When they did press Congress, such as during the
poultry episode, Kennedy was not forced to deviate from his
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free-trade position. Chemicalmen did not deter him,
either, even as import
-competitors prescribed policy.
Instead, congressional liberal traders joined Kennedy in
an inter-branch agreement. The Reuss-Douglas dominant
supplier amendment signified that squabbling existed
between Capitol Hill and the White House. But a
significant portion of Congress backed liberal trade,
uniting behind Kennedy's reasoning that the nation's
security depended on an international free-trade regime and
close cooperation with trade partners. Once Kennedy lived
up to the protectionist side of his fair-trade doctrine by
aiding import
-competitors
, liberal traders assured him his
TEA. An inter-branch accord, styled by the President's
foreign policy aims, determined the politics of free-trade.
Though compelling on economic grounds and as a political
tactic, the fair-trade doctrine alone did not induce
Congress to vote for the trade bill. The national security
concerns of the administration and Congress did. That is,
economic growth was an important reason for freeing global
trade, but had limited appeal in Congress where import
-
competitors were influential. Instead, Kennedy placed the
TEA within the context of the cold war, urging approval in
order to reverse the balance-of-payments deficit and
preserve America's ability to finance its overseas
commitments
.
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His Grand Design in trade and defense sought to unite
the allies under a free-trade regime in order, ultimately,
to provide a solid front against Soviet power. Kennedy and
cold warriors in Congress, not domestic economic interests,
pushed a liberal trade regime based on an Atlantic
partnership. Thus, the comparative-advantage school is
more accurate in explaining the motives and aims of U.S.
trade policy than their hegemony counterparts.
Shrewd maneuvering and graceful rhetoric gave Kennedy a
well-earned triumph. For the President, the victory was
the go-ahead signal for much of his foreign policy agenda.
Upon signing the bill on 11 October 1962, he proclaimed
that the TEA was "the most important international piece of
legislation, I think, affecting economics since the passage
of the Marshall Plan."^"'-
This statement implicitly placed Europe as the key
target of the American trade program. But as the President
later explained, the TEA was an opportunity not only for
advances in trade but for closer political relations with
Europe, for boosting the economies of the less-developed
nations, and ultimately, for unifying the West in the cold
war. With these broad goals in mind, Kennedy approached
the trade negotiations named in his honor.
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CHAPTER 6
ROUND ONE TO EUROPE, 1963-1964
With the Trade Expansion Act secured, Kennedy expected
world trade barriers to be lowered at the sixth round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
, dubbed
the Kennedy Round in recognition of his initiative. Duty
rates were already low, but the TEA would ensure the
European Economic Community's common external tariff would
stay at a reasonable level. Even better, pending British
entry into the Common Market, the dominant supplier
provision would eliminate tariffs on the many goods traded
between the EEC and the United States. The provision would
bring expanded trade dividends for both sides and further
enhance the unity and strength of the Atlantic partnership.
The Kennedy Round became entangled in the divergent aims
of the U.S. and the EEC, however. Trade problems between
the two had simmered since the disappointing end to the
Dillon Round, the Six's retaliation to the U.S. carpets and
glass tariff hikes, and the chicken war. In diplomacy, the
stalled UK-EEC negotiations and French President Charles de
Gaulle's criticism of American foreign policy were only
some of the major irritants.
Underlying these problems, moreover, was an inherent
contradiction in American and EEC trade relations.
Washington had always encouraged European integration, but
unification wrought by the imposition of Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the common external tariff
meant trade discrimination against outsiders. EEC
integration served U.S. security objectives yet conflicted
with free-trade. American negotiators addressed the
problem during the rule-making stage of the Kennedy Round
in 1963 and 1964, the period following passage of the TEA,
through the fair-trade doctrine.
In effect, as the United States tried to wield the new
powers of the TEA, the fair-trade doctrine came directly
under attack by Europe. Prodded by de Gaulle, the EEC
dominated the rule-setting stage of the negotiations. In
order to protect its fledgling agricultural system from
U.S. penetration and adjust tariff structures which it
believed favored America, the Common Market frustrated
Washington's hopes for harmonious and fruitful preparation
for the Kennedy Round. The conflict was a reflection of
heightened European trade leverage, and lessened U.S.
economic power, in the GATT regime. Surely self-
interested, America nonetheless found Europe to be more so
The period before the actual bargaining occurred
pertains to the historiographical debate over trade policy
Hegemony scholars assert that the U.S., under domestic
pressure, sought rules which forced Europe to open up to
American exports by reducing EEC trade restrictions and
selfishly refused to lower its own barriers. Comparative
advantage historians claim, however, that Washington
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avoided the protectionism desired by producers at home
while pursuing export expansion of efficiently produced
goods (regardless of which side made them) for the mutual
benefit of all traders. in light of Europe's obstinate
policy in the early stages, the latter school appears more
accurate
.
For the first time in GATT's history, the 'contracting
parties had problems agreeing on rules. But well before
this conflict, the EEC had showed signs of dissent against
Kennedy's trade designs. Its Commission, the Common
Market's institutional force, applauded the aims of the Act
and accepted the Atlantic partnership in economic affairs.
The less enthusiastic nationally-oriented Council of
Ministers, which held the ultimate power in the EEC by
granting the Commission its negotiating mandate, supported
the linear method of cutting tariffs in broad sectors. Its
members were apprehensive that large-scale cuts in duties
and non-tariff barrier (NTBs) might weaken the unity among
the Six, since an effective common external tariff and the
protectionist CAP were their basic link. The conflict
between European integration and Atlantic free-trade was at
issue throughout the Kennedy Round.
More than any other EEC member, France singled out this
conflict as a prime consideration in trade policy. West
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries generally shared
America's free-trade ideology and goals for the Round,
though German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared a
"monstrous" influx of American goods. Above all, de Gaulle
controlled the EEC Commission's trade policy. France hoped
to limit European concessions, noting that America's trade
surplus with the Common Market might grow larger if the Six
lowered their external tariff. French Minister of Finance
Valery Giscard d'Estaing stressed cautious consideration of
the dominant supplier provision, agriculture, NTBs, and the
"doctrine of integration" implied by the Atlantic
2partnership
.
French attitudes became even clearer when de Gaulle
vetoed Britain's application for membership into the EEC on
14 January 1963. The rejection undercut the TEA. It also
had grave implication for the Grand Design of allied
military and economic unity, which de Gaulle (and hegemony
scholars) viewed as a scheme to extend American
predominance over Europe
.
De Gaulle scoffed at the Atlantic partnership, presuming
that as the Soviet threat abated, Europe would disengage
from America. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy
showed that the allies would not be consulted in an
emergency, and de Gaulle further doubted America's will to
defend Europe. Paris sought both a European nuclear "third
force" to offset the two Superpowers and closer relations
with West Germany by planning a treaty of friendship.
London's acceptance of American control over NATO's nuclear
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force in December 1962 in exchange for U.S. Polaris
missiles convinced him that Britain was more loyal to
Washington than an independent Europe. The EEC now might
be weakened by the Americophile Britain. De Gaulle decided
to stop Britain from "dragging the West into an Atlantic
system" under U.S. domination."*
Franco-American economic relations affected this
opposition to the Atlantic partnership. Concerned about
U.S. investments in European subsidiaries and firms, French
industrialists complained that their small enterprises
could not compete with large-scale American manufacturers.
The TEA portended an invasion of cheap U.S. exports and an
attack on EEC institutions such as the CAP. With 47% of
the EEC's arable land, France was a main beneficiary of the
CAP. Not surprisingly, therefore, Paris denounced USDA
Secretary Orville Freeman's criticism of farm protectionism
in Europe during his visit in November 1962. De Gaulle
also feared Britain's support of less protectionist Holland
and West Germany, the latter at odds with French farm
policy, and thus encourage U.S. trade penetration.^
But if blame can be assessed on the U.S. for the veto,
it lay not in Kennedy's imperialistic ambition but in
misjudgement. He mistakenly believed that Europe would
readily accept closer economic interdependence. De Gaulle
did not. Arthur Schlesinger and historians studying the
era, asserted that de Gaulle voiced a growing European
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sense of potency and desire for independence. indeed, he
tapped the pride of Europeans whose enterprises had
contributed to the EEC's growth and competitive vitality.
The Grand Design was also too impressionistic, a vision
with few practical guidelines. As a program, a "common
pursuit of economic expansion" was vague and provoked
suspicions about the self-interested goals of the U.S. in
gEurope
.
To a large extent, however, De Gaulle's view of Europe
mainly determined his veto. Initially opposed to the EEC,
he now aimed to control it. Plotting Franco-German
domination of the Community, de Gaulle believed that the
addition of another great power would alter this plan.
Once Britain - and presumably the rest of the EFTA - joined
the Common Market, and majority voting emerged by 1966,
there would be more votes against de Gaulle's policies than
7for them. The general did not look forward to these
prospects
.
Washington tried to remain aloof from the entire entry
issue, though the British, several other EFTA nations, and
de Gaulle became aggravated by George Ball's overzealous
interest in the affair. Kennedy supported Britain but
pledged cooperation with the Six in the event of a
8rejection. De Gaulle gave him the chance to live up to
his word.
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On the whole, most nations reacted against the veto.
Mostly the far Right and Left, who fought for greater
independence from America, supported de Gaulle. Yet the
other members of the Common Market, joined by European
integrationists such as Jean Monnet, Belgian Foreign
Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, and EEC Commission head Walter
Hallstein, agreed with the West German parliament members
who called 14 January 1963 "a black day for Europe". A
majority of European politicians and businessmen also
reaffirmed their support of the Atlantic partnership.
Still, out of a desire to preserve the EEC and because
France was an important trade partner for weaker nations
such as Belgium and Italy, the Common Market members and
the EEC Commission were somewhat reluctant to confront de
Gaulle.
^
Across the Atlantic, the veto was seen as an affront to
U.S. policies and as an indication that the Grand Design
was rapidly "going down the drain". Only arch-
protectionists applauded de Gaulle, since the veto vitiated
the TEA'S effectiveness in lowering American tariff
barriers
.
The White House and State Department wished to
avoid a shouting match with de Gaulle, but stressed that
the the General's policies were more damaging to France and
Europe than the United States. Before a visit by
Hallstein, Ball insisted that the President make clear
America's aim of defending its trade interests and the
expectation that the EEC would remain open and devoted to
free-trade. Kennedy continued to emphasize that he did not
want to influence or dominate Europe, but merely opposed
European independence through protectionism. Privately, he
wrote MacMillan that he held France accountable for any
increase in restrictiveness in EEC trade policy, which
"would be a disaster" for the alliance.
The effect of the veto was immediate on the Kennedy
Round in nullifying the dominant supplier provision. Its
elimination prompted Congressman Henry Reuss and Senators
Paul Douglas and Jacob Javits to propose anew that the
provision apply regardless of British membership. They
criticized the administration for its obsession with the
Common Market, and especially with Britain's joining the
EEC, instead of using the dominant supplier as a tool to
pursue the most-favored-nation principle. Because of
Kennedy's "toadying" to Europe, said Reuss, tariffs could
be erased only on jet aircraft and margarine and America
had simply punished itself by making it impossible to
bargain effectively with the EEC. The dominant supplier
amounted to "all sound and fury, signifying nothing".
Kennedy said he would accept the Douglas-Reuss amendment if
Congress did, but believed it was not essential to the
negotiations
. It never passed.
Thus, from the start, a gloom pervaded the preparation
for the Kennedy Round. GATT Director Eric Wyndham White
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called for an early meeting of GATT Ministers in order to
restore confidence in trade cooperation after the veto.
Yet some U.S. officials took de Gaulle's action as another
sign that America would encounter much resistance in Europe
to its free-trade policy. John K. Galbraith, for instance,
argued that the trade talks would worsen America's balance-
of-payments deficit because agriculture would fail to
penetrate the EEC and trade in manufactures would favor
lower-cost European producers. The administration must
cease its "self-delusion" that tough bargaining would open
up Europe to U.S. goods; instead, America should raise its
trade barriers to reverse its balance-of
-payments
deficit. -"-^
Discussions in the White House showed that Kennedy had
also decided to get tougher. At a cabinet meeting on 1
March 1963, he cautioned against a shouting match with de
Gaulle. Yet, the administration must now concern itself
with protecting America's own economic interests and
position. Kennedy felt mounting pressure to take forceful
action from many sectors, notably poultry and wool, and
complained that he could not "keep running around" aiding
them because he would lose his effectiveness as a leader.
In response to de Gaulle, Kennedy announced that "the day
of free traders around this administration was over" and
that the STR, State Department, and White House must "sort
1
3
out our priorities" at the Kennedy Round.
The major priority, however, was to avoid the
protectionism that Gailbraith suggested because Kennedy had
plugged free-trade not only as a solution to the deficit
but as a critical part of Western cooperation and strength.
The deficit had worsened in 1962 by $5 million, prompting
the President to bring in former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson to iron out a coherent monetary policy, propose an
interest equalization tax to cut down on foreign loans and
an investment tax credit to help industries modernize. He
also urged Americans to expand exports, arguing that the
deficit could be brought into balance if exporters could
increase their sales just 10%. White House aide Carl
Kaysen reminded the President that without an increase in
its trade surplus, the U.S. would have to reduce its
disproportionate share of military and economic
expenditures
.
''^ Thus, the fair-trade doctrine must be put
into practice to pry open overseas and American markets on
a reciprocal basis in such a way as not to injure domestic
producers or incite nationalists like de Gaulle to raise
barriers unilaterally in Europe.
Thus, diplomacy was central to U.S. policy at the
Kennedy Round. The talks, said the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations (STR) Christian Herter's negotiating
chief W. Michael Blumenthal, were a test of "cooperation"
and the "sum and substance of a strong and vital Atlantic
15
alliance." Failure at this largest and most ambitious
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Round in GATT's history, invited divisive trade practices,
encouraged nationalism and regionalism, and threatened the
alliance with destructive, 1930s-style protectionism. The
safeguard against such an outcome, explained Herter'
s
deputy William Roth, was "trade liberalization and
expansion which has contributed so greatly to the buoyant
economies of the postwar industrialized world and which
holds the greatest potential for rapid development of the
emerging nations". Building a vibrant and unified Western
bloc of nations was "what the Kennedy Round was all
about"
.
While the level of the common external tariff was still
"malleable" and Europe enjoyed high growth and employment
rates, the U.S. attacked protectionism in Europe. The
EEC's tariff reduced American exports, enabling inefficient
but politically powerful European producers to seize U.S.
markets in the region. If encouraged to keep their tariff
low, the Six would remain more open, permitting a sharing
of trade benefits by all nations on the basis of
comparative advantage and the fair-trade doctrine . "'"'^
Thus, the administration's initial policy was simple:
insist on halving tariffs in broad sectors (keeping
exceptions to this rule to a minimum) , include "fair
access" for agriculture as an integral part of the
discussions, and recognize that the elimination of NTBs
involved politically-sensitive decisions. The U.S.
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leverage to achieve these goals was its large market,
knowledge that the EEC nations depended on trade for their
economic health, and willingness to exchange needed
industrial tariff concessions for cuts in European
agricultural barriers.
But the EEC also had leverage. The Common Market bought
one-third of U.S. exports. American agriculture relied on
European markets, enjoying a five-to-one edge in trade in
food products. Since trade of manufactured goods among the
Six and and to the EFTA and America yielded more benefits
for the Common Market than farm exports across the
Atlantic, the EEC saw no benefit in reducing the CAP. In
addition, export expansion of industrial items promised
more gains than agriculture for Washington, as sales to the
EEC of manufactures had risen almost four times that of
farm goods. Yet the common external tariff was the
determining factor in the future level of industrial
exports. Also, Europe knew the importance of exports to
Kennedy, who had revealed his hand in selling the TEA as a
1
8
corrective for the payments deficit. Europe held many
cards, too.
Recognizing this fact, the State Department wanted
America to aim its sights lower for the Kennedy Round. The
U.S. was asking for more concessions than it could give the
Six, but the American trade surplus made the EEC less
unwilling to reciprocate equally. Thus, the request for
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50% cuts was a wish, not an expectation. Washington should
try for a maximum reduction of the EEC's tariff on items in
the 10-20% range, on which 60% of Europe's duties applied.
Herter and the State Deaprtment argued that the U.S. should
also be careful not to attack Common Market protectionism,
especially on agriculture, which de Gaulle might construe
as inimical to European integration . -"-^
Behind this more realistic position were trade patterns
which forewarned much resistance in Europe to American
free-trade goals. In 1962, the EEC's growth rate and
exports to non-members slowed. The Common Market suffered
an overall trade deficit of $1.9 billion in 1962, down from
the previous year but worsening by 1964. Much of the
deficit was attributable to its unfavorable balance with
America, as Europe's share of the U.S. market decreased 71%
while American exports shot up by 93% between 1958 and
1964. Though Washington insisted that the EEC was too
concerned with its deficit, the Common Market frequently
emphasized this disadvantage throughout the Kennedy
Round.
The way the Six coped with its deficit was to increase
their share of the EEC market, to the detriment of U.S.
exports. Of 177 items made on both sides of the Atlantic,
for instance, 97 American products suffered a decline in
market share and 12 showed no change from 1960 to 1962.
Some of reductions, as in cotton, were due to shifts in
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European purchases from other countries. But many, such as
transportation goods and electrical machinery, occurred
because of production increases in the EEC. America faced
increasingly adverse competitive conditions also in
cereals, fruits, coal, chemicals, and aluminum. in order
to compete, America could expand sales in all of the afore-
mentioned sectors, in which it still had a comparative
advantage, only if the Common Market cut its external
tariff by half.^-'-
But de Gaulle set out to hinder this aim. The State
Department reported that de Gaulle would not torpedo the
Round for fear of inciting a negative reaction from free-
trading West Germany and upsetting his carefully cultivated
scheme for a Paris-Bonn alliance. But most of the French
government sought only a limited success for the
negotiations in order to preserve the protectionist
building blocks of the EEC, prevent an incursion of U.S.
goods, adjust French industry to the eventual removal of
Common Market internal trade barriers, and enable France's
farmers to become the main supplier of food in exchange for
buying manufactures from the other five members. Paris
continued to stress the "political madness" of opening
Europe to a flood of U.S. products by slashing tariffs
further.
French policy placed the other five members in a
dilemma. Despite rallying against Gaullist obstructionism.
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they agreed that unless America negotiated "even where it
hurts", the Round would generate little enthusiasm on their
part for free-trade. The EEC Commission, influenced by
France, suggested separate talks on farm goods, in direct
opposition to U.S. policy. The smaller members of the
Community also felt vulnerable to the U.S. trading
monolith. Yet led by pro-American West Germany, and by
October 1963, its new free-trade Chancellor Ludwig Erhard,
these nations basically supported the Kennedy Round and
U.S. objectives. Though all hastened for protection for
certain industries, the smaller four looked to Bonn to
confront the French black sheep and promote trade
2 3liberalization
.
In effect, running underneath the Kennedy Round was a
current of Franco-German differences on EEC integration and
trade. Erhard, enraged at de Gaulle's veto of British
membership, believed the Common Market should accept the
EFTA nations as members. Above all, he was an Atlanticist,
who knew German industry relied on markets in America as
well as in Europe. Thus, as de Gaulle tried to distance
the Common Market from Washington, Erhard pressed for
closer Atlantic relations. America welcomed this policy
and hoped to enlist Erhard in the fight against Gaullist
24protectionism in the Kennedy Round.
The growing rift between Bonn and Paris centered on EEC
agricultural policy. France, in its quest to dominate
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Common Market food supplies, hoped to discourage the
production of cereals in the other five nations by
negotiating a common price of grain at a low level. Bonn
balked at low cereals prices, which would permit French
grain to undersell politically powerful German farmers, and
hoped to delay a decision on a unified grains price until
after the Federal elections in 1965.
The price issue, however, was entangled in the Kennedy
Round negotiations. De Gaulle, pressed by farmers at home,
could not accept high prices. Ironically, his American
trade nemesis backed this approach in order to increase
access for its grain in Europe. Meanwhile, West Germany
supported Washington's call for lower industrial tariffs,
which Paris did not. Once in office, Erhard pledged to
ensure personally that France would not sabotage the
Kennedy Round by confronting Gaullism at EEC policy-
formulation meetings. He did so through his
"synchronization" plan, in which West Germany would permit
the imposition of the CAP for beef, rice, and dairy
products in exchange for French cooperation at the Kennedy
Round on industrial tariffs. The proposal fell short of
the common grains price agreement, but because Bonn would
go no further, the issue soon stalled the GATT talks on
25farm trade.
Meanwhile, the other major industrial participants at
the Kennedy Round in general awaited U.S. -EEC discussions.
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The low-tariff, liberal EFTA, depended on the Common Market
as its primary market. The volume of trade between
Scandinavia and the Six alone exceeded the U.S.
-EEC total.
Thus, the Outer Seven were interested in the concessions
granted to American products which, in turn, would apply to
the EFTA on MFN basis.
Canada, the rest of the Commonwealth, and the LDCs
opposed the linear cut method because it would expose their
smaller secondary industries to unacceptable competition.
Canada, for instance, was predominantly agricultural and
doubted that a 50% tariff cut on industrial items would be
of much benefit. Ottawa preferred instead to grant
selective, product
-by-product tariff concessions of equal
value to the linear approach. The LDCs sought trade
preferences through separate negotiations under the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development for help.^^
Japan would profit from reduced duties, but eliminating
voluntary export restraints, such as textile quotas, were
of primary concern. Until VER' s were cut in America and
especially Europe, Tokyo refused to accept linear tariff
reductions for its highly protective duties. America was
receptive to this complaint since Japan was the country's
second largest export market. Yet Herter reminded the
Japanese mission in Geneva of their nation's own quotas and
severe restrictions on U.S. farm goods which, if not
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lowered, might hurt Tokyo's sizable exports to the United
States, which rose 70% from 1960 to 1964.^'^
Overall, the contracting parties watched the developing
American-Common Market problems. As early as December
1962, at a GATT working party session in preparation for
the rule-setting Ministerial meeting, the EEC backed away
from the simple linear tariff cut method on the grounds
that significant "disparities" existed between American and
European duties. On French insistence, the Six claimed
that a 50% reduction in the many U.S. tariffs with high
rates and the more medium-range EEC duties would not lead
to concessions of equal value. By March 1963, de Gaulle
had compelled the Commission to insist on a formula for
dealing with the disparity problem, making compensation by
America a top priority before bargaining could occur.
The disparity issue plagued the negotiations for over a
year, erupting into a battle between Herter and the Six.
The STR rebuffed French efforts to establish an automatic
rule for cutting the "peaks" off the high U.S. tariffs to
harmonize them with other nations. Such a rule would
result in unequal and inadequate reductions, which would
cause America to lower its duties more than the EEC, fall
short of the 50% tariff cut goal, and invite outcries at
home from import-competitors about giving away too much and
. . . . 29receiving too little in return.
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In fact, America's 895 tar-i -F-Fq a-i- -u v.0:70 T^arirrs at the high range of 30%
or more did were more numerous than the EEC's mere 45 at
this level. High tariffs encompassed 18% of the U.S. total
dutiable imports, while only 2% of the Six's imports. But
990, or 20% of U.S. imports were duty-free, while only 10%,
or 270 enjoyed free-list status in the EEC. And, more than
half of the latter' s tariffs provided middle-range
protection of 10-20% ad valorem, which the Commerce
Department believed most effectively restricted U.S.
industrial exports, while 30% of America's were grouped at
this level. A halving of tariffs, on the other hand, would
result in a reduction of $8.7 billion in American tariffs
and $12 billion in EEC duties, though both would net $3.8
billion in receipts. In short, though the U.S. indeed had
many higher tariffs, the differences between these and EEC
rates were minimal and not nearly enough to warrant a
gutting of the 50% linear cut method. All of the GATT
members, except the Common Market, agreed with Herter that
the disparities were merely a subsidiary issue. "^"^
At the Ministerial meeting in May 1963, the U.S. and EEC
compromised on disparities after Herter warned of a
breakdown at the talks over the matter, France backed down
on the formula for "de-peaking" U.S. tariffs while America
allowed for a departure from the equilinear cut when
justified by a "significant" disparity. Identifying these
cases occupied the GATT members during the ensuing year.
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But, the Ministers decided to proceed with tariff cuts
applied across-the-board with a bare minimum of exceptions,
though the rules were less precise than those sought by the
United States. Kennedy welcomed the "Geneva Compromise"
but recognized that there was still much work ahead before
bargaining brought down trade barriers in Europe.
The Ministers also discussed NTBs, of which all parties
were guilty. Herter naturally hoped to reduce or remove
the most onerous foreign barriers, such as Italian and
French taxes on U.S. cars. But he also offered to modify
his country's own escape clause, the Buy American
provision, and other NTBs
. The EEC, led by West German
chemical producers, insisted that the Six not negotiate
with America unless the prohibitive American Selling Price
(ASP) system was placed on the bargaining table. Japan,
West Germany, Benelux, and Austria also complained about
the Anti-Dumping Act imposed on American steel imports,
which the U.S. claimed were priced below the cost these
products sold abroad. GATT committees were asked to study
these NTBs and submit lists of the measures in need of
32discussion
.
For America, the most bothersome form of protection was
the EEC's common agricultural policy. Just as in industry,
all nations had farm barriers. Yet only 26% of U.S.
commodities benefited from quantitative restrictions, while
80% of Common Market, and even more of the EFTA' s crops,
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had such protection. Thus, it was no surprise that the
U.S. stress on placing agricultural barriers alongside
manufactures for the first time in postwar trade
negotiations, prompted rancorous discussions within the
Atlantic community. Agriculture tested the extent of trade
liberalism in Europe in the face of large, U.S. farm
exports, America's growing food trade surplus, and
Washington's reversal from protectionist farm policies of
the 1950s.
The prospects for increased access for U.S. agricultural
exports in Europe was dim, as they had been at the Dillon
Round. Farm employment was higher in the EEC than across
the Atlantic, which made farmers in Europe more influential
and markets more precious. American farm commodity exports
had soared in recent years, climbing 26% in 1960-1964 over
the previous five years. Feed grains, wheat, and oilseeds
were the top performers, comprising $650 million of the
$1.5 billion in agriculture the Common Market bought from
the United States. But while the variable levy curtailed
poultry and other products, the strongest U.S. export crops
suffered from the CAP's inflation of prices in the EEC,
which encouraged inefficient production and forced American
farmers into a role as residual suppliers. U.S. prices for
wheat, corn, and barley, for instance, were one-third lower
34than in France. An adjustment of the CAP would help U.S.
farmers
.
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The Department of Agriculture led the attack on the CAP.
Delighted that farmers were now full partners in GATT,
Secretary Freeman declared that without an access
agreement satisfactory to U.S. farmers and Congress, the
Kennedy Round would not be concluded. He reminded the
President that "all agriculture is watching carefully" for
Kennedy actions against restrictions in Europe. For home
consumption, Kennedy and Herter backed up the USDA by
stressing that farm trade exports sold according to the
principle of comparative advantage helped the payments
balance. The President pledged "to take every step to
protect the full rights due American agricultural
exporters", and that "a fair agreement [was] an essential
first part" of the trade talks.
Freeman used this support to criticize the CAP, which
had gone into effect on 30 July 1962 for feed grains, rice,
poultry, and wheat. The EEC, he said, could now modify the
Dillon Round "Standstill Agreements" by breaking tariff
bindings and raising import barriers. Touring Europe,
Freeman found a "very disturbing" trend emerging in the
EEC, in which each country had staked out its market in
particular commodities - France in wheat, Italy in rice,
Holland in dairy products . French Agricultural Minister
Edgar Pisani informed him that French farmers needed years
to develop and expand their production, sheltered from
outside competition. EEC Vice-President for Agriculture
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Sicco Mansholt warned that without U.S. pressure, the
Common Market's grains prices would climb to the high
German level, boost EEC production, and hurt American
exports
.
"^^
Freeman responded that America was willing to modify its
protectionist policies in agriculture, but upon returning
to Washington, he devoted his efforts at the White House
for action against the CAP. He, and the President,
realized the United States had a weak bargaining position
on farm goods, since it sold one-third of its crops to the
EEC while purchasing only 10% of Europe's produce. But
pressure was mounting from the farm bloc to end foreign
restrictions, and Kennedy had based his campaign for the
TEA with this aim in mind. Though acceptance by the Six
for the principle of comparative advantage was an "ideal".
Freeman declared that Herter must insist on minimum
guarantees to insure a "fair sharing of markets" abroad,
said Freeman. If not granted, the U.S. should "let the
people in Western Europe and their governments know what we
really meant about agriculture" as America clearly showed
m retaliating in the chicken war in August 1963.
The STR, State Department, and the White House agreed
with the USDA on gaining access assurances, though less
vehemently. Chief negotiator Blumenthal reminded Americans
that productivity rises and static wheat consumption in
Europe were not new but antedated the CAP. Therefore, the
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U.S. should keep prices low through world commodity
agreements and sell feed grains, meat, tobacco, and fruit
in which it was most efficient and in which EEC consumption
and imports were growing. Above all, he said, farmers
should not expect to "sweep away the elaborate structure of
agricultural protectionism" but seek a progressive
enlargement of access in the EEC."^^
In fair-trade fashion, the STR recognized that Europe
had compelling reasons to confront Freeman. The CAP was a
structural support of European integration, and EEC farm
organization, financing, and pricing policy was still under
debate. Farmers in the region pointed out that the
technological revolution made possible by American
financial generosity after the war had taken hold in
Europe, reducing farm employment but raising output and
creating surpluses. Anyway, America was guilty of its own
protectionism, restricting certain dairy products, wheat,
cotton, and peanut products. Thus, instead of knocking
down barriers, implied the EEC, all nations should agree on
3 9
a level of price supports for their farmers.
Pushed by France, EEC minister Mansholt suggested this
hotly contested "margin of support" plan in February 1964.
Assuming that protectionism and price controls in all
countries precluded the possibility that world agricultural
prices would ever reflect free-market prices, the EEC aimed
to raise world prices to a level in which nations
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maintained production without subsidies. The plan, in
short, set minimum import prices and left each nation free
to set its own level of protection. in practice, once the
EEC agreed on a unified grain price, the Six would bind the
high levels of domestic support for three years. The
Common Market viewed the "Mansholt Plan" as a valid
concession at the Kennedy Round, agreeing to limit domestic
farm support through international trade agreements if
others did likewise . '^'^
The proposal drew criticism from West Germany. Bonn
resisted lowering grains prices, especially because its
farmers received sizable subsidies which would be cut under
the Mansholt Plan. Conceding to unify cereals prices
within a year. West Germany refused to change its domestic
support levels, provoking France to consider a rigid
position on the tariff disparity issue in return. Bonn
eventually gave in to the Mansholt Plan.
The United States issued the major opposition to the
margin of support, formulated purely in the interests of
the EEC without regard to outside producers. The proposal
universalized the hated CAP variable levy system, set
prices at levels which were too high for exporters, and
would not reduce import barriers and expand access for U.S.
agriculture. The Mansholt Plan disregarded existing GATT
rules and concessions by fixing new, three-year bindings,
and in no way addressed the problem of limiting production
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of commodities in chronic surplus. The plan was the
fundamental source of disagreement between the U.S. and EEC
in farm trade. Yet the Chicken War, which by the summer of
1963 had erupted into a major clash between the U.S. and
the EEC, and disagreement on agricultural rules, also
revealed the widening gap between the allies.
The rift irked farmers at home and, as during the TEA
battle, brought pressure on the administration. Farm-state
legislators were irate about the drive in the EEC for self-
sufficiency in food production. They now believed Kennedy
had been too naive in advocating export expansion or had
craftily inflated domestic farm hopes in order to sell the
TEA, and warned him either to persuade Europe to open up or
expect Congress to retaliate. Farmers already had rejected
his supply management farm program in a wheat referendum in
the Spring 1963. The vote added to U.S. trade problems,
permitting overproduction and thus creating larger
surpluses which required outlets abroad. '^"^
There was also disgrunt lement in industry. As required
by the TEA, the President submitted to the Tariff
Commission the items America wished to table for tariff
cuts at the GATT talks. Kennedy hoped to minimize the
number of products withheld from this list in order to show
his intention of promoting free-trade, though certain
"exceptions" were mandatory under law, such as oil under
the national security clause, and carpets, glass, and seven
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other manufactures under the escape clause. in October
1963, Kennedy submitted 6000 products for tariff cuts, the
largest negotiating list in history. Approximately 87% of
U.S. dutiable imports were included; by comparison, only
25% had been sent to the Dillon Round by Eisenhower
.
The domestic input began at this point. The Tariff
Commission held hearings starting in late 1963, in which
manufacturers presented cases against the inclusion of
their products on the negotiating list, and Herter chaired
a forum for exporters that identified foreign protectionist
barriers. Also, pursuant to the TEA, the President
appointed 35 advisors from industry, agriculture, and labor
to aid the STR in formulating a negotiating plan in each
sector. He also selected Congressmen Cecil King (D-LA) and
Thomas Curtis (R-MO) and Senators Herman Talmadge (D-GA)
and John Williams (R-DE) to accompany the U.S. delegation
to Geneva as overseers for Congress. '^^ Herter would be
closely watched by legislators and producers.
The private sector grumbled about post-TEA trade policy.
When the Tariff Commission rejected three petitions for
adjustment assistance, the AFL-CIO denounced the
Commission's technical interpretation of the law and
threatened to withdraw its backing of the Kennedy Round.
The lumber bloc, now 108 strong, urged limits on Canadian
softwood imports
. New England and Southern legislators
increased pressure for an cotton textile Arrangement -type
agreement on woolen textiles from Britain, Italy, and
Japan, but England refused. Kennedy closed some loopholes
in the wool import laws and considered reserving woolens
from the Kennedy Round offer list. Yet other industries
pointed to the LTA as an example of what could be done with
"sufficient will" by the administration. The President
continued to step delicately, reiterating that fair-trade
required letting in imports to expand exports.
Yet the difficulties with the EEC were a call-to-arms
for enemies and allies of free-trade. The ambiguous
conclusion of the May Ministerial meeting, which had
resulted in rules favoring the Common Market on disparities
but no progress on agriculture, angered domestic observers.
Protectionist John Dent joined free-trader Javits in
calling the meeting a failure for U.S. trade objectives.
Other legislators vowed to block a removal of critical
NTBs, particularly the highly-prized ASP, as long as Europe
strangled American exports such as poultry. Congressional
advisor Curtis, struggling against Herter to sit in on
policy planning meetings in Geneva, reminded Kennedy that
the TEA granted no power to deal with NTBs.'^'^
Even close friend Wilbur Mills joined the dissenters.
He made unusually strong statements about the Kennedy
Round, warning that Congress "would legislate toughness" if
Herter was not firm with Europe. Mills had blocked several
protectionist bills on Capitol Hill, but a "soft position"
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would warrant consideration of them. m no uncertain
terms, he declared in May 1963 that "there would be hell to
pay" if the Kennedy Round "resulted in an unequal
48agreement"
.
Kennedy listened, both as a fair-trader who was
discouraged by EEC protectionism but also as a politician
for whom the 1964 election loomed. Herter' s staff played
down the election because it made Kennedy appear more
vulnerable to domestic pressure, perhaps instilling a
cautious, less liberal approach in other GATT members. The
timing of the Tariff Commission hearings in late 1963 and
the scheduled official opening of the Kennedy Round for May
1964, placed U.S. protectionists in a politically favorable
position. If forced to give in to them, Kennedy risked
upsetting the negotiations named in his honor, in which he
had made the target of his biggest legislative achievement
in 1962."^^
When Kennedy counted votes, he noted that a victory in
1964 was not a certainty. The race issue had hurt him in
the South, where he had carried 7 out of 11 states in 1960.
If he lost some of these 7 states (and polls showed him
losing Alabama and North Carolina) , he would not be re-
elected assuming the other results remained the same.
Furthermore, he had won 4 Midwestern farm states in 1960 -
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Missouri. But if he
lost the former and any two of the others, his opponent
399
would assume the presidency. He had won Illinois only with
help from Chicago Mayor Daley and Minnesota riding on
Senator Hubert Humphrey's (D-Minn.) coattails
. in 11
states, his margin of victory was less than 51%, and even
worse, the Kennedy states would have 10 fewer electoral
votes in 1964.^'^
How much trade policy affected votes is hard to assess.
But the election was surely a consideration as he examined
the status of the GATT talks. Kennedy hoped to win the
industrial regions again, where his strength lay, and he
needed farm state support, where he was weak. Thus,
Kennedy publicly backed agricultural export expansion in
part for political reasons. In private, he told Freeman
that he understood the need for access but that the
prospects were not good because of EEC protectionism. The
President also complained that he bent over backwards to
help farmers with special programs and export incentives,
but "then they vote Republican" anyway. Perhaps, lamented
the President just before leaving for Dallas in mid-
November 1963, he had oversold the Kennedy Round. His
failing attempt to retain U.S. farm markets in Europe,
writes William Borden, was perhaps the most disappointing
(and perhaps politically dangerous) aspect of his foreign
51economic policy.
Yet Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, launched
into a further public relations campaign for the
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negotiations. In his first address to Congress, for
instance, the Texan "rededicated" the U.S. to trade
expansion. Like Kennedy, the new President was a vigorous
adherent to liberal trade as a safeguard against economic
depression, a key to friendly allied relations, and a
unifying force against communism. But Johnson, also a
fair-trader, arrived at his trade principles by a different
route than Kennedy. In addition, his record of defending
local economic interests against instead of by
protectionism permitted him to step easily into the role of
promoting the Kennedy Round.
While Kennedy observed the Depression from the comfort
of Hyannisport, Johnson had grown up in an area marked by
rural poverty, though he did later live in a small town as
a member of the lower middle class. In any event, this
upbringing, and a close attachment to his mentor. House
Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX)
, instilled in him a populist
bent. Ignored by Washington in the 1920s and early 1930s,
farmers plunged into ruin as crop prices fell and farm
foreclosures were rampant. Meanwhile, rich Eastern
manufacturing and banking interests prospered behind high
tariff walls. This situation, which greeted Johnson when
he came to the Capitol in 1931, angered Rayburn. The
Speaker hated the Eastern Establishment and especially the
protective tariff, which he called the "robber tariff, the
52most indefensible system the world has ever known"
.
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Rayburn greatly influenced Johnson. m 1948, Johnson
denounced the tariff, labeling it a subsidy for Northerners
while declining world commodity prices undercut farm
income. Texas was reliant on exports, he said, but for
nearly a century the restrictive Republican tariff had
caused foreigners to choke off the state's overseas sales,
to the detriment of farmers. The congressman, therefore,
vigorously supported the Reciprocal Trade Act as a means to
help his rural constituents. The RTA was "not pleasing to
rich northern and eastern industrialists. They want to
bring back the high tariffs which keep the South in a state
of economic dependency. Lyndon Johnson is on record for
extending" the RTA. He did throughout his political
53
career
.
A confirmed free-trader for populist reasons, therefore,
Johnson soon promoted liberalism for national and foreign
policy interests. Protectionism alienated America'
s
allies, he argued in the early 1950s, and resulted in
"international depression". Though oil imports might hurt
Texas independents, in general the American economy would
improve by keeping trade barriers at a minimum. As the
Senate Democratic leader, he urged Eisenhower to resist
protectionism during the RTA renewals, and opposed Senator
Robert Kerr's amendment in 19 60 aimed at preventing further
tariff cuts at the Dillon Round.
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Of course, Johnson realized that some import-competitors
needed protection, and advocated prudence in granting
tariff concessions at negotiations. He once reportedly
joked that a free-trader should never reveal his true
identity because there were no votes in it. Thus, while
applauding passage of the RTA in 1951, he warned against
rushing headlong into cutting tariffs while other nations
raised their barriers.
Above all, oil imports demanded his attention, since he
garnered financial support from Texas independent
producers. He believed that the petroleum industry was a
"keystone" to national security and must not be jeopardized
by "reckless neglect". But he was not a tough
protectionist like Kerr. Johnson backed the Voluntary and
Mandatory Oil Quota programs, but rejected the Neely
amendment for oil quotas in favor of the national security
provision. In effect, strict controls on imports might
provoke easterners to try to eliminate the depletion
allowance tax break, impose price controls, and permit
Federal rationing of crude oil. He much preferred a middle
course that prevented the national security clause from
becoming a "toothless tiger" but preserved free-trade on a
"fair and equitable basis".
Johnson's stress on oil protection and farm export
expansion were basically parochial concerns and earned him
a reputation as less of a free-trader than the other
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presidential contenders in I960. Business Week even
claimed that Johnson's conservatism was a major reason why
protectionism had mounted on Capitol Hill. m reality,
though, he was merely more forthright than the others on
trade, an ardent free-trader but clearly worried about
"unfair competition" from abroad. Myer Feldman
distinguished between Kennedy and Johnson in stating that
the former initially promoted liberal trade and then
approached each industry to accomplish this aim while the
latter started with each producer and tried to arrive at a
general free-trade posture. Regardless of tactics, what
is important is that the two ended up as fair-traders,
seeking to aid vulnerable producers in order to achieve the
overall goal of export expansion.
Johnson also linked exports to the payments deficit.
His efforts at boosting exports, discouraging the outflow
of dollars, and tying aid to purchases of American goods
helped reduce the deficit slightly and completely halt the
gold drain in 1964. In December 1963, he established an
Interagency Committee on Export Expansion to boost overseas
sales. Partly as a result, the trade surplus hit its peak
of the decade, at $6.7 billion, and the highest level since
5 81948. But the deficit warranted a concern for selling
more abroad.
In order to increase exports, Johnson opposed import
restrictions to avoid provoking retaliation overseas.
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Thus, one of his earliest actions as president was to veto
the protectionist lumber origin labeling act. He also
refused to limit woolen imports, despite pressure from
large delegations of legislators, agreeing with GATT's Eric
Wyndham White that quotas would contradict U.S. policy at
the Kennedy Round.
He demonstrated his commitment to free-trade during the
first trade crisis of his administration. Beef imports,
primarily from Australia and New Zealand, jumped 106% from
1961 to 1963 and undercut domestic meat prices. The Common
Market levies on beef had reduced these nations' exports in
Europe. Though overproduction affected prices, cattlemen
and dairy farmers sought quotas on imports as a means to
boost prices. The Senate narrowly defeated a quota bill
sponsored by Senator Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb
.
) in March
1964, but the Finance Committee began hearings on the
problem and one-quarter of the Senate proposed various
restrictive amendments. Senator Mike Mansfield introduced
the Meat Import Law, setting targets above which imports
6 ncould not climb without triggering quotas.
Johnson was receptive but would not go as far as
establishing permanent quotas by law. The beef problem was
familiar to him; his constituents had begun writing him in
195 9 about rising imports. He also hoped to woo cattlemen,
who were traditionally Republican, to his side in the 1964
election. Thus, the President initiated promotional
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schemes, ordered government agencies to buy more beef, and
told Freeman to investigate expanding exports to the LDCs
through PL 480 shipments in order to boost consumption at
home and abroad.
He also instructed Herter to negotiate voluntary export
agreements, under which Australia and New Zealand promised
to lower their exports by 29% and 22% respectively. These
cuts were more than those projected under the Mansfield
Meat Act, which passed Congress. By Fall 1964, the
administration had rolled back imports to pre-1962 levels
with little complaint from Australia and New Zealand. They
turned back to European markets for their beef sales.
The administration also considered the views of import-
competitors at the Trade Commission hearings prior to the
Kennedy Round. The Commission heard testimony from
hundreds of industries concerned with the extensive public
list of items available for duty reductions and which
sought protection from the effects of the 50% linear tariff
cuts. Herter cautioned that the hearings would usher in
mounting pressure from producers to place products on the
exceptions list, which prompted Johnson to issue a
memorandum that forbade government officials from promising
certain industries this sort of protection.
But protectionist pressure increased from Congress. A
total of 75 congressmen from 38 states spent two hours in
late April 19 64, just days before the Kennedy Round
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officially opened, discussing the need for import
restraints. The STR office feared an uprising against the
GATT conference and The Economist stated that 1964 would be
known as the "year of retraction" in trade because of the
plethora of restrictive amendments pending on Capitol Hill.
These included the Meat Act, Buy American clauses attached
to the Urban Mass Transportation law and to the Food Stamps
Act, and lobbying for quotas on shoes, wool, lead and zinc,
steel containers, and electron microscopes, the effort for
the latter two successful. The Tariff Commission also
imposed anti-dumping duties on Canadian steel. In
response, Johnson repeated his pledge for fair-trade,
believing barriers abroad to be a greater problem than
. 54domestic pressure.
Johnson expected gains for exporters at the Kennedy
Round. Optimistic about the talks, he nevertheless
realized the need for patience, persistence, and firmness
with Europe. Johnson supported the Atlantic partnership as
a basis for trade relations and as a means to avoid a wave
of anti-Americanism in Europe and protectionism at home.
But he reiterated America'' s determination to achieve
reciprocity in the industrial sector and fair access for
agriculture. And, adhering to fair-trade principles,
Johnson explained that the negotiations were "not the kind
65in which some nations need lose because others gain"
.
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By early 1964, however, the Kennedy Round seemed no
longer a grand attempt at Western economic cooperation but
a hard-fought business deal. Galbraith criticized Herter
for not recognizing how tough the bargaining would be with
the EEC once the negotiations began on 4 May 1964. But the
STR realized that American objectives might be
unattainable, and thus expected a more modest achievements.
Even German Chancellor Erhard, who sided with the U.S.
trade liberalization effort, believed Washington
exaggerated the chances of the Common Market willingly
cutting its tariffs in light of its trade deficit with
66America.
The Six, for instance, persisted on the tariff disparity
issue. The other nations played down disparities and
emphasized the linear cut method. But the EEC presented a
formula that actually expanded the cases in which America
would cut its duties more substantially than the EEC and
which drastically scaled down the 50% reduction rule. The
Common Market finally backed down at the opening meeting of
the Kennedy Round, though the U.S. leaned toward
conditionally accepting the proposal out of recognition
that the prestige of the EEC Commission was a stake. Both
sides agreed to wait until exceptions lists were "tabled",
or presented, in September before discussing disparities,
and accepted the 50% linear rule as a "working hypothesis".
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Yet the disparity problem was partly responsible for the
pessimistic spirit of the Round. ^"^
Franco-German tension also hurt the negotiations. The
two countries' friendship treaty had fallen flat in the
Bundestag, with West Germany reaffirming an attachment to
the U.S. and criticizing Gaullist ambitions in Europe.
American Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen reported a
less obstructionist de Gaulle had still sought a cautious
approach from Bonn on tariff cuts and pointed to America's
trade surplus with Europe as a reason for harmonizing
tariff disparities. Above all, the general insisted on a
common grains price as a prerequisite to French
participation on agricultural talks at the Kennedy Round.
Erhard countered de Gaulle on these points, but he agreed
in talks with Ball that the EEC seemed to be drifting
apart, a development that would present a real crisis at
the GATT negotiations.^^
After threatening to walk out of the EEC in December
1963 if West Germany did not agree to a low, unified
cereals price, France made clear that its membership in the
Common Market was predicated on the notion that the other
five nations would import French farm goods and subsidize
its exports through an EEC agricultural fund. But the
Bundestag opposed the low prices, out of concern for
removing protection before the Federal elections, and
opposed financing an inordinate share of the fund.
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Throughout 1964, therefore, agriculture was at a
stalemate: Bonn dragged its feet on market organization
while France would not budge on negotiating farm barriers
at the Kennedy Round until West Germany accepted the
unified prices. Without the future levels of protection
set within the EEC, said Mansholt, the Six could not yet
bargain with outsiders. Despite Commission requests for
immediate discussion on grains prices, the matter prevented
the Common Market from tabling exceptions in agriculture
along with industrial goods as the GATT members planned in
September 1964."^°
But even if the grains issue had been settled, the EEC
was unwilling to lower the CAP for non-members. Since 20%
of EEC voters were farmers, there was considerable
resistance to reducing the variable levies. The Common
Market's largest farm lobby, the Committee of Preferential
Agricultural Organization, even pronounced that the subject
of lessening farm protection was off-limits at the Kennedy
Round. French Ambassador to the United States Herve
Alphand told an American audience that though low grains
prices would benefit U.S. producers, a guarantee of
proportional access for Farm-belt exports was not
71possible
.
Such was the bad news for U.S. farmers, but Johnson,
like Kennedy, continued to sell the trade negotiations on
expanded exports. In 1964, more acreage and farm
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employment was attributable to exports than ever before,
which could rise even higher with the removal of EEC
restrictions. On the campaign trail, the President
proclaimed that U.S. agricultural exports had broken all
records by rising $1 billion in 1964, or 20%, a 35% gain
since 1960. It was no surprise that farmers expected a
tough stance against European trade barriers.
Many in the American farm bloc claimed Herter was
selling them out by not insisting the establishment of
rules for agriculture as he had for industry. This belief
prompted several resolutions which opposed commodity
agreements as substitutes for reciprocal trade in farm
goods and attacked French restrictions of U.S. fruit. A
related bill even called for the termination of the TEA two
years before its expiration date of 30 June 1967 in order
to evaluate the Kennedy Round, which some legislators were
now calling an "unforgivable economic stupidity" . "^"^
Except for Freeman, America had softened its policy on
EEC access guarantees but had not deviated from the
fundamental position of including farm with industrial
products at the talks. The USDA wanted global market-
sharing and liberalization; if refused by the EEC, America
should withdraw from the Kennedy Round. Prompted by
Herter, President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk
discouraged Freeman's view. Herter thought such an
approach fatalistic, placing the U.S. in the uncomfortable
role of attacking European integration or hinting of a
trade war. He offered a "flexible, pragmatic" plan, in
place of the EEC's margin of support proposal, to negotiate
tariff cuts on fixed duty items and access on grains and
variable levy items by any method, including world
commodity agreements
.
Herter also eased the pressure on Erhard to agree on the
EEC cereals price. Though offering to cushion the
Chancellor from domestic German farm recriminations by
announcing that low grain levels were demanded by the
United States, Herter was willing to proceed with
agricultural negotiations without a common cereals price if
Europe agreed. Most important, with Johnson's approval in
October 1964, he decided to table the industrial exceptions
list without its companion farm list. This move was
contrary to American policy all along of linking the two
75
sectors.
His decision reflected the deadlocked EEC talks on
grains which prevented the Six from negotiating with the
United States
.
But he also worried that the Kennedy Round
would lose momentum if farm problems delayed meaningful
bargaining on manufactured goods. In addition, Herter
realized that the Common Market might use a postponement to
put off decisions on its internal farm organization. By
going ahead without agriculture, Washington could shift the
I
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burden of responsibility for continuing the GATT talks onto
the EEC, and especially France. "^^
Herter's recominendation naturally irked France. By
dropping its insistence on proceeding with the Kennedy
Round only if farm goods were considered next to industrial
items, the U.S. removed pressure from West Germany to
unify cereals prices. More adamant than ever, de Gaulle
again threatened to walk out of the EEC in December 1964 if
there was no agreement on grains. Erhard finally
acquiesced, and in a major step toward integration, the
Common Market decided on unified prices beginning with the
1967 crop. Yet the issue of funding agricultural subsidies
still posed a large problem. Agriculture, asserted The
Economist, seemed "more than ever like the sick man of
Europe"
.
'^^
U.S. farm interests also reacted against Herter's
retreat. Freeman believed the policy might force France to
accept higher grain price levels than desired by America.
Eventually, Freeman backed Herter's decision and scrambled
to assure farmers that the basic policy of negotiating on
agriculture had not changed. Farmers expressed outrage,
especially the anti-Johnson American Farm Bureau, which
pledged to block the President's farm legislation. This
dissension, along with a protectionist attack on the
administration's free-trade policy from Republican vice-
presidential candidate William E. Miller just weeks before
the election might have worried Johnson. But he won the
rural and industrial vote handily. Nevertheless, the
agricultural stand-off dampened hopes for a successful
7 ftKennedy Round.
The more promising negotiations in the industrial sector
were also somewhat shaky by the end of 1964, as each nation
presented its list of "exceptions" from the 50% linear
cuts. Britain, Japan, Finland, the EEC, and America tabled
exceptions. EFTA members Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
and Switzerland did not reserve any products, but retained
the right to reduce their offers if they did not receive
reciprocity. Commonwealth countries pleaded that their
basically agricultural economies precluded them from
subjecting their vulnerable industries to trade
competition. Canada, with similar problems, drew up a list
of an equivalent value of goods in place of the linear
method.
The lists from nations which did table exceptions
portended of future disputes, especially between the
contracting parties and the Common Market. As an
expression of disgruntlement over the "voluntary" export
restraints imposed by other nations, Japan reserved the
most goods , about one-quarter of its dutiable imports , from
the negotiations. Britain's list covered 10% of its
tariffs, including plastics and coal imports from America.
I
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After the public hearings on the U.S. list ended in the
Spring of 1964, the inter-departmental Trade Expansion Act
Advisory Committee eliminated even more items from the
exceptions list during October in order to demonstrate an
intention to lower trade barriers. The U.S. then exempted
18% of its dutiable imports, tabling cotton textiles,
machine tools, optical instruments, watches, and other
items falling under the escape clause. Oil, comprising 8%
of the list, was not significant to the Round since
Venezuela was not a member of GATT
. And, since Canadian
petroleum enjoyed an exempt status from quotas, America
considered the inclusion of oil on the list unrelated to
the upcoming debate on reciprocity."^^
The EEC's list stirred up controversy, though in defense
of Europe, the process of creating the list was complex.
Each of the Six reserved several items from the GATT talks,
while the Commission proposed a modest list. France's
exceptions were the most numerous of the six nations.
After a marathon Council of Minister's session, a
compromise provided a list of exceptions shorter than those
of the individual countries but longer than the
Commission's. Covering 10% of the EEC's dutiable imports,
however, the final product bothered the other GATT
80parties
.
Though comprising the same percentage of U.S. imports
(excluding oil) , the list was much more encompassing and
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restrictive than those of the other nations. For instance,
the EEC essentially eliminated 80% of Norway's exports from
tariff cuts. Also, the list was complex, divided into
three categories
.
There was a section for full exceptions, including
machinery and commercial vehicles (detrimental to U.S.
interests) and a variety of other items. Partial
exceptions, in which the EEC would offer less than 50%
cuts, contained aluminum and magnesium. Finally,
conditional exceptions would be removed on chemicals if
America eliminated the ASP; on autos, when Britain took
them off its list, on watches as soon as Switzerland
stopped banning the exports of watch-making equipment; and
on cotton textiles, if all nations put them up for
bargaining. The EEC argued that the latter two categories
would ensure reciprocity, but congressional advisor Thomas
Curtis later wrote that the tactic was another indication
of Common Market impediments to the Kennedy Round. ^"^
The EEC and the other nations would have to justify
their industrial exceptions during the next stage of the
negotiations, and the prospects for further conflict
between America and Europe were likely. Over the past two
years, de Gaulle had exposed the differences between the
two trade partners. In the larger political and diplomatic
realm, de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the Common
Market signaled a dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to link
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the Atlantic community together on a more intimate military
and economic basis. Most Europeans did not share de
Gaulle's opinion that America plotted to preserve its
domination in Europe by using Britain and the idea of a
partnership to bend the Six in favor of U.S. policies.
They viewed the veto as a flagrant abuse of his power
within the Common Market. Without a doubt, however, de
Gaulle stymied the Grand Design, considerably weakened the
effects of the TEA, and in many respects, put his partners
in the EEC and the U.S. on notice that the Kennedy Round
would be a difficult affair. And with the veto, Kennedy's
death, and Johnson's subsequent Vietnam-first policy, the
Atlantic community, as historian Frank Costigliola points
out, was "gone in a flash. "^^
De Gaulle was able to control EEC policy; the ten months
of bitter and wasteful debate between America and the Six
over the French-induced tariff disparity issue attested to
his power. But he also found himself confronted by Bonn
just when he had achieved one of his long-standing goals -
placing the mini-alliance of France and West Germany at the
helm of the EEC. Erhard's support of trade liberalization
in industry and protection of inefficient West German
farmers contradicted French objectives. Thus, de Gaulle
was mired in a two-front war against German aims within the
Common Market and U.S. free-trade designs externally.
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By the end of 1964, he appeared to be winning on both
fronts. Erhard had acquiesced to unified grains prices,
while the Cominon Market had submitted a list of exceptions
that prohibited tariff cuts on a large number of items, he
held the bogey of tariff disparities over America's head,
and made clear to U.S. farmers that the CAP was permanent
and directed at European self-sufficiency in food
production. By no means was the French input uncontested
among the Six, but the EEC Commission's policy closely
resembled or was heavily influenced by Paris.
The impact of Gaullism on Atlantic trade relations and
the Kennedy Round was largely negative. Hegemony scholars
point to America's trade surplus with the EEC and growth in
agricultural exports to Western Europe as a justification
for the de Gaulle's (and EEC) resistance to U.S. free-trade
policies. The argument is compelling, for the EEC overall
trade deficit with America rose to a record high of -2.3
billion in 1963 and improved only slightly in 1964.^^ The
deficit, joined by strong domestic pressure on EEC members
to reserve markets for European producers gave the
Commission every right to request rules and table
exceptions that were in the Common Market's best interest.
But the U.S. was bargaining for the future, cognizant of
the implications on America' s prospective export
performance of the CAP and French resistance to lowering
the common external tariff. Chicken exports amounted to
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only 3-4% of total U.S. farm exports to the EEC, but the
implementation of the CAP would mean a loss of sales to the
region. The share of U.S. manufactured exports in the
Common Market would drop as European industries became more
efficient and productive. In sum, the effect of EEC
integration and the resolution of European domestic
economic problems would shift to outsiders. France might
succeed in convincing the other five members that the EEC
was for the benefit of members at the expense of outsiders.
The Six then could subordinate their commitment to
commercial liberalization under the Rome Treaty to
protectionism be setting restrictive rules at the Kennedy
Round.
Also, the hegemony argument does not take into
consideration the tremendous drain of NATO expenditures on
the U.S. treasury for the defense of Europe, which were
several times those supplied by the EEC. Of course,
America received benefits from extending its power
throughout the world, but the payments deficit subjected
its overseas commitments to the threat of cutbacks and and
undermined domestic social programs . Without a large trade
surplus, poorer nations dependent on U.S. aid would suffer
and Europe's defenses would decline. Support existed in
America for the withdrawals of troops and other aid, but
few Europeans, not even de Gaulle, desired such an
approach
.
Thus, a fair-trade policy of export expansion for all
GATT parties seemed the wisest course. Washington was
willing to accept an exchange of more manufactured imports
from Europe for access to agricultural markets in the
Common Market. With the submission of a slim U.S.
exceptions list and the determination to trade according to
comparative advantage, the gains from concessions granted
in the Kennedy Round would be equal on both sides of the
Atlantic
.
Just as policy and trade factors support the comparative
advantage school's case, so too does the disgruntlement of
U.S. producers and legislators. The fair-trade doctrine
was not working satisfactorily according to many Americans.
Farmers criticized EEC protectionism and were extremely
disappointed at Johnson's decision not to compel a tabling
of agricultural offers alongside industrial exceptions.
Manufacturers chafed at both sides' lists, believing the
Common Market was unduly restrictive and the U.S. not
protective enough. Congress' barrage of protectionist
bills to prevent a flood of European imports, while the
administration just as vigorously fought these and EEC
efforts to discourage free-trade, provides clear evidence
that the administration faced problems in promoting fair-
trade
.
Common Market policy in the preparatory stage dispelled
the idea that a hegemonic America dictated trade policy.
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When the TEA called for 50% equilinear tariff cuts, the EEC
created a major conflict out of a relatively subsidiary
issue by harping on tariff disparities. When Freeman
pressed for access guarantees in agriculture, he was flatly
denied by EEC official and private farm interests. Europe
also managed to postpone the agricultural exception lists
and in general, called the shots at the Kennedy Round
because of its unfinished farm organization.
Also, when Herter minimized U.S. industrial exceptions,
the Six devised a novel, three-category list that penalized
its trade partners. The U.S. had an edge in bilateral
trade with the Common Market, but the latter was trying
hard to begin a reversal of this pattern by adjusting the
negotiating rules in its favor. Thus, it is difficult to
discern American hegemonic behavior in the early stages of
the GATT talks. On the contrary, Washington seemed
victimized by French-dominated EEC policy.
The setbacks took their toll on the Johnson
administration's faith in the Kennedy Round. The President
remained "prudently confident of fruitful results", though
this statement was a far cry from the bounding optimism
after the TEA passage two years before. The STR office
cautioned that France could kill the Round by vetoing EEC
policy and German reluctance to accommodate Paris on Common
Market farm issues weakened Bonn's advocacy of free-trade.
There was also growing support within the Commission for
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slower progress in the negotiations in order to consolidate
EEC institutions. Herter predicted average tariff
reductions of 30-35% instead of the original 50% authorized
by the TEA.^^
By late 1964, gloom pervaded the Kennedy Round. The
submittal of exceptions lists brightened the prospects for
the negotiations, claimed The Wall Street Journal , but the
talks would be prolonged at least one and one-half years by
disputes. Business Week placed no bet that the conference
would even reach a final agreement. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk also did not elevate hopes in remarking that "the
Kennedy Round, like all great enterprises that are
underway, could come to nothing. "^^ Such was the dispirited
atmosphere in Geneva as the contracting parties prepared to
justify their exceptions.
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CHAPTER 7
THE AMERICAN RETREAT, 1965-1968
Negotiations over specific tariff levels at the Kennedy
Round began in December 1964 when the participants sought
to justify industrial exceptions and confront the offers
tabled by others. This bargaining phase culminated two and
one-half years later after delays, confusion, and acrimony
among the participants. As the talks dragged out into 1966
and 1967, the differences between United States and Common
Market trade policies were magnified. As a result, the
negotiations became a business deal, neglecting both the
grander political implications and often the principle of
comparative advantage.
As in the two preceding years, the EEC and America
shaped discussion, and internal constraints factored
heavily into their negotiating positions. The trend toward
greater European domination in Geneva continued in the
bargaining phase. The U.S. pressed its policy,
particularly in the agricultural sector, but found itself
stymied either by the EEC's internal problems or by its
external trade policies. How successfully America attained
its objectives at the Kennedy Round in spite of Common
Market negotiating barriers drives to the heart of the
debate over U.S. trade policy.
In short, this debate centers on U.S. benefits garnered
from the GATT talks. Hegemony scholars contend that
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Washington compelled other nations to accept its free-trade
policies. While conceding losses in some sectors, America,
driven by domestic interests, emerged with a bargain that
strengthened its dominance over the international trade
regime
.
The comparative-advantage school argues that the final
stages of the GATT talks witnessed the coming-of
-age of EEC
power and the simultaneous decline of America's
capabilities in the regime. The Johnson administration
fought against European protectionism, lost, and failed to
sign an agreement satisfactory to producers at home.
Proclaimed a triumph for liberal trade, the Kennedy Round
did not meet U.S. expectations and undercut its trade
strength.
During the first six months of 1965, the newly-arrived
country delegations focused on the exceptions lists offered
by the nations taking part in the linear tariff cut
exercise. If not whittled down, these lists, and
especially the extensive ones presented by the EEC and
Japan, would undermine the 50% across-the-board reductions
authorized by the TEA. When the effort to narrow down the
lists proved ineffective, GATT Director Eric Wyndham White
proposed that the linear participants discuss separately
the key sectors which encompassed a large volume of trade
and were also the most sensitive items at the negotiations.
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At first, the U.S. feared the sector approach n.ight
replace the 50% cuts with special rules, encourage cartels,
or induce the EEC to refrain from large reductions in the
hopes of reducing the tariff disparities between American
and Common Market barriers. Yet the U.S. backed the sector
plan for aluminum, pulp and paper, cotton textiles, steel,
and chemicals, as a means to examine more thoroughly all
the trade problems in each industry. Besides, having
looked over the industrial offers, Herter found many
"meaningful" potential concessions. In any event, outlines
of the sector agreements did not emerge until late 1966."^
While negotiators went to work in the five sectors,
however, a cloud of uncertainty hung over the Kennedy
Round, due mainly to French policy toward America and the
Common Market. De Gaulle's familiar domineering attitude
toward the Atlantic community and Europe drove the EEC in
1965 to a major crisis. Paris still maintained that the
Kennedy Round had come too soon and might weaken the
integration process of the Common Market. Since the
reduction of internal tariffs among the Six had not hurt
French industry, though, most Frenchmen began not to fear
as much the potential effects of external trade
liberalization
.
The problem, wrote American Ambassador Charles Bohlen,
was de Gaulle. Moving progressively away from EEC
Commission and U.S. objectives, the general attempted to
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retain French dominance among the Six by discouraging the
shift of decision-making power to the Commission in
Brussels. He soon pushed his own "Grand Design", promoting
European nationalism to counter what he saw as American
"hegemony". Disengagement from NATO, overtures to the
Soviet Union and China, and disrupting the Kennedy Round
were some of the manifestations of his policy.
^
Increasingly, French actions at the Kennedy Round
revolved around the agricultural sector, and particularly
grains. The EEC's unfinished farm program was an impetus
to Gaullist disruption of the talks and the Common Market.
France disposed of 90% of its growing surplus of soft wheat
by exports to non-EEC nations. The country relied on an
export subsidy, paid in part by France and part out of the
Common Market's agricultural fund, to finance its shipments
abroad. Yet, in order to compete with historical grains
exporters, the French newcomer on the world grains market
cut its wheat prices. Such reductions, however, raised the
subsidy required by farmers to maintain income levels and
placed an additional burden on the treasury in Paris.
Thus, de Gaulle sought to control the Common Market's
farm policy for the benefit of his farmers. In order to
discourage production by other members, he had persuaded
West Germany to unify cereals prices at an acceptable level
by 1967. De Gaulle next hoped to shift as much as possible
of France's share of the export subsidy to his EEC partners
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by persuading them to increase the French share of the
agricultural fund. Furthermore, Paris aimed to stabli
global wheat prices at a high level to boost profits for
farmers. To an extent, these objectives met with the
disapproval of other EEC members and the United States.^
Franco-American problems on agricultural exports emerged
as a key potential area for disappointment for Washington
at the GATT talks. The foundation of America's fair-trade
farm policy had been the pursuit of access guarantees into
the EEC. But this aim seemed doomed as the Six pressed for
the Mansholt margin of support plan, which permitted import
levies to fluctuate with domestic price supports, protected
EEC producers, and withheld access commitments. By
limiting Common Market production, the U.S. hoped to
receive assurances of its historical and growing share of
the EEC market. Not only were controls naturally unpopular
in France, though, but the Commission refused to grant
access because the EEC's own producers did not receive such
4treatment
.
The administration stepped up pressure against EEC
restrictions. Criticizing the Mansholt plan, USDA
Secretary Freeman found recognition in Europe that a
"meaningful" access commitment was in order, particularly
after predictions that U.S. commercial wheat exports would
be halved and the French surplus increased in 1965. Herter
added to EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein "in no
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uncertain terms" that America required access commitments
or lessened protection under the variable levies and
opposed the margin of support. Mansholt admitted that only
France did not seek a resolution of the farm trade issue.
^
But Mansholt' s views worried the administration. When
he urged the U.S. to consider domestic as well as
international trade factors, Herter reiterated his pledge
to negotiate U.S. farm policy. Since the Common Market
exported a relatively small amount of farm goods to the
U.S., however, this offer was not significant. Still,
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey later told Mansholt that
high priced domestic subsidies attracted political pressure
that hurt efforts to liberalize trade. Simply put, the
Kennedy Round would "flop" without progress in the
agricultural sector because Congress would never permit
U.S. concessions on manufactures while cutting out the
American farmer from benefits.
Mansholt replied that America's large trade surplus and
farm exports made appeals against EEC protectionism seem
absurd. Yet Humphrey explained that the problem was not
just economic but psychological, in that it gave the
impression that Europe was no longer interested in free
trade. He might also have added that correcting the U.S.
payments balance, so America could fund its
disproportionate share of NATO and foreign aid commitments,
depended on rising farm exports to undergird the trade
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surplus. Humphrey warned that Johnson had no choice "but
to take stern measures unless Europe is willing to play
fair on agriculture".^
In order to avoid a trade war and test the EEC's
willingness to compromise in the farm sector, Herter
persuaded President Johnson to forego the fixing of farm
trade rules, as in the industrial sector, and set 16
September 1965 as the date for presenting non-grain
agricultural offers. Domestic pressure necessitated this
move, since farmers and Congress demanded an indication of
the administration's continued resolve to link cuts in
manufactures with agricultural concessions. But the STR
also hoped to prevent the Common Market from offering the
bare minimum of concessions and forcing Washington either
to suspend the Kennedy Round or acquiesce to meager trade
liberalization on food goods. Thus, in the event the EEC's
offer was insufficient, Blumenthal recommended that other
nations withhold offers until the Six proposed acceptable
7agricultural concessions.
In May 1965, the Kennedy Round participants also began
talks on a worldwide marketing arrangement to replace the
International Wheat Agreement of 1949. Trade in cereals
were central to Euro-American problems in agriculture.
Wheat comprised only 15% of U.S. sales to the EEC. But
America cared much more about feed grains, which amounted
to 42% of its exports to the Common Market and boomed from
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$197 million in 1960 to $476 million in 1966. The future
of these exports under the CAP worried America. By most
estimates, France would seize a greater share of the
market, limiting not only U.S. feed grains but other
nations' meat and dairy exports and possibly diverting them
to America.^
Guided by the fair-trade doctrine, the United States
thus had three aims at the grains talks. First was the
pursuit of access in import markets. The EEC proposed to
base access on a "self-sufficiency ratio", in which member
states would provide 90% of its wheat and feed grain needs
and outside producers would supply the remaining 10%. At
present, this ratio was 87% to the outside exporters' 13%.
When America pressed for a guaranteed quota at this latter
percentage, the Six refused and countered with the margin
of support plan, proposing limits on internal price and
income supports which would restrict imports.
Second, Washington sought a realistic world price level
for wheat. In order to remain more competitive in the
global marketplace, Canada consistently dropped below the
wheat price levels set by the International Wheat
Agreement. Meanwhile, the U.S. had observed the Agreement,
maintained higher prices, and subsequently lost a share of
the market
. Though America broke with the Agreement in
1965 in response to Canadian actions, and captured a
greater percentage of key wheat sales in the United Kingdom
455
and Japan, the administration opposed Canadian and
Australian aims at the Kennedy Round of setting minimum
price levels for wheat significantly above the world price.
Even more important for American exporters, the U.S.
resisted an EEC request for a high minimum price for feed
grains which would jeopardize exports in this growing area
of agricultural trade.
Third, America hoped to establish a multilateral program
to share in providing food aid. The commitment would both
prevent the EEC's excess production above the self-
sufficiency ratio from entering the world commercial grains
market and relieve the U.S. from its disproportionate
burden of aid to the LDCs
. Experts worried that while
America gave away food, and thereby reduced its already
depleted wheat stocks, other nations would seize more of
the commercial market. Asserting that the EEC was quite
capable of taking responsibility for food aid, the U.S. set
an annual target of 10 million tons, of which America would
supply 4 0%, the EEC 25%, and Britain, Japan, and others the
remainder
.
In short, America and other exporters wanted increased
outlets for grain surpluses through the aid commitment,
balanced production and consumption, and stable prices.
Above all, Washington sought access guarantees from the
EEC. Early on, the talks on cereals sparked optimism in
I
I
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the otherwise gloomy assessments of progress in the
agricultural sector.^
Optimism abruptly ended when France boycotted the
decision-making activities of the EEC on 30 June 1965. in
March, the EEC Commission had proposed an ambitious program
for financing agricultural subsidies. Also recommended was
a greater role for the European Parliament in budgetary
decisions of the Common Market. The member states also
went ahead with the timetable to install majority voting by
19 67 as a replacement for the unanimous voting procedure,
which had allowed de Gaulle to wield his veto so
effectively against Great Britain. The general could not
stomach these proposals because they enhanced supranational
control by the Commission and undercut his power to shape
European policy.
The other five countries, led by West Germany, countered
de Gaulle. Since France would be the main beneficiary of
the farm subsidy fund to which they would make large
contributions, they demanded acquiescence to an expanded
role for the EEC in budgetary and political matters in
exchange
.
While de Gaulle refused to link the farm program
with political integration, Erhard and the Five refused to
separate them, and the general walked out of the EEC. The
Common Market suspended operations, including participation
in the Kennedy Round, until the end of May 1966.
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In Geneva, the GATT talks stalled without the EEC
Commission's negotiating mandate from the Council of
Ministers. The contracting parties pondered their
alternatives as the tabling date for agricultural offers
approached. The EFTA and Japan, as agricultural importers,
were not enthusiastic about including the farm sector in
the Kennedy Round and thus might jump at the EEC crisis as
an excuse to withhold concessions. Also, the Six would
feel no pressure to offer concessions once the crisis
ended, which could prompt a withdrawal of offers from other
nations and unravel the entire conference . "''^
After weighing the options, the administration decided
to present its offers. Only Freeman recommended a
postponement of farm sector talks until Europe was ready.
But the STR reasoned that this "stiff-necked" approach was
useless. Blumenthal argued that since "agriculture in the
Kennedy Round [was] not going to be a success story"
anyway, the U.S. should try to prevent any failure in the
sector from being marked as "our fault". The reasons, he
said, were due to domestic politics and diplomatic
13problems. Herter suggested presenting the offers but
withholding items of particular interest to the Common
Market. When farm organizations and legislators agreed,
the President gave the go-ahead. On 16 September 1965, the
U.S. offered cuts of 50% on $500 million of $2.1 billion
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dutiable farm imports and withheld $250 million pending EEC
action
.
After the tabling, negotiations were suspended. The
EFTA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand joined
America in the tabling exercise, hoping the Common Market
would soon follow with concessions. This scenario was
unlikely as de Gaulle continued to denounce the EEC. GATT
Director White called agriculture a "ghastly problem" that
would destroy the Kennedy Round if not solved. By December
1965, much to the delight of U.S. protectionists, the
Geneva talks had reached a low point in morale and
activity. As a European journalist noted, the Kennedy
Round had "run out of gasoline" . "''^
A break in the EEC crisis seemed imminent, however, when
de Gaulle failed to win a majority on the first ballot in
the French elections, partly because of disgust with his
obstructionism in the Common Market. He promptly agreed to
discuss EEC problems in January, 1966. Out of these talks
emerged the "Luxembourg Compromise" in which de Gaulle
acquiesced to the budget and voting procedures, lowering
internal tariffs further, and completing the EEC's
negotiating position at the Kennedy Round, while Erhard
conceded on the organization of the Common Market's farm
program. In the end, de Gaulle's dramatic exit from
1
6
Brussels won him few rewards.
459
The Compromise gave the Kennedy Round a shot in the arm,
though the EEC breakdown had halted the negotiations for 11
months. The GATT members now felt pressed for time since
the expiration of TEA authority was just over a year away
on 30 June 1967. Reaching this deadline would be a great
feat, especially after the Common Market, constrained by
the CAP, presented its disappointing agricultural offers in
July 1966.
Freeman took a hardline against the EEC, urging a
reduction of America's concessions to the match Europe's
offers. Not only would these shallow offers limit U.S.
exports, he argued, but the LDCs would find more reasons to
demand bilateral quotas and preferential trading
arrangements which were policies contrary to Washington's
aims of trade liberalization. Freeman also warned that
giving into the EEC on politically sensitive farm goods
would provoke domestic repercussions."'"'^
Indeed, the American Farm Bureau, wheat farmers, and
fruit and vegetable growers watched developments at the
Kennedy Round in disgust. The latter group, for instance,
warned that the binding of the restrictive CAP at such a
high level of protection might prompt another chicken war.
Though total exports of fruits and vegetables to the EEC
had risen 42% from 1960 to 1965, sales in the former began
to fall in 1966 and the latter had already declined in
1963. The U.S. National Fruit Export Council, backed by
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the Senate Agriculture Conuuittee, opposed any agreement on
farm or industrial goods until American commodities got
improved access in Europe. This view parallelled sentiment
on Capitol Hill. According to Senator John Sparkman (D-
Ala.), the patience of Congress, ranchers, and farmers was
not "inexhaustible" in regards to Common Market
] ftprotectionism.
The administration responded, but not to the extent
desired by Freeman. Herter attacked EEC tobacco
regulations, warning of retaliatory measures if U.S.
exports declined. But he wisely resisted a tit-for-tat
response of withdrawing concessions. Instead, he believed
that maintaining America's offer would pressure Europe to
improve its concessions; a skimpy offer would merely lower
all others and lessen the scope of the trade negotiations.
Many farmers besides the Farm Bureau also conceded that
beating the EEC with a stick was useless. The Six were not
only committed to protect their own farmers but had not
finished formulating their collective agricultural policy.
By mid-1966, Herter and many farm interests began to
realize that the demand for access guarantees was
19
unrealistic
.
This emerging belief, however, did not ease frustrations
during negotiations in the non-grain farm sector in
September 1966. The EEC offer was a bad one for America,
amounting to concessions of less that 10% on about one-
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sixth of the Common Market's dutiable farm imports. That
is, the Six offered tariff cuts on only 20%, or $40
million, of America's $1.5 billion worth of non-grain
exports to the EEC. Thus, Herter conceded to Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long that every effort
had been expended to persuade the Common Market to lower
farm import barriers, with little result. Confiding to
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Herter admitted
that he was "frankly, none too sanguine as to the final
outcome" in the farm sector.
Discussion on industrial barriers held more promise than
food goods. At the urging of Great Britain, the GATT
members negotiated and agreed to an Anti -Dumping Code
mostly as an attack on American use of this NTB. Despite
congressional efforts to make the U.S. law more
restrictive, most of the country's exporters and the
administration approved of the Code as a way to prevent
other nations from invoking their anti-dumping acts once
tariffs provided less protections after the Kennedy
Round.
Tough talks in the five sectors also made headway in
1966. The EEC was a focus in these talks, and yet the STR
also feared that the Six would substitute the sectoral
approach for trade liberalization under the 50% linear cut
rule. Apparently, the Six saw the U.S. -Canada Automotive
Products Act of 1965, which removed trade barriers on
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automobiles and parts in order to create a single North
American market, as a model of how trade might be
controlled rather than freed. ^2 ^here were indications,
then, that the sector talks would be rough.
Not a major exporter or importer of pulp and paper and
aluminum, America had only a secondary interest in these
sectors. Nevertheless, the U.S. had some stake in exports.
In the former, Washington rejected plans by the Nordic and
protectionist EEC nations to tie tariffs to prices in a
sort of preferential trade agreement. In aluminum, the
three big American companies were not big exporters but
backed Canadian and Norwegian efforts against high Japanese
and EEC protective tariff s.^"^
Steel trade, however, was of critical importance to the
U.S. since it had become a net importer. Previously an
ardent supporter of the TEA, the industry reversed its
free-trade stance and pushed for quotas after 1962 on LDC
and Japanese imports. By this time, the gap between
rising imports and declining exports had widened, and the
ratio of imports to consumption rose from 5.6% in 1962 to
16.7% by 1968. Figuring decisively into the influx of
imports were high U.S. prices, which had caused Kennedy's
celebrated confrontation with industry leaders in 19 62.
Britain and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
,
which represented the EEC, also suffered from various
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problems, including overcapacity, weak demand, inefficient
organization, and costly raw materials.
Protectionism in steel was dangerous. In reality,
moderate tariff levels were not as big a problem as export
subsidies and tax policies. Yet a failure to cut duties,
which ranged from 9% in the ECSC and U.S. to 15% in Japan,
could instigate withdrawals in other areas at the Kennedy
Round. America entered the talks at a disadvantage. The
country had bound, or fixed through previous negotiations,
its steel tariffs, unable to raise them without
compensating other nations. British and ECSC duties were
unbound, could rise against cheap Japanese exports, and
force Tokyo to turn increasingly to the U.S. market.
The ECSC posed a problem. The Six offered tariff cuts
of 50%, but from the rate of 14% that existed before the
formation of the ECSC, not the 7% level in effect prior to
the industrial tabling exercise in November 1964. Aiming
not to reduce duties at all, Britain viewed this ploy as a
convenient excuse to stall the steel sector talks. America
opposed this policy, seeking fairer trade.
Progress in this sector ensued because of U.S. prodding.
Herter proposed to "target" tariff rates, in which each
steel product would be afforded adequate protection. The
target plan essentially sought a harmonization of duty
rates, not so much lower rates but similar and more
acceptable levels. Compelling Britain to take a more
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productive role in the sector, the scheme also provided an
impetus for unifying the EEC common external tariff in
steel, helped America bring its higher duties in line with
more average rates, and quieted domestic protectionist
criticism. In short, the target plan addressed all sides
of the steel trade issue in an equitable way. The plan's
success depended on intensive talks in early 1967.^^
Of prime concern also to Washington was the cotton
textile sector. Negotiations centered on reducing tariffs
and renewing the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement
(LTA)
,
due to expire in September 1967. GATT Director and
Cotton Textile Sector Group Chairman Wyndham White had
recommended this linking of tariff cuts with a more liberal
implementation of the LTA.
Despite the proliferation of bilateral protectionist
quotas under the Arrangement, Asian exporters accepted its
renewal
.
An alternative to the LTA might be unilateral
restraints imposed by importers. In addition, low-cost
nations such as Pakistan, India, and Korea, and the UAR had
recently taken over markets previously held by Japan and
Hong Kong. Thus, these latter two now had a stake in the
LTA status quo because it guaranteed them a fixed share of
U.S. and European markets without having to compete against
the "newcomers". Nevertheless, exporters demanded
liberalization of the LTA and more access in bilateral
trade and warned that the response to their demands would
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greatly affect whether they approved of the Kennedy
Round.
Generally satisfied with the LTA, the Six recognized
their obligation to permit more imports into their markets.
America pressured the EEC toward this end, believing that
Europe's overprotected market unfairly diverted Asian
textiles into the United States. The Common Market
preferred to cut tariffs rather than grant more access, but
America hoped to win the Six over to Wyndham White's
linkage of the LTA to tariff cuts.^"^
Not only did Washington want Europe to buy more
textiles, but it sought to renew a basically unchanged LTA,
which had helped open up the EEC in the first place and
slowed American imports. The LTA had also relieved the
White House from domestic pressure from producers, who
enjoyed rising profits in the mid-1960s. These boom times
strengthened the administration's resolve against including
synthetics and wool in a quota agreement, despite the
2 8insistence of textilemen and Congress.
Meanwhile, the fact that the textile industry had
enjoyed economic success and the U.S. had imposed
restrictions using the LTA more than any other nation made
America vulnerable to attacks from exporting nations . The
U.S. still took in a large share of LDC cotton goods; by
1967, imports had risen more than 30% since 1962 and were
9.5% of domestic consumption when they had been 7.2% five
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years before. On the other hand, Washington recognized its
weak bargaining position; without a renewal satisfactory to
the LDCs, the latter might withdraw from the Arrangement
and render it ineffective. The "price" America was willing
to pay for an extension of the LTA for five years was a
more liberal import policy, particularly increased
bilateral quota ceilings and growth rates and lower
tariffs
.
Many LDCs rejected a renewal of the LTA before being
granted tariff cuts at the Kennedy Round. As a result, the
U.S. sought bilateral agreements which promised an increase
of LTA quotas for the LDCs after its extension. This
"policy of encirclement", wrote congressional advisor
Thomas Curtis, won Japanese and then LDC consent to its
two-fold scheme. Unfortunately, the EEC could not agree on
a common textile policy - the Six bargained separately on
the LTA but collectively on tariffs - and they had problems
reaching bilateral accords with exporters. To the
irritation of the LDCs and the United States, the Common
Market delayed the LTA renegotiation until March 1967."^°
The focal point of the industrial negototiations was the
chemical sector and the tariff disparities between U.S. and
British duties and the more moderate EEC rates. At issue
was the American Selling Price (ASP)
, the system of customs
valuation which increased duties well above the actual
value of four products: canned clams, wool knit gloves.
rubber footwear, and certain synthetic organic chemicals.
Actually, the ASP was relatively insignificant in trade
terms, applying to only 108 of over 800 U.S. chemical
tariffs and $43 million of the total $958 million of
chemical imports. But the ASP became the EEC's "cause
celebre" in Geneva because it was so blatantly
protectionist
.
Leading the attack, the Six insisted that the
elimination of the ASP was a precondition for lowering
barriers to U.S. chemical exports. Britain concurred, as
did Japan for the sake of its footwear exports. France and
West Germany argued that synthetic organics were critical
since they suffered a trade deficit with America in this
category. Prized by U.S. protectionists, the ASP was also
a useful counterweight against American efforts to reduce
CAP farm barriers. As U.S. ambassador to the EEC J. Robert
Schaetzel reported, the ASP was an emotion-charged element
at the Kennedy Round, though European "preoccupation [was]
substantially unrelated to the facts. ""^^
Schaetzel believed the EEC exaggerated the effect of the
ASP because the system covered an inconsequential amount of
trade. Yet the anachronistic ASP had outlived its
usefulness. U.S. chemical exports had risen by nearly two-
thirds between 1962 and 1967, from $1.8 to $2.8 billion,
and totaled 9% of America's total sales abroad. Meanwhile,
imports increased 20%, from $765 to $958 million. With a
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three-to-one ratio of exports to imports, the industry did
not merit protection. But industry resistance to the
principle of comparative advantage frustrated the
administration. White House aide and trade advisor Francis
Bator noted that though the ASP applied to only a tiny
fraction of American imports, it was a "protectionist
gimmick entirely out of line with our liberal trade
posture"
.
Producers and their congressmen defied the
administration's fair-trade strategy. Led by Congressman
Peter Rodino (D-NJ)
,
large delegations on Capitol Hill
lobbied the President against abolishing the ASP at the
Kennedy Round. By 1967, 134 House members and 17 Senators
from 12 big industrial and Southern states had written
Johnson, and 40 legislators, mostly from New England,
exerted similar pressure on behalf of the footwear
industry. Though there was no support for it in the House
Ways and Means Committee, noted STR deputy William Roth,
the Senate Finance Committee wanted the ASP retained "for
its own sake". The system was the "trickiest political
34issue", he said.
In June 1966, the Senate adopted a resolution sponsored
by Abraham Ribicoff (R-CT) and 12 others demanding that
NTBs such as the ASP should not be negotiated without the
consent of Congress. Legally, they argued, the TEA did not
authorize bargaining over the ASP at the Kennedy Round.
This position also seemed fair to Congress; Kennedy had
privately pledged in 1962 to retain the ASP. But in order
to boost U.S. chemical exports and above all, conclude the
GATT talks, Johnson wished to work out a difficult
compromise with the EEC to abolish the system. ^he ASP
had become a "cause celebre" on both sides of the Atlantic.
These domestic problems affected U.S. bargaining with
the EEC. Most important, the GATT members based
negotiations at the Kennedy Round on reciprocity. The
Common Market, however, had yet to offer concessions on
chemicals. In fact, the Six flatly rejected a U.S.
proposal to convert ASP tariffs to ad valorem rates and
then proceed with 50% linear cuts, responding instead with
a long list of exceptions and disparities regarding
chemical duty levels. Still, the EEC held the bargaining
advantage since it imported from America a much greater
amount of chemicals than it exported. "^^ Europe required an
acceptable deal.
The turning point came with America's two-package plan,
labeled "decoupage", meaning "cutting apart". The U.S.
separated tariff cuts from the ASP because the latter'
s
elimination required congressional consent. By tying the
two together, the entire Kennedy Round agreement would be
cancelled in the event Congress refused to annul the ASP.
Thus, the U.S. insisted on reductions of EEC chemical
tariffs in return for American cuts. Then, Johnson would
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abolish the ASP in exchange for EEC concessions of equal
value on NTBs such as road taxes. ^"^
Decoupage was a compromise that met European demands to
end the ASP and America's aims of lowering barriers to
chemical exports. As Bator explained, because the EEC -
and especially France - had made such a big deal about the
ASP, the U.S. could now use it as a bargaining chip for
more than it was really worth. By the end of 1966,
however, only Switzerland and Britain had responded with
offers in line with the decoupage package. As in the other
industrial sectors and in agriculture, a chemical deal
would be thrashed out during the Kennedy Round "crisis"
period in Spring 1967, as the participants tried to reach
an agreement before time ran out on the TEA.~^^
Heading into the final stages, the Kennedy Round took on
much significance for Johnson in terms of alliance
politics, diplomacy, and the balance-of
-payments
. Within
the alliance, relations were shaky with de Gaulle. The
general had stepped up attacks against U.S. investment in
Europe, hurt the dollar by instigating another gold run,
and criticized the Vietnam War. By March 1966, he began
the French withdrawal from NATO that rocked the alliance.
In May 1967, he vetoed British membership in the EEC for
the second time because he still believed that London was
tied too closely to Washington. France also led efforts to
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counter U.S. "imperialism" by denouncing the cultural and
economic "Americanization" of Europe.
Another blow to transatlantic links was Johnson's
preoccupation with Vietnam and domestic programs. Many
Europeans accurately pointed out that Johnson neglected
their region as he focused increasingly on Southeast Asia.
Only West Germany lent full support to the intervention in
Vietnam. Many agreed with German politician Kurt
Birrenbach that the President's concern with Great Society
economic programs showed that Johnson had a lessened
interest in entanglements in Europe. Johnson denied the
charge but acknowledged that he had a real public relations
problem in Europe. '^'^
Above all, Washington noted by this time the EEC's power
to shape Atlantic policy. Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Fowler, for instance, feared that France would use the EEC
either to expel the U.S. from Europe or diminish American
strength in the area. A National Security Council report
suggested that the heated controversies in the alliance
demonstrated Europe's desire for a "voice" in world
affairs, and stemmed from the region's integration "fed by
increasing European strength"
. Such a trend came at the
expense of the United States.
In response, the U.S. saw no reason why the EEC could
not contribute more of its fair share to alliance
commitments. Vice-President Humphrey and Senators George
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McGovern (D-SD) and Stuart Symington (D-MO) were among the
rising chorus of officials who attacked Europe's reluctance
to shoulder more of the aid and military burden. Bator
reminded the President that the U.S. payments deficit could
be converted into a surplus with a scaling back of defense
expenses. Johnson acknowledged that a "showdown" with
Congress was in the offing if EEC protectionism prevented
from paying part of its share with revenue earned from
higher exports to the allies . '^^
The persistent payments deficit warranted the decade-
long stress on freer trade and equitable burden-sharing
with Europe. Reaching a high of $6.8 billion in 1964, the
merchandise trade surplus fell to $4.95 billion the next
year and by 1966 was $3.81 billion. Because of voluntary
restraints on capital outflows, limits on dollar sales by
the Federal Reserve Board, and export expansion efforts,
however, the declining trade surplus at first did not
worsen the payments deficit. Thus, in 1965, these measures
created the first quarterly payments surplus since 1957,
reduced the deficit to $1.3 billion from the $3.1 billion
of 19 64, and virtually halted the gold drain.
Yet during the next few years, these encouraging trends
faded. Inflationary pressures caused by Great Society
programs and the rising costs of Vietnam from 1965 to 1967
caused imports to grow by 12%, while exports trailed at
7.7% because many other nations cooled down their economies
with deflationary policies. Also, by 1966, Johnson's
elaborate bureaucracy established to promote exports ceased
meeting and thereby contributed to the deteriorating trade
balance. By 1967, the trade surplus dipped slightly to
$3.8 billion. The payments deficit rose again above $3
billion and prompted another run on gold.^^
Trade with the EEC, moreover, did not help the deficit,
and gave the administration reason to demand a greater
European contribution to NATO and aid programs. In 1964,
America enjoyed a $2.28 billion edge in trade with the
Common Market, but this advantage steadily declined in the
ensuing years. By 1967, the surplus had been halved and by
1968, it was a mere 41 million. EEC imports from America
grew 5.2% from 1964 to 1966, but its exports across the
Atlantic jumped nearly 20%. In addition, Europe was a much
more important customer for U.S. goods than vice versa.
For instance, the Six bought 18.2% of total American
exports in 1965 and sold only 7.1% of their goods. The
critical EEC market, America's declining trade surplus, and
Europe's higher industrial output relative to U.S.
production showed the Common Market to be a competitive
power that could be expected to assume its fair share of
44alliance commitments.
A good start in this direction, believed the U.S., would
be Europe's willingness to liberalize trade. For his part,
Johnson had initiated a determined campaign to beat back
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protectionism during the mid-1960s. Only two of the eight
products under the escape clause in 1962 remained under
protection by January 1967. Included was the sheet glass
restriction, which induced the EEC to free U.S. chemicals
from the retaliatory limits imposed in June 1962.^^ But
this trade cooperation seemed a rare positive note in the
increasingly discordant U.S.
-EEC trade relationship.
Proponents of free-trade in the United States doubted
that trade liberalization would enhance this relationship.
In a hearing on the Kennedy Round in 1966, for instance.
Chairman Leonard Farbstein (D-NY) lamented that the hopes
inspired by Kennedy for Western unity through tariff
reductions had not come to much. "On the face of it, in
view of the apparent setbacks to our political and military
policies in Europe in recent years", he said, "we seem to
have misjudged the impact that [the TEA] would have" on
4 6Atlantic relations. The reason for this failure,
Secretary of State Rusk informed the President, was the
shift in the balance-of-trade power to the Common Market. '^'^
U.S. ambassador Schaetzel pointed out more negative than
positive factors in assessing EEC trade policy. Economic
problems in France, West Germany, and Italy in late 1966
might discourage movement toward opening their markets to
competitors. A deal in agriculture could "be pulled off"
but only if the administration prevented "irate farm
interests and legislators" from disrupting the
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negotiations. In any event, he pleaded for Herter to end
his "bouts of dark gloom and excessive anti-Coirunon Market
bias" developed over years of dealing with the Six/^
But in general, U.S. officials were not sanguine about
persuading the EEC to lower trade barriers as the Kennedy
Round headed for its finish. The ouster from power of
Erhard in West Germany in November 1966 took away a free-
trade champion in the Common Market
. George Ball
complained that EEC policy appealed to "the lowest common
denominator" of trade liberalization, particularly in the
agricultural sector. Herter, just months before his death
in December 1966, remained only "guardedly optimistic"
about success at the Kennedy Round. Congressman Curtis'
positive outlook in December had faded by mid-January 1967
as crises in the industrial and farm sector loomed.''^
Mounting problems in Geneva provoked criticism at home.
Senators Long of the Senate Finance Committee and Minority
Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) censured the White House
for its overly-generous trade policy, and Vance Hartke (D-
Ind.) called the TEA a "colossal failure". Several experts
predicted that the Kennedy Round would be a bad bargain for
the United States and forecast an average tariff cut of 15%
to 18%, a far cry from the TEA' s 50% goal. In response,
William Roth, the new STR, pledged that any imbalances in
offers would be eliminated to assure reciprocity. If not
50possible, the U.S. would reject the final agreement.
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Yet by February 1967, there were hopeful signs.
Johnson's rollback of sheet glass and watch duties sparked
praise from the EEC and Switzerland and boosted morale at
the Kennedy Round. When America found that its total
industrial offers would result in a $2 million deficit, the
country prepared a withdrawal list to ensure reciprocity.
Though justified, the action could have undone the
negotiations if not for the EEC's refusal to submit a
similar withdrawal list. Thus, opting instead to improve
their offers, the Six showed a willingness to bargain on
the "big issues". In order to leave time for an assessment
of the final package before 30 June, Roth set an informal
deadline for the end of March for an agreement on the
• • 51remaining points.
When this date passed, however, the Kennedy Round
entered a "crisis" stage lasting from April to June 1967.
When Roth flew to Geneva to take charge of the U.S.
delegation, the President set up a secret, inter-agency
"Command Group" to give the STR "appropriate backstopping"
at home and Johnson an "open shot" to make fair, critical
decisions. Directed by White House aide Bator, the group
consisted of an STR deputy and high-ranking State,
Commerce, and Agriculture Department members, and
communicated under the code name LIMDI S -POTATOES . This
elaborate structure sounded "like a battle plan", wrote
Bator to Johnson, but the Kennedy Round would face such a
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"crunch" in the coming weeks that it required close
attention, "cool nerves, and fine negotiating judgment to
pull it off"
.
Concluded Bator, "not only five years of
work, but your entire trade policy is at stake".
Though the crisis centered on U.S.
-EEC bargaining over
agriculture and chemicals, the U.S. managed to forge
bilateral arrangements with the EFTA, Canada, and Japan.
With the Outer Seven, America came out on top in
agriculture and about even on industrial items cut by the
linear cut method. Canada, which did not negotiate
according to the linear procedure, also received an
equitable deal. Ottawa granted concessions on imports from
the U.S. amounting to $1.4 billion, while America cut
tariffs $1.25 billion. A balanced deal in the farm sector
and the ant i -dumping code, both of top priority interest to
Canada, boosted its trade with the United States.
The U.S. -Japan bilateral talks resulted in 30-35% tariff
reductions, but this trade relationship underwent great
strain. Japan's long list of exceptions and insistence on
negotiating VERs before it lowered duties placed Washington
at a disadvantage. Experts judged that a discrepancy of
$500 million to $1 billion in offers existed in Tokyo's
favor. America consequently withdrew offers in the cotton
textile and steel sectors to correct this imbalance.
Nevertheless, the U.S. still came out on the worst end of
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the deal, and last-minute haggling only generated more ill
feeling on both sides.
Discussions with the Common Market yielded a mixed bag
of successes and failures. By early May, America's
frustration with the lack of progress on the "big issues"
forced Roth to issue another deadline of May 9, after which
he would return home if no agreement was reached. Causing
particular irritation was the EEC's submission of a list of
withdrawals based on tariff disparities, the major point of
conflict that had hung over the negotiations since 1963-
1964. Blumenthal abruptly laid the matter to rest by
reminding the Europeans that no rules on disparities
existed and threatened counter-withdrawals if the Six
invoked the list.
Still, negotiations proceeded in the five industrial
sectors. There were substantial cuts in the pulp and paper
sector but disappointing results in the aluminum talks.
Both sectors were of only secondary interest to the United
States, unlike discussions in steel, cotton textiles, and
, . T 55chemicals
.
America's proposal of steel target rates, though leading
to some improvement in offers, eventually fell by the
wayside in early 1967 because others believed that the
projected tariff levels were too low for suitable
protection. Yet in the end, each nation lowered tariffs to
a level in which all duties would be matched equivalently
.
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In sum, Japan and Britain cut more than the EEC and United
States
.
The average overall cut in the sector was 37%, a solid
achivement. Washington won reductions on its key steel
exports, with ECSC concessions covering 90%, or $709
million, of U.S. shipments to the Common Market. Nearly
70% of these cuts reduced tariffs from 25 to 49%. The
subsequent outcry for quotas from the U.S. steel industry
clearly marked the extent of American concessions. Partly
as a result of the Kennedy Round accord, steel imports rose
from 11.4 to 17.9 thousand tons from 1967 to 1968, a 63%
56 ^ .increase. Despite its slightly higher tariff levels,
America was a fair-trader in steel.
In textiles, the participants extended the LTA for three
years after considerable argument between the EEC and the
LDCs and Japan in bilateral talks. Thus, America
prevailed; the LTA was not liberalized but importers cut
tariffs at the Kennedy Round by 21% and agreed to a one-
time bonus quota. The U.S. lowered its synthetic duties
24% and 37% on yarn, but only 18% on fabrics, 6% on
apparel, and a mere 5% on wool due to domestic pressure
(though the average wool cuts in the sector were 2%)
.
In sum, U.S. textile tariffs fell 15% while the EEC's
declined 20%. Though the LDCs complained about the
agreement, there was no better alternative. Besides,
cotton textiles soon diminished in trade importance for the
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Third World, replaced by man-made fabrics. The
administration had managed to stave off pressure from the
industry and mild prodding from Congress for the inclusion
of all fibers in the LTA and for no tariff cuts at all on
textile duties. Above all, U.S. imports in all materials
rose until 1972. America certainly strained the bounds
of fair-trade in textiles, but was as reasonable as
possible considering trends of rapid growth of LDC exports,
European protectionism, and domestic political pressure.
The chemical sector remained the toughest area of
bargaining on industrial tariffs. By the end of April
1967, the sector had stalled on the two-package decoupage
proposal. America insisted on unconditional cuts by the
EEC on most chemical products while Europe tied reductions
to the elimination of the ASP. The Six were unyielding on
this aim, rejecting a suggestion by Wyndham White that each
party cut tariffs 20% at the Kennedy Round and an
additional 30% once the ASP was abolished.^®
Noting that European demands would result in an
unbalanced deal clearly to America's disadvantage and
contradictory to the TEA' s intent of attaining reciprocity
at the Kennedy Round, Washington played "chicken" with
Europe in the chemical sector. Above all, the
administration feared that the EEC made implementation of
the entire Kennedy Round agreement dangerously contingent
on congressional action on the ASP. Roth warned in May
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that the ASP issue could be a "stopper" to the
conference.
Wyndham White broke the deadlock at the final "marathon"
meeting of the Kennedy Round on 15 May 1967. His
compromise entailed American cuts of 20% on its low duties,
while the EEC reduced its high tariffs by 20% (instead of
30%)
,
and Switzerland and Japan maintained their initial
reduction offers. Under a separate agreement using the
decoupage approach, the U.S. would eliminate the ASP,
convert duties under the system to normal valuation, and
then reduce low-tariff goods by an additional 30%. Then,
the Common Market would reciprocate by cutting its high
tariffs another 30% and grant concessions on some NTBs
.
The final package benefited America by promoting the law
of comparative advantage. Taking both the initial tariff
and ASP agreement together, the average cuts were 46-49%,
nearly meeting the TEA goal. The U.S. was the victor,
whether each package, the combined settlement, or bilateral
trade is considered. Since its imports were small relative
to exports, the country gained by granting $314 million in
concessions and receiving $796 million from others. Though
its dye industry might be jeopardized by the elimination of
the ASP, the U.S. would enjoy rising exports starting in
6 01968. Unfortunately, to the administration's disgust.
Congress later refused to repeal the ASP and America
appeared as a selfish trader in chemicals.
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The Common Market, however, was unyielding in
agriculture, arguing that a similar effort in farm trade
liberalization as in industry was untenable. In the non-
grain sector, the Six led others in offering duty cuts
amounting to $238 million, or half the U.S. exports
available for reductions. On trade coverage alone, the
U.S. came out ahead and cut farm tariffs less than others.
But CAP variable levies items were of major interest, on
which no worthwhile concessions were obtained. Thus, the
non-grain sector resulted in only a minor degree of
success
.
The EEC was the main reason for the disappointing
finish. In addition to the small overall concessions,
there was little progress in the dairy and meat sector
because of the CAP in the former and the combined
restrictions of the Six and Britain in the latter.
American fruit growers, moreover, criticized the EEC's
token offers. Nevertheless, Johnson rejected Freeman's
request at the end of the talks to withdraw America's offer
on canned hams as a means to balance the agreement,
realizing retaliation was senseless. Overall, the Common
Market discouraged trade liberalization in the non-grain
farm sector.
The U.S. hoped for a more positive outcome in the
cereals sector, where exporters and importers had begun
negotiating an International Grains Agreement (IGA) in
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February 1967. Yet EEC rigidity undercut these
expectations. Exporters realized that the Kennedy Round
offered their last chance for some time to secure an
acceptable aggreement from the Six on sharing in the future
growth of the EEC market, price levels, and food aid.
Problems persisted, however, in all three areas.
The Common Market flatly rejected the access commitment.
Washington tried to fix the Common Market's self-
sufficiency ratio at 87% by pressing for a quota for
outside producers to apply to the remaining 13% of the EEC
grains market. Refusing this guarantee, the Six blocked
America's primary objective at the IGA talks.
Price policy remained a major difficulty. Agreement by
Canada, Australia and the United States on global wheat
prices seemed likely after much haggling. They set a
minimum price of $1.70 to $1.75 per bushel, but this level
ended up being too far above actual market prices in
subsequent years
.
A stalemate ensued over EEC demands for
a minimum feed grains price, which was the key U.S. export
interest. Such price supports, determined by the margin of
support proposal, would curb American exports of corn,
64sorghums, and other feed grains. Another impasse ensued.
Washington initially had advocated an annual 10 million
ton donable food commitment as a means of keeping the EEC's
surplus grains off commercial markets and establishing
fairer levels of aid burden-sharing among exporters.
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America hoped the Common Market would provide one-quarter
of the aid, while the U.S. would donate 40% and other
participants the remaining 35%. By Spring 1967, however,
the STR lowered the commitment to 4-6 million tons, though
the EEC pressed for 3 million. Japan, as a grains
importer, wished to give a small share or a cash
6 5equivalent. Again, American objectives were in jeopardy.
The deadlock of May 1967 naturally provoked criticism at
home. The Farm Bureau and wheat growers continued to
resist the marketing arrangement. Most other farmers
backed U.S. efforts, but pressed for an acceptable grains
deal becuase there would be "nothing more disastrous than
having to face a closed door in Europe, carrying on the
Vietnam War, and trying to give aid to all the
underdeveloped of the world", cautioned James Patton,
leader of the National Farmers Union. That is, a healthy
payments balance rode on a fair-trade settlement in the
IGA.
In effect, the administration began to modify its policy
on grains by applying the fair-trade doctrine. Ambassador
Schaetzel wrote from Brussels that the "nasty issue" of
agriculture could be resolved only if American farmers
awoke from their "dreamland" of believing that other
nations should trade according to the law of comparative
advantage. The EEC's denial of access guarantees
demonstrated the inapplicability of this principle. White
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House aide Bator also urged the President to ignore
pressure from Freeman to withdraw from the Kennedy Round if
the EEC remained obstinate on the IGA. Washington still
insisted on equitable deals in both the industrial and farm
sector, but increasingly realized a compromise in grains
67was in order
.
After the Command Group met and digested several LIMDIS-
POTATOES secret communications from the STR office in
Geneva, the administration settled on a compromise which
gave in to EEC policy. America dropped its demand for
access guarantees in return for the Common Market dropping
the feed grains support price. Actually, this strategy had
been developed some months before, but as the IGA reached a
crisis stage, the Command Group had notified the President
6 8
of his options. The plan succeeded in breaking the
deadlock in the cereals sector, though in general not to
the advantage of the United States.
The grains deal, which 52 nations later endorsed in Rome
in August 1967 as the three-year IGA, reflected U.S.
concessions. The minimum wheat price level was still too
high to encourage efficient trade. The food aid commitment
fell short of America's initial 10 million ton amount and
the sharing percentage. The annual contribution was set at
4.5 million tons, with the U.S. supplying 42%, the EEC 23%,
Canada 9%, and the other nations the remainder. Above all,
the U.S. failed to obtain an adequate self-sufficiency
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ratio or access guarantees in the Common Market. America
retreated in the grains sector, abandoning its key
positions in the face of EEC pressure.
As later trade showed, the IGA did not help American
grains exports in European markets. The deal immediately
seemed a failure, as wheat prices tumbled well below the
IGA minimum in 1967 and 1968 and distorted trade. The high
minimum price also hurt U.S. wheat sales by reducing the
cost of the French and the CAP export subsidy and
stimulating production in the LDCs, thus decreasing
American wheat, flour, and rye sales. The absence of
access commitments also reduced American feed grains in
Europe. By 1969, these exports were less than half the
sales registered in 1966. In any event, the IGA did
attempt to rationalize trade in cereals, began a food aid
program, and above all, eased the way to a conclusion of
70the Kennedy Round
.
Despite the agricultural imbalance, Johnson authorized
Roth to approve the GATT accord on 15 May 1967 after Bator
had warned that without U.S. consent, the other nations
would resort to "jungle warfare" and "spiraling
71
protectionism with parliaments holding the whip hand"
.
The President might "take some heat" from domestic farm,
textile, and chemical interests. But the bargain was fair
enough in economic terms and surely not worth provoking a
diplomatic backlash after four years of difficult talks.
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After some last
-minute adjustments to accommodate the EEC,
the contracting parties signed the Kennedy Round agreement
just hours before the TEA expired on 30 June 1967.
On the one hand, the results were impressive. The GATT
members not only negotiated in certain difficult areas but
forged an agreement that promoted closer relations.
Specific successes included the chemical package, the IGA
aid program, and the Anti-Dumping Code as well as an
initial stab at NTBs
.
Most experts, the American and
European press, the Johnson administration, and GATT
officials lauded the Kennedy Round as the "highwater mark
of international trade cooperation", the "most successful
trade negotiations in history", and an "historic
73
compromise"
.
The Kennedy Round encompassed $40 billion in trade, more
than eight times that of the Dillon Round. The major
industrial nations cut tariffs on manufactures by an
average of 35% on $25.7 billion out of a total $37 billion
dutiable imports. Two-thirds of these reductions were by
50%. Lowered to an average of 9%, industrial tariffs were
rendered virtually meaningless. Tariff disparities were
also no longer an issue; only .8% of U.S. duties were above
30%, when once 7.5% were higher. And, the tariffs of both
the EEC and EFTA ended up half of the level existing before
they formed into blocs. Above all, no nation gained
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inordinately over another; the accord was balanced and
74
reciprocal
.
American industrial tariffs alone came down 64% when the
most significant GATT round in 1947 had resulted in a 54%
decrease and an overall cut by all participants of 20%.
Granting concessions on $6.4 billion worth of manufactured
imports, and $2 billion to the EEC, the U.S. received in
return reductions on $6.7 billion of its exports, and $2.7
billion from the Six. Only Japan got more concessions than
it gave to America. The largest cuts were in advanced
technology items; transportation equipment, machinery, and
chemical, all beneficial to America. '^^
On the other hand, parts of the agreement revealed
little progress toward trade liberalization. The record
for the LDCs was meager. They had initiated an "Action
Program" to stimulate exports by reducing or eliminating
quotas and tariffs which restricted access to the North.
Though the U.S. granted concessions amounting to $900
million, it resisted joining the emerging consensus for
tariff preferences, and its advocacy of the LTA hurt Asian
producers. Tropical products were also losers despite the
special authority in the TEA. Though GATT delegate John
Evans asserted that the LDCs profited from the agreement,
they thought it was a bust. Even Wyndham White singled out
7 6the gains for the poor nations as too modest.
489
STR Roth cited the small cuts in aluminum, steel, and
cotton textiles and the EEC's unwillingness to lower
barriers to a few high-tech goods, such as business
machines, as disappointments. Some of them were setbacks
for the United States. In the latter field, electronics
tariff cuts were minor, which both hurt U.S. exporters and
helped domestic producers in curbing imports from Japan,
However, excluding mineral fuels, U.S. exports would gain
$541 million while imports would rise $537 million, just a
$7 million surplus in the non-farm sector. Without the
repeal of the ASP, however, the export increase would drop
to $487 million, thus netting America a loss in trade from
77the Kennedy Round.
The equivalent depth of reductions and broad coverage of
the industrial sector did not occur in agriculture, which
was the biggest defeat for U.S. objectives. Though the
volume of trade subject to tariff reductions was four-to-
one in America's favor, the average duty cuts were 20%,
while industrial tariffs were reduced 35%. The CAP
prevented cuts on a host of U.S. exports, including grains
and poultry, and Washington won no access guarantees to
7 8
assure future levels of farm sales. The EEC blocked the
fair-trade doctrine in agriculture
.
This setback spurred a dangerous reaction against the
EEC and free-trade in general. Freeman and the USDA tried
to put the best face on the agreement, calling it a "modest
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success" in which U.S. aims had been realized "to some
extent". Yet the "lessons" of the Kennedy Round were
largely negative. Freeman learned that no longer could
America hope to lower European farm trade barriers by
invoking the benefits of free-trade.
Instead, he detected a divergence in philosophy
concerning commerce in the agricultural sector. Nations
such as the United States traded according to the law of
comparative advantage, while the EEC adhered to the law
only in certain cases, and the LDCs produced to exist.
These approaches created a "disturbing" conflict which
undergirded the problems at the Kennedy Round and boded ill
for future American export prospects.
U.S. farmers agreed. Major exporters within the farm
bloc, such as the Farm Bureau and big grain dealers,
opposed the IGA partly in principle against state-run
marketing agreements and partly because it curbed liberal
trade. Above all, they realized that their exports were
left completely "at the mercy" of EEC policy. Since the
Kennedy Round failed to obtain meaningful concessions on
CAP variable levy items, claimed the Farm Bureau, the
8 0
results were moderate, "at best".
Opinion on Capitol Hill concurred. Senator Frank
Carlson (R-KS) , the key farm-state member on the Finance
Committee, reserved judgment on the overall package but
criticized the IGA. On behalf of the House Republican Task
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Force on Agriculture, Congressman Odin Langen (R-Minn.)
called the Kennedy Round a "failure", blasted the
administration's negotiating behavior, and joined other
legislators in declaring that the American farmer had been
"sold out" in Geneva.
In the industrial sector, opinion ranged from disgust to
lukewarm views. Textilemen recorded their "deep
disappointment" that the LTA renewal did not include all
fibers, while chemical interests agreed with protectionist
O.R. Strackbein that the ASP package was a "time bomb
loosed against the American economy. "^^ Most exporters
were only mildly optimistic, expecting a boost in sales but
doubting the gains would be drastic. A number of
businessmen predicted little impact from the results,
either because NTBs placed more significant restrictions on
their products or because exports were of little importance
and concern relative to the domestic market. The Wall
Street Journal reported that the business community had
greeted the Kennedy Round with "fear, hope, confusion - andbit 83ig yawn"
.
Besides the expected denunciations from protectionists.
Congress unleashed a broad-scale attack against the
agreement and Johnson's trade policy. Of particular
concern was the proposed elimination of the ASP and its
effect on chemical and footwear imports. Though most
legislators promised at a congressional briefing by the
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administration to reserve judgment, many were disturbed by
the Kennedy Round results. Senators Pastore and Ribicoff
and Congressman Gerald R. Ford (R-MI)
, for instance,
questioned why America had granted concessions in
vulnerable import sectors such as textiles, chemicals, and
steel.
This sort of disgruntlement erupted soon afterwards in a
backlash against free-trade that, to a large extent,
determined U.S. trade policy over the next decades. By the
end of 1967, no fewer than 729 House bills and 19 in the
Senate proposed quotas on over 20 imported goods. At one
time, remembered White House aide DeVier Pierson, 97 of 100
Senators had endorsed one or more of these bills. Senator
Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) explained that the Kennedy Round had
been the equivalent of "unilateral disarmament" by the
United States. Until the administration grew tough at
negotiations, he announced. Congress would "insure that
trade is fair" by matching foreign NTBs with America's
85
own •
The last 18 months of the Johnson presidency witnessed a
full-scale effort by the administration not
,
ironically, to
consolidate the gains of the Kennedy Round but to defend
the agreement against protectionists. Free-traders such as
Senator Jacob Javits prepared to "do battle" against
protectionism, but the opposition was strong. For
instance. Chairman Long of the Senate Finance Committee
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joined forces with Congressman John Dent and other
restrictive traders in denouncing the Kennedy Round and
pushing for quotas.
The first major movement in this direction came in July
1967, when Long ordered a study of the steel industry's
import problem and then took the opportunity to denounce
EEC barriers to U.S. exports when he began hearings on
quotas in October. The STR office reported mounting
protectionist sentiment in both political parties'
leadership and in key committees on Capitol Hill. The push
for quotas became so pervasive that the EEC, Canada, Japan,
Britain, the Nordic nations, and most of the Latin American
8 7countries expressed concern.
The quotas proposed in 1967 and 1968 applied to many
items, but the major ones were for steel, oil, and
textiles. An Omnibus Quota Law, following the procedure of
the Meat Act of 1964, would also trigger quotas on any
imports that reached a certain level. Senator Ernest
Rollings (D-SC) introduced the textile quota, but Wilbur
Mills also proposed to "improve" the LTA by tying import
increases to U.S. consumption. Oil-state legislators
sought to freeze the 12.2% limit of the Kennedy-Kerr
agreement into law and steel interests suggested a quota.
Free-traders were alarmed. John Hight of the Committee for
a National Trade Policy proclaimed that the bills amounted
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to a "trade policy crisis greater than any in the last 30
8 8years"
.
The administration reacted with firmness out of a
defense of the Kennedy Round accomplishments and as free-
traders. Treasury Secretary Fowler told Long that engaging
in a "quota war" was a "fool's game", especially for a
nation that enjoyed a large but shrinking trade surplus.
Quotas only caused retaliation. Bator echoed this
response, writing the President that "an export-surplus
nation can't win a serious war of import restrictions - it
8 9has too much to lose.
Johnson agreed, and would not permit the drive for trade
liberalization, the gains of the Kennedy Round, and efforts
to improve the payments balance be destroyed by
protectionism. He feared an "economic cold war" in which
"everybody stagnates". Thus, not wishing to invite
"massive retaliation" from abroad, Johnson declared that
the quota bills would not "become law as long as I am
90President and can help it".
Yet this courage exacerbated a tricky legislative
problem for the President. He sent a two-year extension of
the TEA to Congress in 1968, including an elimination of
the ASP and liberalization of the adjustment assistance
provision. The latter had been an "abysmal failure"; to
date, not one of the several petitioners had qualified for
relief because the criteria were too rigid. A revision
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would not pose a problem on Capitol Hill, but the ASP issue
would. The situation in Congress was "very rough',
reported aides, and even "dismal" because of complete lack
of Democratic leadership for free-trade in the Senate. The
Kennedy Round and the sinking trade surplus had taken its
toll on enthusiasm for trade liberalization. Vietnam and
inflation had instilled similar frowning on any other major
endeavor by the Johnson administration in 1968.^"'"
Thus, the TEA did not enjoy the upbeat atmosphere like
its predecessor in 1962. At hearings before the House Ways
and Means Committee, it became apparent that the ASP posed
as an insurmountable obstacle. The threat of protectionist
riders attached to the bill prompted Mills to delay
reporting it out until it was "clean". But by July, many
members of his committee opposed another free-trade
initiative, as they watched the trade surplus plummet to
$611 million, the lowest level since 1955.
Aide DeVier Pierson reported a "Mexican stand-off" in
the House; both the trade bill and quotas were stalled. In
the end, the White House opted for the TEA'S death (and the
retention of the ASP) in the committee for defeat of the
quotas, including the "big boys" of textiles, steel, and
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oil. A brand of inter-branch accommodation which
essentially nullified a new policy, the deal drew the
curtain on the trade initiatives of the 1960s. The Kennedy
Round, the "high-water mark" of free-trade, had unwittingly
opened the door to protectionism and initiated a less
liberal phase in America's trade history.
The political fall-out after the Kennedy Round signified
its success in liberalizing trade, but it also pointed to
America's inability to cope with competition from abroad.
Once the country directed the trade regime, but by the late
1960s America had turned inward and vacated the leadership
role to the EEC. Europeans increasingly feared that the
U.S. might withdraw "into its shell" and loosen its
economic and military commitments in the alliance and
around the globe. The EEC, by 1968, stepped up efforts to
prevent such an occurrence by campaigning against U.S.
93protectionism. The administration was at a loss to
reassert American command over the international trade
regime
.
More than any other sign, the balance-of-payments
deficit indicated this impotency. The problem reached
crisis proportions in 1968; the collapse of the British
pound, the large outflow of dollars for Vietnam, and the
ensuing run on gold spelled disaster. Remedies included
imposing mandatory controls on capital outflows,
consideration of a tourist tax, and import surcharges, and
negotiations for allied offset payments to help fund
American troops abroad.
Johnson also concentrated on boosting exports, but to no
avail. Much to his frustration, Americans still neglected
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overseas markets - exports averaged only 4% of the GNP fr
1963 to 1968. The Commerce Department complained about
"export-lazy" beer, machinery, clothing, lumber, and even
auto industries; the U.S. trade performance remained "far
from reassuring". The push for quotas and the still-born
TEA of 1968 only aggravated the problem. Worsened by the
declining trade surplus, domestic inflation, and the
crumbling monetary system, the persistent deficit
eventually led to more drastic, and restrictive, measures
by the Nixon administration in 1971.^"^
The Kennedy Round was partly responsible for the nagging
deficit and the American abdication of leadership over the
trade regime. Especially after the EEC crisis of 1965, and
even before, the talks had lost their luster and grandeur.
No longer thought of as part of a grand design for the
Atlantic community and global commercial order, the GATT
conference became a zero-sum game, in which one side gained
at the other's expense. This attitude carried over into
the post-Kennedy Round period, particularly in the United
States.
The Kennedy Round was a success in terms of freer world
trade and global relations. Large tariff cuts in
manufactures, the grains agreement, and a serious look at
NTBs were only some of its achievements. The talks
permitted closer bonds between the EFTA and the Common
Market and enhanced Japan's status as a major industrial
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trade partner. Considering the disturbances in the
alliance caused by Charles de Gaulle, moreover, the Geneva
accord "provided a sort of comforting continuity and
momentum toward agreement in at least one area" of Atlantic
relations, wrote congressional advisor Curtis and his
95
aide. "No monument to partnership", contended William
Diebold in 1972, the Kennedy Round nevertheless was a
"landmark" in U.S. -EEC relations.
Most observers also believed that the negotiations were
a triumph for the European integration movement. Gaullism
failed to obstruct the EEC's participation in the talks or
dismember the Common Market. Instead, the Six worked as a
"unit" and thereby strengthened the concept of regional
consolidation. Washington even asserted that this "growing
maturity" tightened the bonds of the Atlantic community for
9 7the benefit of all traders. Without a doubt, however,
the EEC's solidarity made it a tougher bargainer and more
resistant to U.S. trade aims,
EEC policy prevented the White House from making good on
the promises made in 19 62 of bringing benefits for the U.S.
economy through trade negotiations . The rout suffered by
American agriculture at the hands of the EEC, Gaullism, and
concessions in the industrial sector made Kennedy's
prediction of domestic economic prosperity, reduced
unemployment, and an intimate Atlantic partnership seem
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overblown by the end of the decade. European bargaining in
Geneva blocked the TEA' s effectiveness.
Most significant, the rise of U.S. imports at a rate
much higher than exports may be blamed to a large extent on
American concessions in Geneva. The Kennedy Round might
have been good for the trade regime, but it was "too much
of a good thing" in the eyes of many American producers.
In part, it caused the country's first trade deficit in the
postwar years in 1971.^^ Indeed, the talks were not so good
for the U.S. trade balance.
In short, an assessment of the Kennedy Round results and
subsequent reaction in the U.S. gives more credence to the
comparative-advantage than the hegemony school argument.
The latter school's viewpoint was validated in specific
sectors. For instance, Washington forced and won a
revision of the restrictive LTA, gained in the critical
chemical sector (especially by not repealing the ASP) , and
looked forward to continued growth of many capital-
intensive exports. America's sheer size and share of the
world trade volume enabled it to determine much of the
final outcome in its favor.
Without a doubt, moreover, the country grew more selfish
after the talks. The quota bills, defeat of the TEA, and
reversal of organized labor from its erstwhile support for
9 9
free-trade to protectionism demonstrated this behavior.
In addition to retaining a trade edge in key industrial and
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farm sectors, the United States also held a positive
overall world trade balance and an edge with the EEC,
though both surpluses were dwindling. A flagging giant,
America was still a dominant force in the trade regime and
acted as a hegemon, argues the hegemony school.
Yet the facts of the Kennedy Round do not fully bear out
the hegemony view. First, the final product fell short of
the goals set by the TEA. America's supposed hegemonic
interests would be served by 50% tariff reductions in the
industrial sector, a diversion from the U.S. to Europe of
the tropical commodities of Latin America, and assured and
growing access into European agricultural markets. Though
many duties on manufactured goods were set at or came close
to the 50% aim, America achieved none of these objectives
at the Kennedy Round.
Second, Washington's efforts in the name of free-trade
had unintended, often the opposite, effect of the initial
objectives in 1962. The U.S. lowered its own import
barriers and touched off a protectionist backlash. And, in
its pursuit of trade liberalization for the sake of
national security, postwar tradition, or even a much-needed
victory to offset the Vietnam, monetary, and domestic
political and economic quagmires, the administration forged
an agreement which hurt U.S. trade interests. The trade
surplus plunged into a deficit by 1971 for the first time
in the twentieth century.
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Third, the Common Market prevented America from acting
as a hegemon. The EEC wielded much, and perhaps more,
leverage than its counterpart across the Atlantic, As T,K,
Warley points out, the American assumption that Europe's
interest of reducing tariffs on manufactured goods gave the
U.S. equal leverage to bargain down EEC agricultural
barriers was wrong. Washington was "defeated on grounds of
its own choosing" in the farm sector by European
resistance. In the end, the U.S. was unwilling to halt the
Kennedy Round, but its primary objectives of equalizing
industrial with agricultural concessions had failed. ''"'^^
For these reasons, but mainly the latter, the
comparative-advantage school's counter-argument that the
U.S. did not and could not behave as a hegemon seems
plausible. For the first time since before the war, Europe
came to the bargaining table equal in stature and nearly
equal in trading strength to the United States. The United
States had to reckon with a fully-blossomed "New Europe",
and, in the final tally, the EEC won its aim of lowering
industrial tariffs while maintaining agricultural barriers.
To an extent, Europe redefined the fair-trade doctrine to
suit its interests. Clearly, as U.S. officials and
producers gradually came to realize, America could "no
101
longer call the tune" at trade negotiations. Atlantic
community plurality was established fact.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
John F. Kennedy hoped that free-trade would reinvigorate
the domestic economy, balance international payments, and
unify the West. Indeed, trade increased in dimensions not
recorded since the Cobdenite era one hundred years before.
America's push for liberal trade was responsible for this
growth and a stronger alliance. Yet the days of U.S.
leadership, and certainly predominance, over the global
trade regime were numbered. When Kennedy was in the White
House, "American liberal capitalism still seemed capable of
mastering any challenge
. . . The falling trade
surplus, an ailing economy at home, financial crises, the
Vietnam War, and internecine conflicts among the allies
destroyed this confidence by 1968.
Indeed, Congress turned hostile to the Kennedy-Johnson
trade program. In 1973, at hearings on the successor to
the Trade Expansion Act, Senate Finance Chairman Russell
Long declared that the "history" of the TEA had been
unfavorable. America had counted on trade partners and its
own negotiators to strike an equitable bargain for all
participants through GATT . The end result, though, was the
first U.S. trade deficit since 18 94, a huge payments
deficit, and a more protectionist EEC.
Not only was "the bloom off the rose of the 'Atlantic
partnership'". Long said, but the U.S. objected to being
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the "least favored nation in a world full of
discrimination". He pledged that "the next decade of our
trading relations will be different from the last" after
Congress passed tougher, more restrictive legislation.^
The very name of the bill, the Trade Reform Act, indicated
the swing U.S. opinion had taken from a decade earlier when
the country accepted trade expansion.
Kennedy's dream of promoting prosperity and allied unity
by an Atlantic partnership seemed fanciful only six years
after he had announced his Grand Design. Despite Johnson's
vigorous defense of liberal trade, no longer did Washington
appear as the generous leader of the alliance. Tired of
giving allies a "free ride"
,
Congress considered
withdrawing troops from Europe and passing retaliatory
trade legislation to counter EEC restrictions and balance
the payments account. Observers at home and abroad feared
that America stood on the brink of isolationism after a
3thirty year hiatus. The momentum toward trade
liberalization had halted, closing a chapter in American
postwar trade history.
In order to determine the factors which caused this
transformation and the role of U.S. power in the global
arena, this study examined the trade policy at four levels-
of-analysis : international, governmental, societal, and
individual. The examination concentrated on two inter-
related objectives: understanding the trade policy
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decision-making process and analyzing the effects of U.S.
policy on the international trade regime. Though some
questions remain partially or fully unanswered, enough
evidence exists to draw conclusions.
Four models provided the test cases for the decision-
making structure. Bureaucratic politics was not sufficient
to explain policy evolution and implementation. One reason
was that Executive branch agencies were not loci of
decision-making during the passage of trade bills. Though
internal discussion occurred over the scope, content, and
timing of the Trade Expansion Act, the bureaucracy did not
play nearly as important a role in the policy process as
the President and Congress. Interdepartmental turf wars
were not a decisive factor in formulating trade policy.
Compromises for settling bureaucratic fights were not
needed because administration members essentially held the
same views on trade. The model applied more to the Kennedy
Round, especially when the Department of Agriculture
lobbied for a tougher stance against the EEC but was beaten
back by everyone else . Even in this case, there was
conflict only over tactics; the STR and State Department
agreed with Freeman about CAP restrictions, though they
were not as vociferous in their complaints. With only
minor deviation, the entire bureaucracy advocated trade
liberalization and an equitable settlement at the GATT
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talks. This unified view stemmed from presidential
influence
.
Analysis at the individual level revealed the
irrelevance of the bureaucratic politics model and the
applicability of interest intermediation. Simply put, the
president, congress, and to a lesser extent interest groups
decided trade policy. Since 1934, the White House has
consistently advocated liberal trade. Kennedy's
internationalist bent and pre-war observations of the
effect of protectionism on the world economy confirmed his
free-trade views. His successor became an adherent by
suffering under high tariffs imposed by the industrial
East. Johnson's populist strain meshed easily with
Kennedy's internationalism, particularly since both were
New Deal Democrats and supporters of the Reciprocal Trade
Act
.
Cold war exigencies sustained both presidents' support
after 1945. The need to strengthen Europe and Japan and
build a prosperous alliance capable of stabilizing the West
through freely exchanged goods and services, attracting
LDCs, and fending off Soviet aggression were the paramount
concerns of both presidents. The rest of their
administrations, and much of Congress, agreed that security
undergirded the need for liberal trade. Thus, there was no
contention over the basic lines of policy advocated for the
trade regime by the United States.
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At first glance, a conflict between this free-trade
ideology and practical politics seemed natural and
unavoidable for the two presidents. To be sure, Kennedy
expended much political capital on his trade program. Yet
the fair-trade doctrine rationalized a deviation from
liberalism, dealt effectively with protectionists, and at
the same time promoted lower tariffs. Neither president
was a doctrinaire free-trader in the State Department mold.
Both were sawy politicians who knew how and when to
accommodate powerful private interests and their
reresentatives on Capitol Hill. Free-trade ideology guided
the presidents; fair-trade political strategy fulfilled
their objectives
.
This critical political element puts in doubt the model
of corporatism. This synthesis describes how efficient
exporters exploited their partnership with government by
minimizing interest group conflict and channeling benefits
their way. No doubt Kennedy advocated the TEA with these
interests in mind. He expected them to take advantage of
trade opportunities in the EEC, expand exports while
limiting investments, and thereby add to the trade surplus.
The Kennedy Round reaped advantages for these capital-
intensive producers, though less than initially hoped for
in the agricultural sector
.
Decision-making did not function along corporatist
lines. For instance, the Committee for a National Trade
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Policy, the free-trade lobby of Big Business, only provided
information and promotional assistance for the TEA
campaign. The administration did not bring the CNTP into
the White House for policy discussions, though many Kennedy
and Johnson officials were former members. Also, Kennedy
was often at odds with these free-traders, particularly
when he placated protectionists with special programs and
import restrictions. The private sector was a large
factor, but was outside the actual policy process.
Nor did the evidence show that a private-public
partnership of class alliances or combinations with similar
ideological or economic aims existed in the trade regime.
Such an arrangement might be found in the investment,
financial, or aid spheres, all of which were subject to
control by elite segments of the government and the private
sector, such as bankers , insurance companies , or
multinational firms. The OECD fostered global cooperation
and attempted, as Charles Maier notes, to "de-ideologize"
the marketplace and ensure that economic efficiency
prevailed over divisive political squabbling.^ But not in
trade. On the contrary, competition among national
economic groups occurred at the Kennedy Round, and brought
politics into the negotiations. Gaullist efforts to
promote French agriculture and the interests of the Common
Market over American objectives, in addition to disrupting
the talks for nearly a year, were the most dramatic
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examples of political issues entering discussions over
trade. Many rising exporters were stymied by domestic
interests on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, De
Gaulle and the EEC Commission prevented efficiently-
produced U.S. food goods from free entry into European
markets and thus denied American Big Agriculture its major
objective. Congress refused to repeal the ASP, to the
detriment of foreign chemical concerns
.
Sector agreements in industry would seem prime
candidates for the corporatist model. Yet in textiles,
America forced a deal not only on the LDCs but on the
Europeans, while steel and chemicals were subject to
private and political pressure back home and limited in
many cases by protectionism. Trade did not appear to be
peacefully carried out by international firms, as
corporatists assume, but constrained by domestic interest
groups and the diplomatic aims of foreign heads-of-state
.
Skepticism also arose over the corporatist argument
because a consensual relationship among private interests
was hard to find in many cases. The American economy was
so diverse that a unified outlook was frequently non-
existent even in the export sector. The growing trade
surplus, large industrial plant and farm resources, and
efficient productive capabililities indicated that the U.S.
should be a country eager to sell abroad. Debate over the
TEA showed otherwise.
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In essence, the U.S. remained anineffective trader,
sending overseas only 4% of its GNP throughout the 1960s
and buying about the same amount. American business
interests were indifferent or opposed to foreign trade.
Even many farmers, who were the best exporters, inclined
toward protectionism or selling in the domestic market.
Ostensible corporatist industries such as electronics and
chemicals were dominated by import-competing, protectionist
elements. Big Labor's advocacy of free-trade depended
largely on adjustment assistance; when this aid proved
ineffective, the AFL-CIO switched to the protectionist
camp. Such apathy, opposition, and diversity undercut the
corporatist argument.
These various attitudes and the influence of
protectionist import-competitors gave credence to pluralist
models of decision-making. Based on the notion that the
American economy was rife with competition and conflict,
pluralism points to a triangular relationship of interest
groups. Congress, and the White House in trade policy
decision-making. Politics plays a prominent role and
indeed, was the determining factor in the 1960s.
Though the RTA gave the president greater autonomy in
trade, he still had to win authority from Congress through
legislation. Congress never surrendered control over
policy during the postwar years. On the whole, legislators
did not restrict the president, but established procedural
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safeguards to protect vulnerable interests from import
injury. The White House acquiesced by the fair-trade
5
approach. The Kennedy tactics on textiles, lumber, oil,
carpets and glass - and in export sectors such as chickens
and chemicals - reflected this process. Thus, domestic
politics, more than economic factors, determined decisions
on many sectors in foreign trade.
The TEA campaign revealed that the inter-branch rather
than the bureaucratic and regulatory politics model applied
to the decision-making framework. The latter paradigm made
Congress too malleable in the hands of private interests;
if logrolling was prevalent, how did such a free-trade bill
ever pass Congress? The presidential-congressional
accommodation exposed how the White House wielded the fair-
trade doctrine to preserve its liberal trade policy, while
legislators cast votes for the TEA after protecting, or
getting credit for protecting, their constituents.
Thus, Executive-Legislative branch bartering prevailed.
Textile legislators won the seven-point program, refused to
bow to pressure from voters for quotas, and many supported
the TEA. The six-point lumber plan was enough for
Northwestern politicians, and they did not press overly
hard for import limits from Canada. The oil deal satisfied
interest groups, yet only came to fruition when Kennedy
bargained with Senator Kerr. And, even ardent
protectionists voted for the TEA after Kennedy raised
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tariffs on carpets and glass. The President horse-traded
protection for TEA votes, and Congress obliged.
The validity of the inter-branch model was further borne
out on the liberal trade side. Kennedy accommodated
chicken-state legislators when they threatened to vote
against the TEA. He wrote Chancellor Adenauer of his
concern and later started in motion the policy that
eventually led to the Chicken War. Until he realized that
Common Market obstinancy made pleas against European
protectionism hopeless, Johnson also plugged away for a
liberalization of the CAP at the Kennedy Round. But above
all, presidential appeals for free-trade as a weapon in the
cold war attracted support from Congress.
In effect, Congress listened to Kennedy's constant
reminder that the TEA served national security, and
continued to support liberal trade for this reason even
after the Kennedy Round disappointments. At the heart of
the trade program were worries about affording U.S.
military and aid commitments. A trade surplus would help
provide funds to maintain these expenditures, especially as
the country fought a seemingly losing battle against its
international payments deficit. Free-trade would also
prevent the alliance from disintegrating into hostile trade
blocs, susceptible to Soviet influence, while a prosperous
capitalist system would lure poor nations to the Western
side. Kennedy's Grand Design promoted profits for
Corporate America, but not merely to enhance the economic
status of efficient producers, as corporatists ultimately
imply. Anti-communism lay at the basis of export expansion
and liberal trade.
The administration realized that placing its free-trade
drive in the context of the U.S.
-Soviet conflict would be
effective since cold warriors existed in great numbers on
Capitol Hill. An inter-branch accommodation was ready-
made. Naturally, many legislators cast votes for the TEA
because it was part of a long line of traditional U.S.
trade policy, combatted potential depressions, and helped
export interests. But remarks by the free-trade bloc
during 1962 showed that economic gains were not an end in
themselves but an integral building block for Western
defenses against communism. The appeal of the Grand Design
made the presidential relationship with Congress much
smoother
.
Still , these leaders were elected officials, concerned
about satisfying constituents. Thus, legislators looked to
the President for help in protecting certain producers.
Similarly, the President, hoping to pass the TEA, viewed
Congress as the most important factor. Less certain was
the extent to which presidential elections concerned
Kennedy and Johnson, although conjectural evidence pointed
to a natural concern for the effects of trade policy in
overcoming political weaknesses in selected regions. In
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any event, inter-branch bargaining demonstrated a pluralist
arrangement in U.S. trade policy.
Domestic political deals permitted liberal trade
agreements. Despite some protectionist deviations for
vote-getting purposes, the U.S. preserved the openness of
the trade regime. Fair-trade was responsible for this
liberalism, as the structure of GATT permitted trade
expansion as long as national commercial interests were not
demonstrably injured. Although the regime underwent
considerable strain after the Kennedy Round, the
contracting parties did not form into restrictive blocs.
The persistence of freer trade and gradual, reciprocal, and
equitable tariff cuts based on the non-discriminatory most-
favored-nation rule was a triumph for American trade
polxcy
.
That the U.S. succeeded was remarkable, considering the
turn inward prompted by its declining trade standing.
Regardless of its military superiority during the 1960s,
the United States had fallen from the zenith of power. The
country was no weakling, unable to meet competition from
Europe and Japan. America still bought and sold in more
volume than any nation, and its GNP was only slightly less
7
than all others' output combined by 1971. In addition,
America held much leverage over the trade order. The
country was not as reliant on exports and imports as its
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trade partners, and held the lure of its large market over
their heads.
Indeed, scholars debate whether U.S. "hegemony" dwindled
in terms of capabilities. Historian Paul Kennedy claims
that the decline in America's relative wealth, output, and
trade was inevitable from the 1960s on, as Europe and Japan
recovered from the war. But the U.S. was not producing
less, others just made more. America in the trade regime,
however, was not the hegemon defined by Immanuel
Wallerstein as being when "one power can largely impose its
rules and its wishes ... in the economic, political,
milxtary, diplomatic, and even cultural sense". America
did not follow this course at the Kennedy Round, quite
simply because it lacked the capability.
Without a doubt, the period 1960 to recent times
suggests a drop in American fortunes. The ratio of U.S.
national income to the total of all market economies'
incomes fell from 1960 to 1970, as did its share of world
production of petroleum, steel and iron ore, and wheat.
From 1960 to 1980, America's production as a percentage of
the global GNP plummeted from 34% to 22%, while the EEC's
rose from 18% to 22% and Japan's from 3% to 10%. As
Stephen Krasner writes, the U.S. was not a second-rate
country but "became more like a normal nation-state. No
longer does American power dominate in virtually every
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issue-area. No longer can the U.S. simply impose its will
Q
on others .
"
The same held true in trade. America's merchandise
trade of $6.8 billion in 1964 had turned into a deficit of
-$2.2 billion in 1971 and -$6.4 billion the next year. The
few surpluses in succeeding years were aberrations; after
1976, the trade deficit was never higher than -$31 billion
afterward and plummeted to -$125 billion or more during the
latter half of the 1980s. The balance-of
-payments
predictably followed suit. In 1962 it had been -$3.6
billion. Ten years later it declined to -$11.2 billion and
then took off into the huge debts of the 1980s, even as
military spending fell. Higher oil prices had much to do
with the deficit. But the structure of trade, established
partly by the concessions granted at the Kennedy Round and
the rising strength of Europe and Japan, was largely
responsible
.
The Common Market and Japan outpaced U.S. trade. EEC
and Japanese exports of manufactured goods grew faster than
American sales between 1967 and 1980. In addition, the
Six's share of world exports fell during the same period to
28% (but only 34% counting the enlarged nine-member
Community). Japan's portion rose to 7.1%. The U.S. share
was 12.1%, a drop-off from the 19.3% of 1967. Also, while
America's trade and payments deficit grew to tremendous
proportions, the enlarged EEC enjoyed surpluses on both
accounts until 1984, when it went into the red. Japan
recorded deficits in trade but booming surpluses with the
United States, especially in the 1980s.
Bilateral trade hurt the American merchandise trade
account. America ran a growing deficit with Japan from
1965 onward, rising from -$1 billion to -$5.3 billion in
1976 and -$54.4 billon by 1986. The U.S. surplus with the
EEC fell to $28 million by 1972 but rose to large surpluses
throughout the 1970s. Yet, the edge was not large enough
to overcome the overall trade debit with Japan, other Asian
and African nations, Canada, and West Germany. And, by
1983, America suffered a deficit of -$1.3 billion with the
Common Market which grew to -$17.4 billion two years
later
.
These figures reflect on American power beyond the
1960s. On the surface, the trade surplus with the Common
Market demonstrated that Washington did not suffer from the
Kennedy Round. But this conclusion ignores the fact that
America's overall trade balance was in deficit throughout
most of the post-Kennedy Round years. It also neglects the
overall payments deficit which all postwar presidents
failed to reverse.
This problem had reached serious proportions by the end
of the Eisenhower presidency, and though Kennedy and
Johnson managed to reduce the deficit periodically, their
successors could not prevent it from growing out of
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control. Domestic inflation, oil prices, and international
monetary breakdowns were partly responsible
• But a main
reason for the deficit was that America still funded a
large bulk of military and economic assistance, while the
allies financed much less. This situation cut into the
U.S. trade surplus with Europe and only worsened the
account with Japan. America paid dearly for its leadership
over the Western alliance, which benefited its trade
competitors
.
Therefore, Kennedy and Johnson demanded trade
liberalization in order to expand U.S. exports, which in
turn would help pay for allied defenses and development
programs in the less-developed countries. Their
administrations pressed diligently for fair-trade based on
comparative advantage, especially with the EEC. Europe,
however, was building the Common Market, protecting this
new organization by tariffs and the CAP. European
integration conflicted with the American for freer trade,
and Washington was largely the loser.
Trade in agriculture indicated this pattern. U.S.
exports of grain, poultry, and other variable levy items
dropped by 47% after 1965 when the CAP was fully
implemented. Non-levy commodities such as oilseeds and
fruits and vegetables rose, but only due to increased
consumption within the Six. In short, American farmers
were unable to retain their historical share of the EEC
market as their portion fell from 13.5% to 10.7* by the
last half of the 1960s alone. ^^^^^^ essentially snubbed
American pleas for liberal trade in agriculture.
Not only did the Common Market decline in importance for
American sales, but Europeans also began to compete with
the U.S. in food trade. The world's largest poultry
importer in 1962, the EEC became the largest exporter by
1982. It also gained ground on U.S. grains sales. Not
surprisingly, America's agricultural surplus with the
Common Market gradually sank throughout the 1970s and
1
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1980s. The EEC success story in building its farm system
had deleterious effects on U.S. trade.
Europe's ability to confront American trade aims
successfully showed at the very least that Kennedy and
Johnson overplayed their trade cards. Both promised
benefits from mutual tariff cuts with the EEC, especially
in sectors in which U.S. efficiency was prevalent, like
agriculture. Yet they misjudged, and were politically
naive to boot. They took into consideration neither the
domestic restraints on European officials, the
effectiveness of Gaullist obstructionism, nor the fact that
the EEC would logically resist dismantling the CAP while it
15
was still under construction. For starters, Washington
led U.S. farmers down a path of inevitable disappointment.
In effect, the Grand Design, though plausible and
unselfish, was unrealistic for Europe at the time. De
Gaulle was the extreme manifestation of Common Market
resistance to U.S. policy. But the EEC Commission
naturally placed the building of the Community's
infrastructure before the forging of an Atlantic
partnership. Europeans also worried about the effects of
the dominant supplier provision, which might dilute the EEC
and bring in an overwhelming flood of American goods.
Agreeing with the diplomatic intention of the Grand Design,
they chafed uncomfortably at its threat to their
integration process
.
The Common Market also had legitimate reasons for its
restrictive policy, especially in agriculture in which
employment was much higher than in America. In other
words, Washington was not an innocent victim of European
ruthlessness, suffering at the hands of EEC protectionism
and Gaullist political antics. Most of the Six were as
globally- and liberal-minded as America. Furthermore, the
U^S. pursued its interests as doggedly as the Europeans,
1
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seeking an edge in the industrial and farm sectors.
The Kennedy Round boiled down to a test of wills among
the Atlantic powers. The talks became a "contest between
European and Atlantic ideas", wrote Harold van B.
Cleveland, and not surprisingly, the EEC stressed the
17 . •former. In the final analysis, trade liberalization
"revealed an unexpected depth of trans-Atlantic economic
1
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tension", argued David Calleo. Waning U.S. leadership
failed to enhance alliance solidarity in the 1960s. The
Grand Design disappeared, unrealized.
This very failure, however, signified that America was
not a hegemon in the international trade regime, and thus
validated the comparative-advantage school's argument that
U.S. leadership brought gains for all traders. In Geneva,
the EEC largely won the big battle over agricultural
barriers, while all linear nations stood to gain in the
industrial sphere. As an example of hegemonial muscle-
flexing, wrote Andrew Shonfield, the Kennedy Round "was a
curiously unsatisfying one for [America, ] the hegemonial
power." In the longer-run, the U.S. trade and global
economic position grew weaker while other nations and the
1
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trade regime enjoyed rising prosperity.
Scholars have described the U . S . -European relationship
in the immediate postwar period as one of "consensual
American hegemony", in which Europe accepted Washington's
leadership as a necessity for economic recovery and
national security but did not lose its identity or overall
policy objectives . Michael Hogan, for instance, described
the "considerable degree of autonomy" enjoyed by Europe
20
under the American-led Marshall Plan. A decade after
this aid program ended, Europe had converted this autonomy
into sheer power under the aegis of the Common Market.
Since the formation of the EEC, the Western trade order
had become more pluralistic and power more equitably
distributed, in large part due to American policy.
Washington responded to the EEC by attempting, according to
Joseph Kraft, to plug "into the dynamism of Western Europe
and the Common Market: the Old World called in to redress
the balance of the New".^^ The open and flourishing trade
regime attested to the success of this approach. Yet by
the late 1960s, U.S. officials questioned whether their
support for the Common Market monolith had been in
America's best interests. Former White House aide Francis
Bator wondered if the alliance could "avoid the risk of an
economic cold war between a growing EEC and ourselves"
.
Europe's impressive capabilities in the trade regime
fulfilled an important U.S. postwar objective. Ironically,
the EEC emerged as a fierce competitor. Thus, justifiably
content that its leadership had made European recovery
complete, America nonetheless eyed the future with
apprehension by the late 1960s. The country continued to
trade, but could not forestall its fading economic fortunes
that President Kennedy had warned about in 1962. At the
time, he did not realize that the American retreat had
already begun.
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